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NOTE

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Soldier and the State

In international and domestic politics, military is the most visible instrument of State power and its last resort. The power of the State is a mix of strategic, military, economic and political strengths and weaknesses. It is determined, according to Ray S Cline, not only by the military forces and the military establishment of a country but even more by the size and location of territory, the nature of frontiers, the population, the raw material resources, the economic structure, the technological development, the financial strength, the ethnic mix, the social cohesiveness, the stability of political process and decision-making and finally, the intangible quantity usually described as national spirit*.

The employment of state power as an instrument of internal or external strategy, therefore, is not limited to the visible spectrum, but also spans a vast area which is outside the soldier's domain. Hence, national security interests of the state, like territorial integrity, economic security, favourable regional and global environment, and promotion of core values, can be preserved only if the state employs its different instruments of power, in a graduated and flexible response, to challenges, and does not rely on the soldier, too often. The vast array of police and para-military organisations, still proliferating, must be trained and equipped and clearly told to shoulder their responsibility; otherwise their maintenance by the State would be a total waste. Armed Forces are structured to face external threat and their use in internal security tasks, though justified by law, is bound to reduce their capability for the main role.

This calls for immediate introspection. It is also necessary, for the security management of the State, to involve all concerned with the decision making process, including the military leadership which is, today, highly professional and patriotic. This would provide the interaction between the soldier and the politician.

For this, the reactivation of the National Security Council formed in 1990 - with some changes in its organisation - would provide the interface between the soldier and the rest of the security apparatus of the state. In this issue of the Journal, Lt Gen AM Vohra, a former Vice Chief of the Army Staff, and an internationally well-known security analyst, brings his deep knowledge of the higher defence management and keen insight into its short falls. Several other articles in this issue also call for a restructuring of our system for management of national security. Can we do this before it is too late?

* Ray S. Cline, *World Power Assessment 1977*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977) pp. 33-34.

Security of the North-East

LT GENERAL R V KULKARNI, UYSM, AVSM*

INTRODUCTION

It is indeed a matter of great privilege for me to address this august gathering on a subject which has been a matter of great concern to us for a long time. When I was asked by General Sinha if I would venture to talk on any aspects of the North East, initially I hesitated.

My hesitation was on three counts, one, that parts of the North East have been in the focus for a considerable period - since mid fifties - and by now, lot has been said and analysed by scholars as well as critics, by now most of the observers have formed firm views, two - personally, I feel that it is difficult to communicate on issues which can only be felt or experienced. North-East is one such issue. Lastly, the issues involved are complex and highly sensitive, some of them cannot be debated in an open forum.

My talk today aims at presenting the NE, as I have experienced and understood, as an observer, as also, a soldier in different colours of uniform, that is Army and Assam Rifles. My involvement in the NE has been restricted to only four tenures of postings, one each in Assam, Arunachal Pradesh (erstwhile NEFA), Nagaland and last one, dealing with all the States, from Sikkim to Arunachal Pradesh. Each tenure gave me a feel of the area in a decadic time frame i.e. sixties, seventies, eighties and the nineties, in an ever expanding horizon and elevation in perception levels.

By no stretch of imagination, you should attribute authority in my exposition. I tried all along to study, understand and appreciate the region, its people, their culture, ethos, attitudes and value systems and thereby their problems and a possible approach to resolve them.

I propose to present all the issues in a broad perspective - these are many and complex.

* The author is a former Director General of Assam Rifles and at present Adjutant General, Army Headquarters, New Delhi. The article is a text of the talk delivered by him to the members of the USI on June 11, 1992.

SCOPE

I would be dealing with the subject under the following parts :-

- (a) Geopolitical and socio-economic appraisal of the NE states.
- (b) The Problem.
- (c) An Approach

GEO-POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC APPRAISAL OF THE NORTH EASTERN STATES

Looking at the map of India, an average Indian from the heartland tends to view the North East (NE) as a composite regional entity. Consequently, the perceptions relating to the NE get viewed from the same plane and bias. Few scholars have indeed analysed individual issues from a rational approach. As regards politicians and bureaucrats (both civilian and military), it is generally a region best avoided; if contact is compelled, it is marginal or minimal. To date, a posting to NE in civil department is viewed by the systems as a means to ease out an errant official; for the individual, it is an indication of being out of favour, in fact a punishment.

At the outset, it needs to be appreciated that the North East is not a homogenous region with common political problems or social systems and customs. Even physiographically, the region consists of mountains and hills, plateau, valleys and plains. Not many are perhaps aware that Shillong, the Scotland of the East as is known, is not a Himalayan Hill Station, but is located on a plateau separating the Himalayas from the wide plains of the Brahmaputra valley. Connected to the rest of the country through a narrow strip of 50 km in North Bengal, NE States share borders with Tibet (China), Myanmar, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Historical developments in this region warrant a close scrutiny to understand the present situation. Assam was linked to the rest of India, prior to the commencement of the Christian era; had an immense impact of the Bhakti cult of the saint reformer Sankardev in the 15th-16th century; was administered as a British-Indian province since its occupation by the British in 1826; and its people actively participated in the freedom struggle. Guwahati was the venue of a general session of the Congress Party in 1926. Consequently, political leaders from Assam, the bastion of the Indian nationalism in the NE, counted in the national politics.

The present Meghalaya came under British rule by a process of take over of Jaintia Hills in 1832 and Garo Hills sometime in mid 1850s (1822-1869). The extension of authority over the present Arunachal Pradesh was rather slow (commencing from the 30s of last century) and marginal. It was treated as an Excluded Area thinly administered. Political control over the Naga tribes was established only by 1874; however, there was no assertion of actual sovereignty over the areas inhabited by them. Kohima was occupied in 1878. The Mizo Hills came under British control after a series of punitive expeditions, in 1889.

The British concept of annexation of territories in the NE did not envisage extension of administration, due to these being inaccessible and of little consequence, economically and strategically. Aim was perhaps to provide protection to the plains people. These areas saw no interference/disturbance in their social practices, customary laws and even system of ownership of land. The cordiality of relations was further ensured by promulgating Inner Line Regulations framed in 1872-73 and still operative in Arunachal, Nagaland and Mizoram. Since Meghalaya was part of Assam with capital at Shillong, it was treated differently. Manipur and Tripura, the two princely states were merged in 1948-1949.

DIVERSITY

The region's population totalling approximately 26 million has extraordinary diversity - ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural. There are over 200 main tribes/subtribes (Kukis alone have 37 subtribes). The people belong to, at least six different ethnic groups. The diversity in religious persuasion extends from Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity in main - to animism and certain traditional religious beliefs and practices.

The multiplicity of languages and dialects is indeed amazing; they number over 420, out of a total of 1652 or so, in the whole country. Even in the small state of Meghalaya, of the two main tribal communities, while Khasis belong to the Austric ethnic group with language of Mon-Khmer Branch of the Austric Asiatic family, the Garos and their language belong to the Tibeto-Burmese family. There is no comparable diversity to be found in any part of the country.

It, therefore, emerges that the North East is not a homogenous region. Each of the states in the region has a distinct character, personality shaped by the composition of its people, its culture, traditions and history.

It therefore follows that, the NE cannot and does not have a common

political or social problem; each of the states has its own differentiated problems requiring different solution. In spite of a plethora of problems of the NE, there is a common basic requirement of the region - our ability to view the region in a proper spirit and understanding.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE NORTH EAST

The strategic imperatives of the NE region having common borders with China, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal are more than obvious. I need not elaborate further. As a part of the British Empire and British rule in India, the NE region had no foreign power on its borders. There was Tibet in the North, across the Himalayas, where Chinese *de jure* suzerainty was accepted, but till 1949, China was too preoccupied with her internal problems. Arunachal Pradesh now faces China all along its northern borders. Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram now share borders with Myanmar since its Independence in 1948. Partition of India in 1947, resulted in Tripura, Mizoram, Meghalaya and Assam having to share borders with a foreign country - Bangladesh (then East Pakistan). Sharing border with friendly Bhutan and Nepal has its own problems, albeit on a different plane.

GEO-POLITICAL FACTORS

Geopolitical factors have been the root cause of some of the most serious problems of the NE region. The single biggest concern has been the demographic upheaval the region has undergone and is still going through, as a result of partition and turmoils across the borders. The acute fear of being swamped by an alien culture and losing dominant position due to influx of the migrant population, needs to be appreciated, and resolved, although, presently with no workable solution in sight. The fact is, considering the condition astride the borders, the influx would continue indefinitely, with varying degree, trickle to floods.

DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

The following demographic characteristics of the regions need to be taken a note of:-

- (a) The growth rate of the population is 3.5 percent (All India 2.5 percent).
- (b) Low population density - 104 per square km against All India average of 216. In Arunachal Pradesh it is the lowest - 8. There is uneven spatial distribution, eg, Assam has 75 percent of population but 31 percent of the region's area.

- (c) High literacy rate except in Arunachal, Assam and Meghalaya.
- (d) High concentration of scheduled tribes. Meghalaya (80.54 per cent), Nagaland (84), Arunachal Pradesh (69.78), Mizoram (93.52), Assam (10.9), Manipur (27.30), Tripura (28.45).

Unlike rest of India, tribal societies have no caste structure - but are by and large egalitarian, though certain ranking prevails. Also evident is community spirit and self reliance. The traditional economy is mostly geared to consumption and subsistence. Market economy is a recent phenomenon.

SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS

As a result of impact of impulses especially those emanating from the Centre, the traditional rural elite is being displaced by a new urban ruling politico-bureaucratic elite. Impact of the modern education is obvious. Traditional values, social and work culture are under severe strain. The educated youth are shunning physical work, seek a place in the new social order, disregarding the traditional norms/customs. In certain tribes whereas the last generation is wearing no clothes - the next generation is attired in 3 piece suits.

Traditionally the NE tribal societies have been self governing communities, based on clan/tribal structure. In this, administration was decentralised to individuals according to precedents and practices. The centralised administration ushered in, during pre as well as post Independence years, has had a rough interface with the traditional. Hence the compromises such as autonomous district councils, the tribal courts (examples - Shillong - Mon). We therefore need to explore possibilities of a happy mix. Outright imposition of a pattern from the Indian plains would not work.

ECONOMY

Although each State is autonomous in managing its financial affairs (budget), there has been an effort to tackle the problem of the region as such, by setting up North East Council (NEC) - an advisory body for economic, social, interstate projects and security matters. Incidentally, as DG Assam Rifles, I was ex-officio Security Advisor to the NEC. Apart from various aberrations and non-functioning for certain spells, the NEC is playing a major role - it is indeed a bold experiment. Unfortunately, a regional plan has taken a long time to emerge. Working against all odds and impediments, areas in which impact is being made are transport, communications, power generation, horticulture and agriculture and industry based on local resources; the last but the most important one is security.

Frequently, the question is raised as to how long the Centre will continue to treat the states of the NE as Special Category States and 'spoonfeed' them. What is perhaps not understood, the entire gamut of conditions in the NE - social, economic, cultural, political, the tangible and the intangible. We also need to take a note of the take off stage in 1947, impact of education, need for integration and lastly the political processes working in the rest of the country. Wastefulness in financial management need not be the monopoly of few. Efforts for integration need not be treated as appeasement. History has to be understood in the fullness of its past, present and future.

THE PROBLEM

INTERNAL THREATS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

National security has various facets, threats to national security from across the borders, in the form of an open aggression, are better appreciated, get duly analysed and planning to counter or checkmate these take place in a reasonably comprehensive manner. However, threats emerging from internal turmoils, starting from the low, i.e., collapse of law and order to the high, i.e., insurgencies and secessionist movements traditionally get response, only as a reaction and not as a deliberate preplanned 'action plan' and seldom as a strategy. Our approach to developments in Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, GNLF, Assam, Punjab and J & K is a pointer.

I am not certain if adequate thought is given to the glaringly obvious trends in the border areas, which have the potential to give rise to Low Intensity Conflicts (including insurgencies) warranting as serious, if not more attention, than the classical threats to the national security from across the International Borders.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE NORTH EAST

The North-Eastern region, comprising of the plains of Assam and tribal states bordering Tibet, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan have continued to be a matter of concern of varying degree of gravity, from the 1950s. For the people of the heartland, there has always been a hesitation to look at the Mongoloid tribes as any other Indian, their psyche and behaviour pattern seldom understood. The attitude of most of the Indians is 'better avoid a contact with the North-East', be it a casual or as a 'tenure of posting'. The only exception being the business community generally referred to as Marwaris. For an average person arriving in the region, acceptance of the underdevelopment, isolation and privation is a difficult proposition and the countdown for the unavoidable tenure starts from Day One. There is little cheer and no involvement in the assignment.

INSURGENCIES IN THE NORTH EAST

For the average citizen of the country, insurgencies and NE have been closely related and perhaps synonymous, and hence just accepted as a matter of fact. However, emergence of insurgencies in the Punjab or J&K evokes a different feeling/response. It is time we look at the entire nation as one and appreciate turmoils in every region with as much sensitivity.

I do not think I need to analyse the history of each of the insurgent movements in the North East. It would be a separate and fulltime exercise. Suffice it to say that, each one appeared as problems in various states, localised in nature, i.e., affecting the individual state or communities, with negligible or marginal spill over to the adjoining states, and never to the whole of the region. The approach adopted by the Central authorities in dealing with each of these turmoils, was therefore individualistic. Traditionally, the decision makers hoped to seek resolution for individual issues varying from agitations (peaceful or violent i.e., Law and Order problem) to terrorism and insurgency (secessionist movement) by deploying police forces, local or ex CPO in the initial stages and armed forces (Army and Assam Rifles) in extreme cases. Concurrently, opening up dialogues with the dissatisfied elements on the political front was found to be adequate, to keep the individual turmoils under check or at acceptable levels. Full resolution was seldom achieved and certain residual activity was accepted. And by mid 1980s, a view emerged that perhaps the internal situation was well on the way to stabilise and by the year 2000 AD, various insurgencies and secessionist movements would simmer down to purely law and order problems and hence within the purview of police forces, the concerned states and at best Ministry of Home at Delhi.

Obviously, the emerging trends were not taken a note of, in making assessments and deciding course of action, be it from economic, socio-political or security point of view. The signing of accords with Nagas, Mizos, TNVs, GNLF and Assam was taken as a positive development in resorting normalcy and bringing each state of the region out of isolation and into the national mainstream.

The developments in Assam i.e., emergence of the ULFA, its phenomenal growth in strength and support base from the masses need to be viewed in a different manner. The situation has been further aggravated by the formation of the Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF) which has in fact taken form at the instance of ULFA by forging an alliance with the NSCN and UNLF with a view to liberating the entire Indo-Burma region, comprising North-East India and North-West Burma. Claiming to be a separate

and cohesive social and cultural group with distinct identity, the movement has avowed to deal with India, the main and the only enemy.

Within a brief period after its inception, ULFA was calling the shots in Assam, had established bases in the neighbouring states, had rendered the political and administrative process in the state irrelevant and was successful in running a parallel Government or perhaps the very Government itself. For the first time, a secessionist movement, instead of offering a challenge had posed questions to the people and suggested an alternative, albeit, nebulous. Even without an armed struggle, ULFA had been successful in the establishment of a people's government.

The issues involved are not merely ULFA, Assam or IBRF. Assam is the nerve centre for the North-East - the lines of communications and supply, viz, roads and railway lines for sustaining the entire North-East, pass through Assam. These are extremely fragile and marginal, and if choked, as had been happening lately, had disastrous effects in terms of economy of all the states, as also, for the security of the entire region.

It is obvious that the philosophy of tackling the insurgency problems individually, that too, as 'graduated response' and not as prevention by foreseeing events would cause disaster. An integrated approach on a wide front, encompassing the entire North-East, involving all the Government organs, (political, administrative as also law enforcing) is called for.

A relatively recent development is the increased flow of drugs in the North-Eastern region from across the border. The Myanmar narco-mafia appears to be making inroads into the North-Eastern States. Besides providing the transit route for the international markets, the North-Eastern region is also facing a growing drug addiction problem. The region, therefore, needs to be adequately strengthened to deal with, both drug trafficking as well as addiction problems.

REASONS FOR CONTINUED TURMOILS IN THE NORTH EAST

For many, it would appear that there is also a spurt of fresh insurgent activities in the five outermost states of India in the NE, i.e., Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Tripura. In reality, it would be seen that, we did not achieve full resolution and accepted certain residual activity. Further, concurrent to signing the accords with individual groups, serious efforts were not made in appreciating the factors which gave rise to the secessionist movements, for deciding the future strategy and approach to

ensure that the root cause were tackled and the people of the region brought out of isolation into the national mainstream.

Silently, we have permitted the numerous tribal groups seeking independence/autonomy, inhabiting the remote region astride our borders with Myanmar to gain strength and seek polarisation. All these groups, whether of Indian or Myanmar origin, continue to find safe sanctuaries in the hill tracts of Myanmar out of reach of the Govt at Rangoon, and obviously India.

Since the fires were not fully extinguished and causes for their appearance in the past ignored, the subdued embers are getting periodic fresh leases varying between glow to leaping flames. There is no dearth of fuel in the shape of grievances against the Union Govt. either genuine or perceived (at times latter more appealing than the former).

Although the earlier insurgencies were politically motivated, presently, the apparent cause is lack of attention by the Centre and inadequate resources allotted for the development. An honest analysis indicates that the real reasons are :-

- (a) Collapse of state organs including the police. In fact most states created the police forces only as an employment avenue. No effort has been made in the past to shape them into effective law enforcing agencies. The untrained police force, poorly led by incompetent local officers brought up in tribal/clan loyalties are a sad picture.
- (b) There is a genuine feeling that the North East is least understood by the decision makers in Delhi, that they are being taken for granted and in the scheme of priorities they do not feature or at best, at the lowest.
- (c) There is growing unemployment in the region. With increased aspirations, youth shun hard work, seek only white collared jobs (not work), indulge in drugs/liquor. Accessibility to easy money (ex Central Aid) is fuelling the fire.
- (d) Excess flow rate of central aid gets siphoned off before reaching the target population. A new class i.e., corrupt politician and ineffective bureaucrat has emerged which is being resented by the people. Hence, a desire for change implying anti establishment attitudes.
- (e) Easy availability of new and sophisticated weapons. Old weapons continue in the area.

At this stage, it would be essential to review the developments and trends in the NE.

DEVELOPMENTS IN ASSAM

Presently Assam continues to be at the focal point of the entire North East. ULFA, the youngest, is setting the pace for other insurgent groups. Although not all money exorted from tea gardens, businessmen and bank robberies has landed in the ULFA treasury (a sizeable portion appears to have been used by certain individuals for their personal benefits - cars, trucks, and such other commodities), amount spent on training of the cadre under the NSCN and procurement of weapons has helped them to create a dedicated and ruthless core. There are reports of formation of a suicide group including even girls. Linkages with NSCN(N), NSCN(S), as also Punjab and J&K terrorists, and LTTE have enabled ULFA to establish pipelines for procurement of sophisticated weapons from international market as well as Pakistan.

The ULFA, without offering a direct challenge to the elected Govt in the State or an outright fight with the security forces, has been able to build a reasonably broad support base amongst the population thereby affording the extremists, security and mobility. This is substantiated by the fact that the top leadership, the hostages and the cadre in general have been able to find secure shelters, and complete shielding albeit partly under threats of reprisals. This support base is from a wide cross section of the society - intellectuals, students, upper castes, plains tribals and housewives. This support base is essentially derived by propagating the cause of neglect and apathy by Delhi, which sell well. The stated objective of the ULFA, namely independence, perhaps is an overstatement of the point. While quoting history in staking the claim for a separate mongoloid nation state, what is ignored is that the very theory of Nation State is irrelevant in the Indian context, it is too recent. Such a view held by ULFA perhaps is not shared by various tribal groups in Assam, who are merely seeking adequate political and economic benefits within the Indian constitutional framework. It is also doubtful, if the ULFA's view and philosophy is shared even by the non-tribal Assamese other than the caste Hindus in Upper Brahmaputra Valley - which are presently the main support base of the ULFA. And last but not the least, it is a matter of conjecture if this thought process of the young Robinhoods has the acceptance by the elders of the society, who have abjured their responsibility in such vital matters of state.

Interaction with various elements and groups from Assam indicates that the strength of the ULFA, which enabled them in the past to adopt any

tactics and selective violence against the so called enemies of the people, is on the wane.

There is a distinct possibility of wresting the initiative from the ULFA on a selective basis, by tackling various factions, separately. This does not involve application of force but on the contrary by reaching out to them by human approach.

At this stage, although we need to review the status of other insurgent groups in the NE, due to the paucity of time, I will skip it. For this talk, it is not imperative.

HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT

Activities of advocates of Human Rights and some so called Indian intellectuals are indeed a matter of concern. They are adding fuel to the already broken out wild fire on the subject. Foreign agencies and countries who are seriously interested in destabilising India, have found it convenient to manipulate the Indian Human Rights activists and supporters of the insurgent groups for internationalising the issues at various platforms and thus malign the image of our country. We cannot accept the UN also to be such a forum. Functioning of the anti-national elements, in the name of 'Right of Self-determination', seeking active help of the International Forum and their cause, i.e., 'Liberating the struggling smaller nationalities against the oppressive, colonial rule of Govt of India', needs to be curbed firmly.

APPROACH TO THE NORTH-EAST

It is apparent that the Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF) although taken form at the instance of ULFA, may not achieve its goal of carving out an independent state comprising North East India and North West Burma, claimed to be separate and cohesive social and cultural group with distinct identity. It is however, a good forum for polarisation of various insurgent groups in the region. Although both India and Myanmar are affected, the absence of Myanmar authority in its NW Region implies India being the main and only enemy. Further, each of the groups is working in a complimentary manner, thereby enhancing their overall reach and capability. NSCN(N) providing safe bases and training facilities, ULFA the bankers, NSCN(S) arms procurement ex international markets. Khalistanis and LTTE also appear to have made their contribution. Finally, the international drug mafias are forging their channels through the North East luring the entire population to easy and fast buck and thus exposing them to all the attendant evils.

Thus, ULFA cannot be viewed as problem of Assam alone. The growth of ULFA would not only cause collapse of Assam but with its linkages with other insurgent groups in the region, the entire NE would be sucked in this vortex of ULFA. Assam is the nerve centre for lines of communications and logistics for the whole NE. These are fragile and marginal, and if choked, can cause disastrous effects on the economy of all states, and would also degrade the ability to employ security forces even at the borders.

The philosophy of tackling the insurgency problems individually in a compartmentalised/isolated manner and that too, as 'graduated response' and not as prevention by foreseeing events needs a review. An integrated approach on a wide front, encompassing the entire North-East, involving all the Govt Organs (political, administrative as also law enforcing) is called for. Shedding the distanced and stand off attitudes, the approach must ensure involvement of the people, taking into account their sensitivity.

For instance, while tackling ULFA, the critical centre in the North East, steps need to be taken to break the nexus of various insurgent groups amongst themselves, with the foreign powers/bases supporting them and the masses on own side.

CONCLUSION

Analysis of each of the movements individually as also collectively indicates nexuses amongst themselves as also of more serious a nature with the prominent personalities in public life. This is a matter of concern. Although all such issues need political involvement and solutions, the present involvement is not with a view to seeking resolution of the problem through dialogue but for deriving mileage for power base.

While working out a model, earlier models of neither the North East nor from other regions can be recreated. These may not find acceptance or throw up solution. The grievances harboured by the people are complex in nature and a mix of genuine and perceived (latter ones more often posed as genuine). Since segregation may not be feasible, these will have to be tackled together.

The developments in the NE states, cannot be treated as a mere law and order problem and thus left to individual states or ministry. It is a problem of national security.

Establish NSC & Restructure MOD

LT GEN A M VOHRA, PVSM, IA (RETD)

The issues of national security and higher control of defence have been discussed in this journal and elsewhere fairly often in the last decade or so without any impact on the organisational structures or the methods of working. However, both are matters of such consequence that the propagation of reforms necessary must be persisted particularly as we now have a Prime Minister who is addressing problems systematically and a Defence Minister who is seen to be taking interest in his portfolio. Earlier, Mr Arun Singh had shown similar rather rare trait as generally the demands of political activity claim precedence. Unfortunately, Mr Arun Singh's tenure was a short one.

In a review of Monty Palit's recently released book, "War in High Himalayas", S. Gopal observes, "He shows that the system of government and the institutional framework for the making of policy had inherent weaknesses which at times of crises caused confusion and invited disaster." So much for national security infrastructure and mechanism. On the count of higher control of defence, the observation is equally telling. "There was a gap which was never sought to be bridged between the civil and military sides of the administration". On both counts, no advance has been made in the 30 intervening years and more.

NATIONAL SECURITY

The rationale for the national security infrastructure is easily explained. Basically, any issue effecting national security, be it economic, an internal problem or an external threat, to name only some, needs a holistic consideration. Even if it is to be referred to the Cabinet for a decision, an input from one ministry, Finance, Home or Defence, does not ensure this. What often happens is even worse; the known views of a minister or the PM colour the analysis of the ministry concerned. In any case, a ministry loaded with the day to day problems and managing normal administrative matters is not the best apparatus to analyse national security issues.

To keep global as well as regional developments under review, to look into the future to forecast, formulate and analyse issues having a bearing on national security as also to look into questions of national security that may be referred to by various departments of the government, there is requirement of national security staff composed of personnel from varied disciplines

and walks of life; academics, analysts, diplomats, bureaucrats, the military and others. This multi-dimensional national security staff (NSS) would serve as the "think tank" of the National Security Council (NSC) which would, in effect be a Committee of the Cabinet with designated ministers and special invitees; Ministers of External Affairs, Defence, Home and Finance being the permanent members and others being invited depending on the issue being discussed. The Chief of Defence Staff/Chiefs of Army, Navy and Air Staff, Scientific Advisor to the Minister of Defence and other officials would also be invited in accordance with the same criteria. The Prime Minister would head the Committee.

It would be necessary for the NSC to have a high powered secretary of the rank not lower than the Cabinet Secretary, but preferably of a Minister of State. However, the Secretary, should be from a Service (Civil or Military) and not a politician. He would coordinate the work of the NSS and ensure that its results receive the attention of the NSC. The latter requires easy access to the PM who would, to be sure, also throw issues at the NSS for analysis as indeed any member of the NSC may. Secretary NSC would have the normal secretarial functions of arranging meetings, issuing directions based on the decisions of the NSC and obtaining progress reports from the ministries concerned for the information of the NSC.

Some ill informed criticism of the NSC suggests that the NSC would be an extra-constitutional body. The fallacy of this observation is too apparent to need a detailed comment. As stated earlier the NSC would be a committee of the Cabinet which is formed as provided for in the constitution. The other observation that an NSC structure would involve duplication is also not valid. Issues effecting national security may nominally be the concern of a particular ministry but their holistic, comprehensive and detailed analysis requires consideration by a separate body so that factors having a bearing on all aspects of the polity are given due weightage.

Early in 1990, the National Front government announced the formation of the NSC but the institution did not become functional and just as well; the structure proposed was not workable. For one thing, it did not provide for NSS and gave some similar role to the JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee). Without a whole time NSS that is not bogged down with routine but acts as a "think tank," the NSC would not get the required inputs and national security issues are not likely to be even taken cognisance of in time.

Lack of coordination of intelligence agencies stands out for all to see. Various intelligence organisations cultivate their bosses and become a law into themselves. They often work at cross purposes and seldom risk forecasts.

The JIC should be given the task of coordinating their activities. It should also provide important inputs to the NSC in the way of intelligence assessments and forecasts. It cannot obviate the NSS.

At present there is no institutional arrangement and our response is knee jerk and ad hoc. National security issues are taken cognisance of too late and measures to meet the problem are considered on the basis of personal equations a la NEFA 1962 where the equation was BG Kaul, BM Mullick and the Prime Minister. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet is defunct. In any case that Committee was primarily for the higher control of defence. What we are talking about here is national security in totality. This process has to be institutionalised with the NSS, the "think tank," as an essential part of it.

HIGHER CONTROL OF DEFENCE

There are two major aspects of higher control of defence that need attention. The first relates to management and the second to coordination. To take the management aspect first, the present system is not conducive to timely or correct decision making due primarily to the existing system of financial control as also the organisation and role of the Ministry of Defence (MOD).

The Financial Advisor (FA) is an official of the Ministry of Finance. So, apart from financial control in the way of budget allocation, the expenditure of the funds allotted is also controlled by Finance Ministry through the FA. It is the job of this Ministry to manage the finances of the nation both in the way of revenue and expenditure. Financial advice should also be available to various ministries of the government but as an integrated part of these. In this case, the FA should function as an officer of the MOD to terminate the control by the ministry of finance after funds have been allotted.

MANAGEMENT OF DEFENCE

Integrated finance would help in making timely decisions. At present all matters are considered by three channels, one after the other; first by the Service HQs, and then by the FA to whom the MOD refer the case and finally by the MOD. Apart from the fact that this process is time consuming, this consideration in isolation by the three elements does not draw on collective expertise of the military, the bureaucrat and finance. An integrated MOD, with the Service HQs and Finance as part of it, would lead to an analysis of the proposal only once by the military, finance and bureaucracy at various levels. Thus, in addition to integrating finance, Service HQs; Army,

Navy & Air Force HQs, need to be made part of the MOD. In other words the MOD should be an integrated set up with finance and Service HQs merged in it.

In the present set up the MOD functions as higher HQs of the armed forces as it were. Manned as it is by generalist IAS officers who serve in the MOD for a tenure or two. It has no expertise to perform this role. Nor indeed is there a requirement of such a role as it only causes delay besides creating a bloated organisation in which there is, more or less, a deputy secretary for every director in Army/Navy/Air HQs. Thus we have a situation where the views of the DGMT, who has put in 30 years or more service including command of a division, on duration, scope and number of courses to be run at a training establishment, being questioned by a deputy or joint secretary having experience of 10 to 15 years in district administration and civil secretariat and thus considering the issue on the basis of common sense rather than any specialist knowledge of the subject. An integrated MOD would do away with this situation; the DGMT would be part of the MOD and the financial aspect would be gone into with integrated finance before the proposal comes to the DGMT.

There is also a case that the bureaucratic element of the MOD should be found from other services also such as the IFS and the armed forces apart from the IAS. While this proposal needs analysis, one step that needs to be taken immediately is that bureaucrats deputed to the ministry should specialise and their subsequent tenures at the Secretariat should be with the same ministry.

Serious rethinking is called for in regard to the role of the MOD. More and more of the management of defence needs to be left to Service HQs with their integrated finance. The MOD should restrict its role to national security issues, interaction with external affairs, coordination of the work of various intelligence agencies under the JIC, R & D as well as defence production and procurement of weapons. This is just a random list but the subjects mentioned are important aspects of defence management and constitute a full enough a plate. The size of the MOD can accordingly be cut down.

The best way of bridging the gap between the civil and military side of the administration mentioned in the initial paragraphs of this paper is to restructure the MOD as suggested above. This institutionalised integration would bridge the gap in as far as implementation of policy (management) is concerned. To achieve this at the strategic policy making level the answer, as suggested above, is to establish and ensure proper functioning of the NSC.

COORDINATION

The level of coordination achieved by the three services in matters of defence, both operational and administrative, depends entirely on the personalities of the three chiefs. The institutional arrangement in the way of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) with the longest serving chief as its chairman is non-effective. In the field of operational planning, the Services make their plans individually. There used to be, and perhaps it still exists, the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) under the COSC with a joint planning staff of three officers of grade I level, one each from the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. It served the purpose of keeping the services informed. There was little scope for joint planning except for some minor tasks.

A few years ago, a high level joint planning staff was established with a Lt General at the head. This staff could serve the purpose of joint planning within the proper structure of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The aversion to the institution of CDS is very difficult to understand as the misgivings, of the politicians as well as of the Services are easily explained.

The understandable apprehension of the political bosses is that the post of the CDS would carry too much power. Being strong, he may use this power in an unconstitutional manner. Firstly, the CDS will not be in command of any forces and will wield no direct power over troops, units or formations. Secondly, in a democracy, like India, where changes in government can and have been brought about by constitutional means in the way of elections, a coup is unlikely particularly as each constituent's power is defined and each has functioned within these bounds. The armed forces are content in performing the important role of the defence of the realm. Thirdly, in circumstances which vary from polity to polity, when a coup does take place, it is the angry colonels, in command of forces, who bring it about. Therefore, on reflection it should be clear that the understandable apprehension is, in fact misplaced.

The services themselves have not exactly supported the CDS idea primarily by virtue of the misunderstanding that the post would be monopolised by the Army. The Army has indeed created such an impression by some senior generals observing that, in our context, the land battle is of the essence and that the primary task of the Air Force is to provide air support to the land forces. (Even if the first half of this statement is true at present, one should bear the likely future developments in mind. The Gulf War was an air and missile war with ground forces performing a mopping-up role). It is also, sometimes asserted that the Army is the predominant service in our armed forces and should provide the CDS. Since the implementation of the prin-

ciple of appointing the best man for the job would create its own problems, the best course, and indeed the one accepted by all advocates of the CDS system, is to fill the appointment by rotation. This is what is done by most countries and the adoption of this course should allay the fears of the Navy and the Air Force.

This process of coordination by structuring the CDS system should be accompanied by creating unified theatre commands; Western and North Eastern with theatre commanders from the Army, Peninsular & Southern Command with a CinC from the Navy and two under CsinC from the Air force - Air Defence and Strategic Air Command.

RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

Military hierarchy no less than the bureaucratic one resists change for many reasons, vested interest being the predominant one. It is human for a service chief or the defence secretary to think of the effect of changes suggested from the point of view of its effect on the post they occupy. One hopes that the individuals who occupy these and similar posts are big enough to brush aside such subjective considerations.

Is it too much to expect that the PM and the Defence Minister will find the time to put these problems on their priority list so that they get attended to? The consideration of setting up the NSC as also the restructuring of the MOD, establishing the CDS and theatre command systems, cannot be kept pending for too long.

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Joint Naval Exercises: Overdue Change of Course

VICE ADMIRAL S MOOKERJEE PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

During the fifties and early sixties, our navy used to be a regular participant in the annual Joint Naval Exercises of as much as four to six weeks duration in and off Trincomalee. So was Royal Navy, a prominent ally of the USA and Pakistan with whom we had already fought a war. There was no hue and cry either in our Parliament or media. In 1977, at the height of Big Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean, then Janata Government, whole-heartedly approved a fairly large-scale Joint Naval Exercise with major Units - including an aircraft-carrier - of Royal Australian Navy - a very close ally of the USA - and Royal New Zealand Navy - both co-members with the USA of ANZUS Pact. Major Units of our Navy including Vikrant took part. The author, then commanding a squadron of Leanders which took part in the Joint Naval Exercises, does not recall airing of any misgiving of any sort by Shri George Fernandes, then a key Cabinet Minister. In recent months our Navy has carried out Joint naval exercises not only with the navies of some Indian Ocean littoral states but as importantly with the British and French Navies. All these, like previous Joint Naval Exercises, did not result in rush of blood to the heads of opposition members of our Parliament, spear-headed by Shri Fernandes who tried, fortunately in vain, to pressurise the Government to cancel the planned Indo- U S Joint Naval Exercises. The less than two days' exercises are behind us. But, in the overall security interests of our country in post cold war era, it is crucial, in the context of tone, tenor and substance of the Rajya Sabha debate on 6 May 1992, to clear the ignorance and misperceptions about holding meaningful Joint Naval Exercises. Issues involved are both political and naval.

End of cold war and break-up of erstwhile Soviet Union have ushered in a period of transition and uncertainty. Profiles of a new world order will gradually be shaped during the next two decades. Bipolarity lies buried; and the fact that USA had to finance the Gulf war through international contributions is a clear signal that there is a limit to USA's ability to unilaterally lead the world. Although uncertainty surrounds the possible emergence of a European super state under Franco - German leadership, future of Russia, military policy of economic super power that Japan has become, rise of China and India during the coming decades as major powers, signs are unmistakable that the world is moving towards multipolarity. Management of a multipolar world will be more complex than the erstwhile bi-polar world. In such a

world, non-alignment loses its virtues of simplicity and effectiveness. Pragmatism demands that India develop meaningful relationships - economic, political, diplomatic and military - with both USA and emergent major powers.

It also needs to be recognised that economic, ethnic, sub-nationalist and religious forces, hitherto hidden from the eyes of the world are already showing signs of replacing communism as the main ideological force. Low intensity conflicts, proxy wars and terrorism have become very much an important part of security agenda of world nations. India has special problems in this regard.

We have much to thank the USA for her support to our stand on Kashmir, her criticism of Pakistan for aiding militants in Kashmir and Punjab and behind-the-scene pressure on International Monetary Fund and World Bank for grant of massive loans to us to save our economy from the brink of bankruptcy and enable us to embark on the road to economic recovery and growth. India and the USA - world's most populous and largest democracies - share faith in open societies, secularism, unity and integrity of nations and crucial importance of keeping sea lines of communication open. During his recent visit to Washington, our Defence Minister described Indo-US relations as being "excellent". This might be the end we both want to achieve from the present state of our relationship being in "good shape" as put by Dick Cheney.

Of course, we have differences. But in the kind of world we are living in to-day, International Relations, as aptly put by Ambassador Abid Hussein, is a mixture of sunshine and shadows. This applies not only to Indo-US relations but also in the bi-lateral relations of USA and her long-standing allies like Japan and Western Europe. Pragmatism demands that as a potential major power, we extend areas of sunshine with USA and other emerging major powers and desist from magnifying differences and mislead public opinion by making passionate and fiery speeches reminiscent of an era gone by.

In the all-important task of extending areas of sunshine, Navy-to-Navy relations, as will be explained later, assumes special importance. This is specially so in the case of USN which continues to be a major instrument of US state policy.

Because of the unique nature of demands, challenges, opportunities and romance of the seas, navies of the world speak a language with distinctive words, phrases, style of expression, develop a commonality of minds, manners, customs and skills - call it common culture if your will. As a result,

Navy-to-Navy relations tend to transcend geographical boundaries. This phenomenon provides coastal states whom the oceans have made neighbours, a fertile soil to build friendship on. Joint Naval Exercises are, in addition to other forms of naval co-operation, therefore, an important instrument of State policy.

These exercises take place on the High Seas - "a wide Common" as described by Admiral Mahan. Hence, the accusation by some opposition stalwarts during the Rajya Sabha discussions on 6 May 1992, of compromising territorial integrity and even sovereignty, is at best ignorant and at worst an attempt at disinformation to mislead public opinion. In fact, joint exercises in international waters away from the public eye, are infinitely preferable to Joint exercises on land involving presence of foreign troops on own territory, as a confidence building measure.

In the Rajya Shabha, Joint Naval Exercises were criticised as being contrary to the desired policy of self-reliance. Self reliance cannot be considered as an end-in-itself. It is a means to an end. The bottom line is to have a navy, manned by highly trained and motivated personnel, which optimally exploits the available hardware to fulfil missions entrusted to it. Within limitations of resources, we have set up adequate training facilities including training simulators ashore. For afloat training, our annual practice allowances for fuel, ammunition and missiles are, if anything, generous. Training exercises in ascending hierarchy of complexity are carried out. None-the-less, a "purdah" approach to training for naval missions, suffers from serious disabilities.

First, in the absence of international exposure and competition, we do not really know what our strengths and weaknesses are with regard to operational planning, training and hence combat worthiness. Since there is no prize for runners-up in a war, confidence in our ability to come on top when chips are down, is essential for safeguarding national security.

Secondly, in the context of all important deterrence, internationally recognised professionalism of a navy, bestows on the nation inestimable political and diplomatic advantages. Flag-showing visits to foreign ports - though important - are not enough. Real test is at sea. Therefore, realistic and meaningful Joint Naval Exercises offer both challenges and opportunity.

Thirdly, Joint exercises with foreign and internationally renowned navies such as USN, RN and French Navy provide a unique opportunity to assess the effectiveness of hardware of participating navies including our own. This assessment, objectively discussed and analysed, would provide invaluable inputs in identifying areas of modernisation and making good deficiencies.

Joint Naval Exercises could be low keyed having the primary aim of fostering good relations. Participating units will be exercised in simple day-time manoeuvres, station-keeping and basic seamanship drills at sea. But, if the aim, in the words of Shri Sharad Pawar in our Parliament on 6 May 92 was to expose our Navy to "advanced tactics and techniques" of a Super power Navy, such exercises have to be much larger in scope and complexity, include operations on, under and above the seas, and hence would have to be of longer duration than the recent two-day exercises with the US Navy.

This brings up the issue of possible compromise of technical parameters of acoustic and electro-magnetic sensors, thereby facilitating counter-measures to deny their usage. Electronic and acoustic intelligence-gathering by spy satellites, special electronics surveillance aircraft, ships, non-combat ships, submarines and sea-bed acoustic sensors, are high on the agenda of peacetime missions of major naval powers with USA leading the field. Gulf War demonstrated extensive use of such intelligence. But, intelligence, by itself, does not win wars. Deceptive and safety measures, active and passive, exist. Properly trained personnel and innovative tactics do nullify the effects of enemy electronic counter-measures and jamming to the extent that we are not totally denied the use of our sensors and weapons. Also jamming is not an end-in-itself. In spite of its extensive use during the Gulf War against ill-trained Iraqis which gave no battle, as much as 70% of 90,000 tons of explosives including precision guided missiles, missed targets. The greatest single factor in a conflict is not so-called "force multipliers" but highly trained professional manpower under expert tactical leadership. Joint Naval Exercises with major navies would help us considerably in achieving that standard of professionalism.

As we stand to gain professionally so do other major navies we have exercised with including US Navy. Undoubtedly, US Navy is world's largest and technologically most sophisticated Navy. But, it does not necessarily follow that it is also the most professional. Japan in World War II, had an awesome Navy. Yet, she lost the war due to faulty strategy and serious tactical mistakes.

Since World War II, U S Navy's professionalism has not really been tested as Royal Navy was during the Falklands War and Indian Navy in 1971. US Navy has been pitted against Coastal states with insignificant navies and hence enjoyed virtual immunity at sea. On the other hand, analysis of published reports of incidents and accidents at sea -- Pueblo to Vincennes through the Stark would emphasise the need for further improvement in grass-root professionalism like Bridge work, Bridge-Combat information Centre (CIC) interface, state of readiness in sensitive areas of deployment, rules of engage-

ment, damage limitation etc. There is, therefore, considerable scope for exchange of expertise and lessons between Indian Navy and its partners, including USN, in joint Naval Exercises. If USN did not believe that it stands to gain in professionalism - particularly after observing consistently high standard of professionalism amongst senior Indian Naval Officers who have been graduating from US Naval War College - senior US Naval officers in recent years, would not have been sending feelers to senior Indian Naval Officers for staging Joint Indo-US Naval exercises.

Another fact of significance is that USA, as stated by Shri Sharad Pawar on the floor of the House of Elders, proposed the joint exercises to be held in the Pacific. In recent months, Australia has made similar proposals. Thus, two major Pacific nations would like Indian Navy to play an important role in preserving security in Asia - Pacific region. Partnership with ASEAN navies will lead to a concert of naval powers which will be an important factor of stability in the management of emerging and complex multi-polar world.

Summing up, in post cold war era, bipolarity is giving way to multipolarity. In the complex task of management of a world of several major powers and ethnic contradictions, non-alignment has lost its relevance. As a potential major power, India should develop pragmatic relationship with other major powers - existing and emerging - with special reference to Asia-Pacific region. USA's proposal to hold Indo-US Joint Naval Exercises in the Pacific, is significant.

Further, low intensity conflicts, proxy wars and terrorism have become high on the security agenda of nations including ours. We share faith in open societies, rule of the law, with USA whose support to our stand on Kashmir and Punjab, serve our core national interests. So does her behind-the scene support in procuring massive assistance from IMF and World Bank for our economic recovery. There is also congruence of views in keeping sea lines of communication open in Asia-Pacific region. Differences and disagreements will be there. That is what International Relations is all about.

For the sake of expanding friendly relations and our national security, Joint Naval Exercises assume significance. Common culture amongst navies, tend to transcend geographical boundaries. Conducted in international waters away from public gaze, sensitivity about sovereignty etc become non-issues. Joint Naval Exercises do not run counter to our policy of self-reliance; in fact, it strengthens it by testing it against international competition, enhances professional reputation and hence deterrent value of our navy and as importantly provides valuable inputs for identifying areas for modernisation.

Joint Naval exercises could either be token in nature or high-keyed. To derive maximum benefits - professional and political - exercises with major navies should be of the latter category. Since, peace time intelligence gathering by diverse means is an important peacetime mission of all navies, the possibility of compromises of sensors and weapons should not be over stated. Tactical and material counter measures - active and passive - exist to counter effort to deny use of electro-magnetic sensors. That Iraqis failed in this regard during the Gulf War was because they were ill trained and unprofessional. Whilst intelligence continues to be a principle of war, the most important one still is, highly trained, motivated professional manpower under astute tactical leadership. High-key Joint Naval Exercises address this vital requirement.

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India's Foreign Policy Options in the 1990s*

MAJOR RAJIV KUMAR

INTRODUCTION

A few decades from now the rapid changes in the world during the eighth and ninth decades of the 20th century will provide a delightful, yet bewildering study to a scholar of international politics and security. The end of the Cold War, the termination of the Warsaw Pact, the unification of Germany, the virtual comity of interests across the board in terminating Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, are events which could not have been visualised even a short while ago. Who for instance would have visualised the Soviet President and Chief of the CPSU stating "...the (communist) model that has been imposed on the party and society for decades has suffered a strategic defeat...indeed this is a crisis of socialism and socialist idea...It is of exclusive significance that we speak about ourselves as a party of democratic reforms...it is only the plurality of opinions and the democratic comparison of views within the framework of constitutional law that will make it possible to find the truth"¹

The emerging kaleidoscope of scenarios - pushed somewhat by Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait and its aftermath - offers new challenges to India's policy makers. Some of the emerging images are indeed confusing eg has the United States emerged as the only Super Power? Has the world finally moved from bipolarity to multi polarity? How relevant is the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) with the seeming emergence of multi polarity and end of the Cold War? What is the emerging "New World Order"? Do its ramifications suit us? Will regional conflicts, stay regional and localised when greater interests are involved, or has the Gulf War set a model for wars to come? The spectre of terrorism and narcotics, quite often caught in a puzzling combine with its declared opponents, continues to loom large. The advent of democracy in Eastern Europe has manifested itself negatively in the rise of violent sub nationalism... One could go on. Closer home the ethnic strife in Sri Lanka, the continued Pakistani support to terrorists in Kashmir and Punjab poses a serious threat to our national and regional stability.

Ironically while major changes in the world's scenario call for alert, concrete, rapid and concerted foreign policy projection, Indian responses

* This essay has won the second prize in group "A" of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 1991.

have been seemingly confused, dictated often by internal rhetoric. We are perhaps the only major country to have gone through the world wide turmoil of the Gulf War without even a full time Cabinet Minister for Foreign Affairs, and this at a time when major realignments were so obviously in the offing." A total marginalisation of India may have been avoided by the "damage control" actions taken at the bureaucratic level later but the obvious denial to India of the "largesse" bestowed by Kuwait in its reconstruction programme, and the "cold shoulder" from the USA are bitter pills which the country has had to swallow.

George Modelski writing on the theory of foreign policy defines it as... "the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment. Within it two types of activities may be singled out for special attention: the inputs flowing into it, and the output it produces. The foremost task of foreign policy analysis must be to throw light on the ways in which states attempt to change, and succeed in changing the behaviour of other states."² Thus while foreign policy objectives may have a certain commonality between states, viz the protection and furtherance of national interests, changes in the international and internal environment necessitate changes in policy options. More than at any other stage in the second half of the 20th century international and domestic developments - the latter linked in our case to transborder regional problems - call for changes in our foreign policy options. The subject thus merits a study of both the international and internal scenario.

AIM

The aim of this paper is to evaluate India's Foreign Policy options between now and the turn of the century.

This paper is laid out in the following parts :-

- (a) The Emerging International Order.
- (b) India's Security Compulsions and Stature as a Regional Power.
- (c) Possible Foreign Policy Options for India.

THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Even a cursory glance at India's Foreign Policy postulations since Independence would discern four clear points viz:-

- (a) Protection of India's interests through the Cold War without getting

embroiled in Super Power rivalry both in the international and regional arena. This would be evident in India's refusal to be drawn into any Super Power sponsored regional pacts eg the ASEAN, the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) and its neutral stance.

(b) Meeting, or pre-empting a possible Sino Pak combine; evident notably in the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1971.

(c) Seeking an economic and political role for the Third World within a bipolar world order; and obtaining for India the stature of a Third World Leader; the setting up of the Non Aligned Meet, the Africa Fund and strident posturing in matters relating to the independence of Zimbabwe, Namibia and other colonies, North South dialogue, South - South dialogue.

(d) Establishing and furthering India's role as a regional power in South Asia, particularly in the Indo Pak sub continent; intra regional interventions in East Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, the efforts to keep the Indian Ocean free of Super Power rivalry.

However some of the above constants have certainly changed. The Cold War has ended, the bipolarity of the world order is certainly over, the USA has positively emerged as a military power, a thaw in Sino Soviet relations perhaps makes guaranteed Soviet support in preventing a Sino Pak collusion a bit less realistic, just as India is perhaps a bit less relevant to the Soviet Union in the global order. Regionally tensions have escalated over territorial, extra territorial and ethnic issues eg in Kashmir and Sri Lanka. These issues are involved, vexing and due to their ethnic nature also linked to internal Indian-Pakistani-Bangladeshi or Sri Lankan policy.

With this as a backdrop we can now proceed to examine the changes in the international Order and their effect on our International, Extra Regional and Regional Policy options.

THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND CENTRES OF POWER

During the last four decades it was quite possible for the Third World to identify the two basic centres of power ie the USA or the USSR. This bipolarity imposed certain restrictions on the foreign policies of the Third World ie these countries had to align themselves with one of the power blocs for their economic development and security. To some extent this meant accepting tacit domination or self imposed curbs, often at variance with the

avowed national ideology. Egypt offers an extreme example of a country forced to align itself with one camp or the other. Bilateral economic relations were also deeply affected by cold war considerations. Economic assistance from the Super Power blocs was linked to their strategic interests.

If the bipolarity of the world order somewhat circumscribed foreign policies of the Third World, it also imposed certain compulsions on the Super Powers. The USA for example was forced to support dictatorships and unpopular regimes in power eg in the Philippines or in Pakistan against its declared norms of support to democratic values and human rights. The disappearance of the Soviet Union as a countervailing force has certainly changed this situation. In the aftermath of the Gulf War there appears to be only one Super Power in the world. The complete sidelining of the Soviet Union's efforts to broker a peace in the Gulf, and the Chinese act of abstaining from voting in the security Council when it could have vetoed the use of force has made one thing clear - neither the Soviet Union nor China had the will to oppose the United States even before the Gulf War actually broke out. The 'Rambo' image of the USA is further strengthened by the statement of President Bush that he might have said "to hell with" the UN and sent troops to Iraq, if the Security Council had not authorised the use of force against Iraq.³

To the Third World looking for security, the image of a single power dominating the world is certainly not reassuring. The issue therefore is quite simple - can some other power blocs arise to countervail the United States, and derivatively can Indian Foreign Policy be shaped to utilise a new developing power balance in the international arena.

THE UNITED STATES : LIMITS TO POWER ?

While the military dominance of the United States and its unfolding national confidence is undeniable some indications that it is not, and cannot be absolute, are also obvious.

Militarily it would be interesting to note that after inciting the Kurds to rebel against Saddam Hussein's regime and having obtained the resulting military advantage the US and its allies quietly backed out when a civil war situation which could have sucked them into a protracted low intensity conflict situation, wherein the advantages of hi tech and manoeuvre warfare would not have been derivable, seemed to be developing.⁴ The United States has announced that it is not a global policeman. The realisation that on overstretching of resources may perhaps lead to a reversal in the presently upbeat national mood will perhaps now force a balancing act. Within the country strong sentiment against display of military muscle and taking on more than

what is strictly necessary is beginning to assert itself. Noted 'think tanks' like Alan Tonelson of the Economic Strategy Institute denounce the "...irrelevance of our foreign policy, and even its victories to the concerns of most Americans. The US he says, should junk the idea of something called leadership and "insulate" itself from the disasters of the Third World. He would also have the US abandon "overseas missions that however appealing bear only marginally on protecting and enriching the nation".⁵

It would also be pertinent to note that after Vietnam US military involvements have been cases of overkill, in brief operations eg in Grenada and Panama. When confronted with a possible protracted casualty heavy situation in Lebanon the US withdrew after a single major terrorist attack.

US analysts appear to be conscious of the limits to power and Harvard's Joseph Nye is quoted as defining power as being of two kinds "hard" and "soft"! Hard being derived from a combination of military and economic clout, giving it the ability to force its will on others. Soft power being a country's ability to lead because others want to follow depends "on the appeal of culture, society and ideology". Over the years the US has relied upon a combination of 'hard' and 'soft' power to maintain a leading edge. However at the present juncture while the USA stands out as a symbol of hard power its soft power shows a different profile. As Nye states, "Our low saving rate and high deficit have diminished over hard power... By consuming too much and investing too little, we're risking our capacity to stay on the edge of the third world technological revolution... In 'the 80's we went from being the biggest creditor nation in the world to being the biggest debtor, and that has cost us a further degree of political influence... As far as soft power, we'll begin to see that erode too if our cities fall apart, if we no longer can offer our citizens upward mobility because our economy is stagnant in short a healthy economy is a precondition for a successful foreign policy."⁶

The condition of the US economy thus seriously curtails its dominance of world affairs. In 1988 its per capita GNP was \$ 19,770 in comparison to \$ 14,340 of Japan and \$ 13,987 of United Germany.⁷ Thus while the US still leads the industrial developed world the gap is closing rapidly, and has in some ways been closed. Taking investments in, and aid to South East Asia for example; Japanese corporate investment in the eight fastest growing economies in 1991 stands at \$ 26.8 billion in comparison to the US investment of a mere \$ 7.4 billion. Japan has already replaced the USA as the biggest aid giver. Newspaper and political magazine editorials now speak of the 'Yen Bloc'.⁸

Sheer economic reality therefore indicates the emergence of atleast two

alternative economic centres of power ie Japan and Unified Germany. The reunification of Germany and the end of the Warsaw pact, the signing of the START as also the gradual move towards a unified Europe will mean a gradual reduction of the United States role in the 'Security of Europe'. This of course is dependent on the extent to which sub nationalism and secession is controlled in the Soviet Union and its former allies. Escalation of violence may invite intervention to restore stability. By all accounts a resurgent Germany will become a European power by the turn of the century. This would involve a competition of interests within the EC.⁹

Whatever be the ultimate fate of NATO, it is quite obvious that a new chapter in the US - Europe linkage is now opening up. As Europe moves towards economic unity and prosperity its dependence on the US decreases, as it forms an economic continuum it will also form a competing economic bloc. US authors in fact have already begun to speak about possible areas of conflict and "European protectionism". Writing in the *Journal Foreign Affairs*, Hoffman forecast in 1990... "If the Soviet - American contest should cease being the most important issue in world affairs, conflicts of economic interest among allies might well escalate, and both sides might behave more like blocs competing for economic and financial preponderance than like partners submitting to the same rules of fair competition, free trade and cooperation". Hoffman also warns, "... Also likely is the continuation in Japan, of a strategy aimed at maximising the global power of industries in which it has the lead. A world economic recession could only turn the world economy into a contest of protected regional blocs..."¹⁰

An obsession with formation of economic blocs seems to have afflicted American writing of late. The *Time* magazine issue of 29 July 1991 commenting on Japan's emerging economic might states "...Japanese exports to its neighbours now exceed those to the US or the European Community. Tokyo is also concerned that two potentially hostile trading blocs might be forming in the West, as the EC moves towards full integration and a proposed North American free-trade zone linking the US, Canada and Mexico takes shape. If these trade groups become too exclusive, Japan would not mind leading a bloc of its own in Asia".¹¹

It thus appears that while militarily the US might be a Super Power, other power blocs based on economic power have begun to emerge. Even in terms of military power the US is not totally absolute. The Russian Republic still retains sufficient military strength. Although the emerging pattern indicates a shift to economy related politics, with visions of "trade wars", the possibility of growing economic powers translating themselves into military powers also cannot be ruled out. It therefore follows that while a visible

military unipolarity may have emerged, an economic and political multi polarity has also emerged.

On 5 Mar 91 President Bush told the US Congress that the Gulf War was the first test of "a new world coming into view, a world in which there is a very real prospect of a new world order".¹² Although he did not elaborate upon the idea he has spoken about it often; in terms of collective security, unfettered communications, enforcement of democratic values, human rights etc. While this does point to growing US aggressiveness in foreign policy and trade it does not appear that its attempts at international domination will go unchallenged. The resistance in Thailand to the pushing of US cigarettes into the country by US cartels to make up for a shrinking domestic market is a case in point.¹³

CHINA : THE DARK HORSE ?

The above discussion largely relates to the USSR, USA, Japan and Europe. It is interesting to note that since 1990 China seems to have occupied a comparatively lesser prominence in the media. Throughout the Gulf War the Chinese profile has been low. Sweeping changes in the world seem to have passed by China. In fact the Chinese would appear to be the greatest beneficiaries from the change. The threat from the Soviet Union has ended, aid from the USA continues to roll in, a gradual US military withdrawal from the Asia Pacific denudes the region of Super Power presence, while the USSR and the USA set about reducing conventional and nuclear forces, Chinese nuclear capability stays intact. And all this seems to be occurring without a single worthwhile concession or compromise.

As China shares the longest, and disputed border with India its postulations are of special relevance to India's policy makers - both regionally and globally. It would be of interest to take note of Chinese perceptions of the "US Global strategy and International Environment" in the 1990s for the enunciation of their "Basic Policy".

Chinese political scientists strike combined notes of caution and optimism. Huang Zheng, Senior Adviser, Beijing Institute for International Studies opines that in the emerging scenario... "the United States will consider¹⁴ itself as the leader of the world, it will master the contradictions by employing tactics of maintaining balance, unite Germany and Japan to hold China and the Soviet Union in restraint, and restrict Germany and Japan by drawing support from China and the Soviet Union, so as to continue intervention in world affairs in a vain attempt to realize its dream of dominating the world".

The statements of President Bush about human rights and market economy, about a "beyond containment strategy" are seen as an attempt to attain unanimity with allies like Germany and Japan. Zhengji in fact sees current US policy towards China as... "to maintain a normal or even relatively good relations with China on the one hand, while on the other to exert pressure over developing rapidly. It is not willing to see China really strong and prosperous."¹⁵

A definite caution and apprehension of US efforts at domination of the world therefore tinge Chinese perceptions. These perceptions are even sharper in official Chinese writings. Most Chinese commentators however appear to be obsessed with the progress of their "four modernisations".

In terms of security the Chinese still see the need to balance between the USA and Russian Republic and assert that... "in the field of military security the Peoples Republic of China will continue to maintain the best security environment since its founding more than forty years ago", and... "the trend of multipolarization of the force structure of the world will be further developed and the pattern of multipolarity of the world will gradually be formed".¹⁶ Cai Mengsen Secretary General of the BIISS in fact asserts.. "The most spectacular phenomenon in the 1990's will be rise of Europe and Japan... taking the world as a whole there will be five main power centres: the United States, the Russian Republic - CIS (or Germany), Japan and China. In the meantime some regional forces will also begin to show their capabilities and will play a decisive role in their respective regions."¹⁷

It is significant that the Chinese have seen no need to let down their nuclear or military guard. Nor has the country's cautious stance in terms of either information flow, or political ideology been given up. Dissent in fact was absolutely stifled. An indication of Chinese status as a power in the US scheme of things also becomes evident from the fact that despite the brutality of suppression unleashed in 1989 no worth while sanctions were imposed against China and protests made only for the sake of record.¹⁸

It is however in the regional perspective that the Chinese view of things becomes even more relevant to us. While the Chinese take note of what they feel is a limited detente promoted in the South Asian region by the US and Russia, the existing situation is seen as volatile and subtle characterised by changes in the "quadrupartite relations among the United States, the Russian Republic, India and Pakistan".¹⁹ The structure of this quadrangular relationship is seen as an important factor affecting the development of the situation in South Asia.

Intra regionally the continued friction between India and Pakistan as also other countries is seen as potentially dangerous as "none of the religious, ethnic and territorial disputes as well as the issues handed down by history between India and its neighbours was resolved". In Chinese views the region perhaps stays an unstable backyard where "relative stability" might be maintained, some move towards relaxation may take place but in which.. "the strategic pattern... that has been shaped up over a long period of time can hardly be fundamentally changed".²⁰

We can therefore draw a few deductions from the emerging global scenario:-

(a) While a military unipolarity has emerged with the USA emerging as the predominant military power a multi polarity is already emerging in terms of economic power.

(b) The unipolarity of US military power though a pragmatic reality is curbed by its inherent economic situation. Furthermore while Russia may have drastically negated its role globally and gone on the strategic defensive it still stays a strong military power with the ability of military deterrence.²¹ China too stays a credible military power; even a power to be courted by the USA and Russia.

(c) The emerging unified Europe will gradually see a reduction of dependence on the USA, and in due course become totally competitive with it.

(d) The pressure of economy and trade will see new patterns of trade wars. Linked, as they are, with the developed world the Third World will find itself subjected to increasing pressures to open up its economy to the economic powers. The formation of joint blocs against such pressures will be exceedingly difficult due to reasons of individual economic survival. In any case economic powers will make every effort to deal with countries bilaterally, rather than with economic blocs.

(e) Militarily the developed world seems to be moving towards greater level of military detente. However the gradual decline of communist power has given rise to a cycle of sub nationalism in Europe. There appears to be a convergence of interests in all factions towards limiting sub nationalism. The pronouncements of President Bush on the Russian soil against secession by former Soviet Republics are an extreme illustration. Similar efforts are also on in Yugoslavia.

(f) Overall world effort and attitudes now indicate a desire to control aggression, eg as in Kuwait. Military effort when undertaken will be under the garb of legitimacy and international consensus. Even democratically the use of force now requires internal consensus.

(g) While the threat of global war has reduced, the threat of regional wars has not. In fact regional tensions have increased due to the availability of surplus military stocks from the Western and Eastern powers, rise of sub nationalism, forced mass emigrations of population (eg the Kurdish migration), ethnic and communal tensions.

(h) Greater flexibility is now available to the Third World countries in international politics and the need to be allied to one of the Super Power blocs is now over. Conversely the need for a Super Power to support regional powers in intra regional conflicts to 'contain' the opposing Super Power by proxy is also over.

SOME CONTRADICTIONS

A peculiar mix of global stability vis-a-vis regional instability, an attitude of global balance vis-a-vis bilateral competition and aggression both military and economic seems to be emerging.

While globally there appears to be an urge towards stability, the rise of sub nationalism, terrorism especially narco terrorism, religious fundamentalism will threaten international stability.

These contradictory pressures are perhaps most evident in South Asia; with the Indo Pak subcontinent providing a striking example of an arena in which perhaps every contradictory pressure, as also extra regional alignments are in focus. These affect both India's security and status as a regional power - if it chooses to call itself one.

INDIA'S SECURITY COMPULSIONS AND STATURE AS A REGIONAL POWER

The Indo Pak problems over Kashmir, the Sino-Indian border dispute are perhaps too well known to merit elaborate description. While these will be discussed in this part, the emphasis is on bringing out the newer problems affecting India's security, as also the changes in its security environment.

That India's land mass, population, industrial base and strategic location amongst numerous small states gives it a kind of a dominant status in

the perceptions of its neighbours is undeniable.²² However this very size appears to be a major reason for generating surprising insecurity in its neighbouring countries. The ethnic, economic and communal issues generating trans border conflict in the region are a consequence of the close affinity, and to some extent of the fact that ethnically, culturally and religiously the entire subcontinent is perhaps one entity; thus the internal Tamil problem of Sri Lanka affects India, the Mohajir problem in Pakistan affects India (as a high proportion of Mohajirs have ties and family linkages in India), internal problems of Bangla Desh leading to trans border migration affect India, friction between Nepalese factions affect India.

Ethnic commonality generates fears of elimination²³ of identity in neighbouring countries especially Pakistan, and leads to a cultural and ethnic assertion. Trans border ethnic affiliation is thus a major part of the first security compulsion of India - its internal security and instability.

India's multi ethnic and multi religious society possesses the roots of strident sub nationalism. This inherent centrifuge is being skilfully exploited today by Pakistan to contain India. State sponsored terrorism is a major threat to India today.

While the above problems are basically internal in nature though being exploited by Pakistan in full, a major linked issue now is of narco terrorism. Narco terrorism is all pervasive; its ramifications ultimately extend to politicians, terrorist groups, anti social gangs, bureaucracy (including law and order forces) and social front organisations. Fuelled initially by Afghan Mujahideen groups and Pakistan, narco power promises to be India's biggest single security concern linked to terrorism. The necessity of keeping drug traffic moving will, or rather has already made the "business" a bit of a rogue. Hypothetically even if India and Pakistan are able to settle their differences some day, it is doubtful if the drug barons will be easily curbed.²⁴

THE SINO-PAK FACTOR

Having touched upon the internal security threat to India - albeit with regional connotations we can now turn to the two basic problems of Indian policy.

The division of India and the creation of Pakistan are historical facts. Visions of "Akhand Bharat" may have existed in the minds of a few for some years after Independence. It is doubtful that they exist today. The underlying issues to the Indo Pak conflict are basically rooted in history, an artificial division and the Pakistani psyche. Fears of reabsorption initially geographi-

cally and politically, and now culturally and in terms of identity continue to dominate Pakistani actions. Thus while in the initial years Pakistani leadership chose to establish linkages with the Western powers²⁵ to secure a guarantee for their security, in the current scenario the demise of the cold war is now forcing them to seek linkages with Islamic forces, with a combination of inspired insurgency in India.

In concrete terms the single most destabilising factor in Indo Pak relations is the Kashmir issue. Both countries have taken strong positions on the issue and it is unlikely that the leaderships of both countries can make any worthwhile compromise on the issue. Pakistan's unleashing of the war by proxy and the blase rabble rousing screams of "Azadi" by Benazir Bhutto define the Pakistani attitude. Within Pakistan perhaps no political force is as strong as the Army, and it is unlikely that a compromise can be effected with a highly nationalist and motivated Army, especially when it has reason to believe that it has gained a certain amount of military advantage by sponsoring terrorism and insurgency to contain India. Internally in India also a certain segment of the majority community too has pushed to an extreme posture and it is doubtful that even a minor concession can be made by any Government in power.

While till now Pakistan could tout an alignment with the USA to obtain political and military leverage vis-a-vis India, the decrease of Pakistani relevance to the USA is pushing it towards an increased alignment with the Islamic countries. Recent Pakistani media blitzes at the Organisation of Islamic Countries Conference in Turkey and repeated harpings on the solidarity of the "Ummah" show Pakistani attempts at garnering support from this quarter. It is however unlikely that Pakistan will be able to obtain the mantle of leadership of the "Ummah" or that it will receive unqualified support from them on generated issues like "human rights". Not only is the Islamic movement deeply fissured by partisan and national considerations, it also has ethnic divisions. Furthermore it has strong internal contests and blocs. The Iranian contest with Pakistan over a role for the latter in the Gulf is a case in point. In any case it is doubtful that a "human rights" plank can really survive; given Pakistan's and the Islamic countries own doubtful record. However in a religiously charged atmosphere the possibility of a convergence does lie.

The other Pakistani card so far has been its alignment with China. This has served them well as their commonality of interest in containing in India has continued to match. Pakistani perceptions of China being Pakistan's friend as also its generous military aid, underscore this relationship.²⁶ However it is also significant that both in 1965 and 1971 the Chinese did not intervene militarily. In fact since 1987 and subsequently it has been possible for India

to mobilise troops from the East for internal security duties in the West. Even on Kashmir Chinese statements have tended to treat the issue as bilateral between India and Pakistan. There are thus limits to the kind of support Pakistan can expect from China. This of course does not underestimate Sino-Pak friendship.

As the main issue behind the Sino-Pak axis is the convergence of Sino Pak interests in containing India it would be relevant to examine the status of bilateral relations between India and China.

BILATERAL RELATIONS : INDIA AND CHINA

The resurgence of Indian military power became evident in 1987-88. Even if termed as an over reaction, the placement of a credible force in a reasonable time span on the Sino Indian border makes a repeat of 1962 impossible. What does stand out is a gradual thaw in Sino Indian relations. It is significant that Indian responses to the 1989 internal Chinese repression were muted, treating it as a purely internal matter.

The Sino Indian Summit of 1988, the setting of a joint Working Group to sort out the border dispute, the holding of Flag meetings, exchanges of civil and military delegations and the recent (semi official?) visit of the retired Indian Chief of the Army Staff General K Sundarji are illustrative of changes in Chinese thinking. It is significant that the Chinese for the first time chose to discuss nuclear strategy with a visiting Indian²⁷.

Domestically too Indian polity and public opinion are perhaps in a better and appreciative mood for a dialogue with China. There is thus a possibility of compromise between the two countries. A convergence of Indian and Chinese interests seems to be occurring in spheres larger than purely regional. To list a few points of convergence:-

- (a) Both countries will seek to resist US hegemony under the garb of sanctions and aid disruptions on issues like "Human Rights", "Intellectual Property Rights", "Trade Mark and Patents", "Domestic Reform" etc.
- (b) Both countries need technology, foreign investment and hard cash inflow. They stand to benefit by mutual interaction.
- (c) Additionally, meeting grounds exist in cultural areas, sports medicine, hi-technology transfer or cooperation.

It would also be pertinent to note that the Chinese have stabilised their stranglehold over Tibet. Although the presence of a large Tibetan refugee population alongwith the Dalai Lama continues, its potential as an irritant or a destabilising factor has drastically reduced. The studied ignorance accorded to the Dalai Lama during his recent visit to the UK makes it evidently clear that in the perceptions of the Western powers Tibet is no longer an issue. However diplomatic necessity - or convenience may lead to the issue being exploited at a later date.

THE NUCLEAR FACTOR

The last major regional development is the fact that Pakistan has emerged as a Nuclear Weapon state in the sub-continent. This status is quite evident from the fact that the US President has been unable to give the necessary certification of Pakistan being a Non Nuclear Weapon State in the current year. The recent Pakistani efforts to induce a dialogue with India on Nuclear Non Proliferation were perhaps meant to provide a new factor in US perceptions.

Although the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme has been undeclared and ambiguous, the much exposed Pakistani attempts at securing the necessary materials and knowhow are sufficient pointers towards the end result of Pakistani efforts. Yet again the Pakistani effort is not in response to, but precedes the Indian explosion of 1974. In real terms Pakistani nuclear ambiguity is purely notional.²⁸

Dr Stephen P Cohen, whose books on the Indian and Pakistani Army are regarded highly, visited Pakistan in early 1980 and interacted with Pakistani Army and defence officials. According to him many Pakistanis felt the necessity of a nuclear device to... "neutralise an assumed Indian nuclear force. Others point out, however, that it would provide the umbrella under which Pakistan could reopen the Kashmir issue; a Pakistani nuclear capability paralyses not only the Indian nuclear decision but also conventional forces and a harsh, bold Pakistani strike to liberate Kashmir might go unchallenged if the Indian leadership was weak or indecisive".²⁹

Coupled with the fact of Chinese nuclear domination, the Pakistani possession of nuclear weapons is a serious threat to regional stability. Focussed, as the threat is, on India it calls for a response, and questions the declared non nuclear weapon stand of India.

With the backdrop of the foregoing discussion and deductions thereto we can now discuss the possible foreign policy options for India.

POSSIBLE FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS FOR INDIA

A historical analysis of Indian Foreign Policy since independence would reveal a strong blend of Nehruvian idealism and native Indian pragmatism. The former was most evident upto 1962, or perhaps upto 1964. This is perhaps a natural outcome of Nehru's personality and the fact that he also held the foreign affairs portfolio. The phase since 1964 to 1971 was largely dominated by the need to safeguard India's territorial integrity and nurse its national and military power to a state of 'health'. From 1972 to 1987 Indian foreign policy entered a more pragmatic state conscious of its own pre-eminence in the region. 1987 perhaps marks the peak of India's military revamping, with phrases like "coercive diplomacy" being banded about. The period since 1987 has once again, apparently focussed Indian attention on internal needs and seen a gradual retardation of power display - marked by the withdrawal from Sri Lanka, a rapid deployment and withdrawal from the Maldives, with basic policy declarations of the fact that India was not interested in a "regional role" or becoming a "regional policeman". Since then we have largely been involved internally in fending off domestic or economic crisis. Our role in the Gulf War was confusing, despite our military status we continue to beleaguered by security problems. All this calls for an internal examination of our very system of policy formulation. The issue of our structure for policy formulation is beyond the scope of this essay, however it is quite evident that we do not appear to have a cohesive or integrated structure for the purpose. The stance of the Chief of the Army Staff in 1987 was at sharp variance with that of the External Affairs Ministry during the Ex Brass Tacks and post Brass Tacks crisis if it may be called that. Yet again when ordering the IPKF to Sri Lanka the foreign policy postulations and ground reality appeared to be at variance.

Commenting on the apparent mismatch Air Commodore Janak Kapoor writes "The Policy Planning and Review Division of the MEA, does not have any military specialists, and naturally avoids planning on politico-military issues".³⁰ This compartmentalisation is also evident in the areas of economic relations, publicity abroad or even in the composition of Indian delegations proceeding abroad. From news items appearing in the Indian media it appears that a proportion of Indian delegations are mere pleasure junkets bestowed as largesse on political and bureaucratic followers. The need to set our house in order is obvious.

FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS FOR INDIA

The changed context in which foreign policy is now to be conducted would appear to be international, extra regional and regional.

INTERNATIONAL

Internationally our foreign policy would call for adjustment to the Post Cold War world, the changed situation of the USSR, the tilt of the military balance in the favour of the USA and the rise of competing economic blocs.

The first question this situation throws up is the future of the NAM. By appearances NAM seems to be irrelevant as bipolarity has disappeared. Yugoslavia the present leader is deeply mired in a Civil War. The NAM initiatives to prevent the Gulf War were brushed aside by Saddam Hussein. All these would indicate that NAM has ceased to be a reckonable force. Conversely the stance of the group of 77 and NAM did much to restore the freedom of Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Given the current situation NAM will have to reorient itself for the protection of economic interests of the developing member states against exploitation by the emerging economic blocs. A related area would lie in intensifying South - South dialogue and cooperation in terms of economic aid, raw material, mutual investment, movement of skilled manpower, technology, information flow. This is not a new thought process, the Indian External Affairs Ministry's report of 1964-65³¹ in fact paid attention to it. The pressure on economy will now need greater orientation of NAM as a trading bloc. This will face pressures from the economic blocs and member states will have to indulge both in bilateral and group dealings. The opportunity for a North - South dialogue seems to be decreasing, however internally NAM could form a loose mutually supporting trading bloc.

Another possible role still lies in preventing regional conflicts within member states. The possibility of influencing world public opinion by use of the media, formation of voting blocs in international fora still remains. NAM will have to move to a newer functional model. It still remains a major platform for the LDCs and Newly Industrialised Economies.

Attempts will have to be made to create a common bargaining platform to face the unified European Market from 1992. NAM in its modified form will continue to be a foreign policy plank for India.

EXPLOITING THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

With the end of bipolarity and the termination of Super Power animosity a convergence of almost all major power interests has occurred. These interests lie in developing economy, preventing conflict and protecting the integrity of nation states. This convergence will enhance the role of regional

security pacts. In any case the US, China, and Russian Republic will continue to retain an element (albeit consciously avoiding tension) of balance.

Internationally the US will remain a global military power, with a strong presence in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. On the positive side this will imply a benign, perhaps partially coerced stability in West Asia. The US in fact seems to be working towards this objective in its attempts to broker a peace between Israel and the Arabs.

Hard realism, both economic and military, thus forces us to modify our policies to look for points of convergence with the USA. Even for the USA, India is a key factor in South Asia. Briefly the points of convergence would appear to be as under:-

- (a) Combating narcotics traffic emanating from the Pak Afghan border, ultimately destined for the West.
- (b) Curtailing fundamentalist Islamic convergence or unity.
- (c) Curbing terrorism in all its forms.
- (d) Enlarging trade relations; the US as on date is India's largest trading partner.
- (e) Both countries share democratic traditions; Indian intra regional interventions in South Asia have invariably been forced by the need to provide support to democratic institutions. Both the Sri Lankan and Maldives interventions received US support.
- (f) The US is looking for markets in the Asia - Pacific - Indian Ocean region, in the face of stiff competition. This necessitates regional stability and a search for allies. India as the largest industrialised, and military power would appear to fit US needs for a regional power capable of providing stability. This need will accelerate with the growth of internal pressures towards isolationism in the US, as also its withdrawal from the Asia Pacific progresses.

THE INDIAN OCEAN

The presence of the US in the Indian Ocean, or in its immediate vicinity is now a reality. We have so far concentrated on issues like "Zone of Peace" to keep the region free of Super Power rivalry. With the rivalry having demised this issue appears to be over. However the region continues

to require a stabilising force to prevent situations like the Gulf War from arising, to keep trade and oil moving. India does not have the sea power to keep the region under check nor does it have the ability to contest US domination over the region. Pure reality therefore demands adjustments by India on this count.

NON PROLIFERATION : A POINT OF DIVERGENCE

India's refusal to submit its nuclear facilities to an examination or to sign the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty are based both on self respect and pragmatism. Pakistan is an "ambiguous" nuclear weapon state, China a confirmed power. It is obvious that the Indian land mass lies under a nuclear threat both from Pakistan and China. It therefore follows that any attempt at curtailing the spread of nuclear power in the region must include China. The USA has included China in such discussions for the first time.

Chinese apprehensions have been covered earlier in this paper. Thus while the Chinese will continue to exploit their relationship with the USA for some time to come they will not let their guard down. In such circumstances India cannot sign the NPT. This is a point of divergence. This is one issue where India will have to identify a foreign policy line to make itself acceptable to the USA. If Israel with a well known nuclear status can be a US ally, why cannot India be a friend?

This ground for divergence in fact offers an interesting possibility, that of balancing US vis-a-vis China. Both may have to woo India to balance each others influence in the region, China motivated by its apprehensions of US domination and the US ultimately viewing China as a potential threat. We will have to walk this local Asia - Pacific partial bipolarity; and this balancing will have to be another foreign policy thrust.

The next area of divergence with the US so far has been in the US irritation on Indian protectionism and refusal to open its economy. While the New Industrial Policy does not convert India into a market economy, it substantially removes some irritants and opens itself to investment.

BALANCING THE ECONOMIC POWER BLOCS

A major foreign policy thrust will have to be the exploitation of and balancing the "Economic Power Blocs" as they have begun to emerge. The Indian market will ultimately have to open up. SAARC offers an opportunity for the region to emerge as an Economic Bloc. The main hinderance so far has been Pakistani refusal in matters of industrial tie ups, or trade. Logically

an economic bloc can emerge in the region only with the co-operation of Pakistan. As this is not likely to be forthcoming, India may well look beyond its immediate region into South East Asia and the Asia Pacific. We are in a position to enter in economic tie ups with ASEAN. Japan offers another opportunity to secure aid, technology and investment.

The real challenge will however come as the competing trade blocs of North America and Europe come into conflict. For the time being these blocs may operate to salvage East Europe and utilise its market potential.

A major thrust of India's foreign policy will now have to be in the economic sphere; exploiting it, and preventing a damage to Indian industry and market.

THE RUSSIAN FACTOR

It is quite evident that Russia has overcome initial problems of sub nationalism and is not in the danger of imminent collapse. It still stays a military force, with a clout, even if reduced. It also stays a major balancing factor in our relations with China, a source of military hardware and technology. India will thus have to continue the maintenance of its relations with Russia. In fact our relationship with Russia will continue to be of use both regionally and extra regionally.

EXTRA REGIONAL AND INTRA REGIONAL THRUSTS

To a substantial extent India's extra regional and intra regional thrusts are interrelated. To the West, Pakistan's attempts at enlarging the scope of conflict and involving Islamic countries in the dispute poses a threat extra regionally. To the East the impending collapse of Mynamar in the face of US sanctions will set loose sub nationalism just across India's disturbed Eastern borders. The armed Kachin and Shan groups are already well organised. A reduction of the already fragile central authority will plunge the country into armed chaos, with possibilities of a spill over into India. The situation may invite Chinese intervention.

Indian foreign policy makers will thus have to now reanalyse the state of India's relations with the Islamic world. Although the OIC is quite vocal about India's internal affairs, the internal poverty and dissensions within its member states will prevent unified action. It however presents a potentially destabilising threat to India internally, apart from raising the possibility of arms transfers or funding of Pakistan.

The scenario therefore calls for a containment of the threat. In terms of foreign policy this will imply:-

- (a) Engaging in and cultivating bilateral relations with individual Islamic countries, to reduce Pakistani influence and possibility of an Islamic front emerging against India.
- (b) Developing a Russian - US - Chinese convergence against Islamic fundamentalist unification.
- (c) A possible alignment or easing of relations with Israel and development of relations with Syria; the two major opposing and stabilising forces in the region.

In so far as Myanmar is concerned Indian policy makers would do well to evolve a consensus with China to contain potential sub nationalism and violence in the region.

INTRA REGIONAL THRUSTS

Intra regionally the situation has changed drastically. Bangladesh has converted into a democracy, Nepal into a constitutional monarchy, and Pakistan to a democracy of sorts (with the military as the guiding light and senior partner). These changes for the first time in the last four decades imply that the region has a common democratic ideology.

As basic fears in the region emanate from common ethnicity and geographical, mostly riparian issues, and fears of India's size, it would perhaps be best to choose a thrust to reassure the countries in the region that India stands by their territorial integrity. The next step should be the fostering of vested economic relationships in which regionally a mutual dependence is developed. The problem in the latter case is that none of the countries of the region have a common border except with India. Yet again none of these countries has the potential to match India in terms of economic or military power. The resultant insecurity forces them to adopt intransigent attitudes towards India as also attempts to internationalise even minor bilateral issues. The signals that should emit from India should be categorically reassuring yet specific on the count that the spill over of their domestic ethnic compulsions and conflicts into India is not acceptable, nor is the intervention of external powers in the vicinity of India.

India for its part will have to contain its internal politics and regional assertiveness firmly to prevent ethnicity and local political rhetoric from threatening regional stability.

THE PAKISTAN FACTOR

A major factor in the region however is India's relationship with Pakistan. While other countries in the region do not have open conflicts with India, Pakistan is not only openly hostile but also confrontationist in approach. In dealing with Pakistan therefore we have to take into account its real centre of power, ie the Army. The only meaningful dialogue with Pakistan -- the Shimla agreement-occurred when the Pakistani Army was out of power and discredited. Such a situation is not possible to arise in the near future. The only possibility which may arise is of a partial eclipse of military dominance if political authority asserts itself.

In dealing with Pakistan India's foreign policy will have to be oriented towards reassuring Pakistan about India's fullest desire to see it secure and cohesive. This is necessary as Pakistani insecurity stems from its fears of identity and legitimacy.

A second thrust should aim at stressing the points of convergence of Indo - Pak interests viz in containing narcotics traffic which has begun to threaten Pakistan internally. Ameliorating the problems of divided Pak-Indian muslim families is another area needing attention.

In all probability growing economic pressures will force a de-escalation of tensions and initiate some kind of economic accommodation.

Terrorism, Low Intensity Conflict in Kashmir and problems in Punjab are however issues which will involve firm face offs and concerted action both by diplomats and the defence forces. At the diplomatic level this will involve exposing Pakistani sponsored narco terrorism and isolating it internationally. The changes in the Post Cold War scenario no longer make Pakistan a key factor or ally for the USA. Concerted Indian diplomatic pressure at this stage would do much to bring international pressures to bear on Pakistan forcing it to reduce and perhaps stop its aid to Kashmir and Punjabi terrorists. The Pakistani stance of now separating the two ie treating Kashmiri terrorism as distinct from that in Punjab and intensifying the insurgency in Kashmir is perhaps aimed at presenting the fait accompli of a Kashmiri uprising to the international community before pressure begins to act on it.

In terms of nuclear ambiguity it would be best to match Pakistani ambiguity, as long as India is in a position to go "nuclear" (in the sense of weaponry) should the situation arise. Pakistan will for all purposes have to be treated as a nuclear weapon power.

THE SINO-PAK AXIS

It would be quite clear to Pakistan that despite its cordial relations with China, and the flow of military aid, that the emerging commonality of Sino-Indian interests make the use of military force against India unlikely.

India would do well to further the impression by increasing the pace of the Sino-Indian thaw and building bridges with China. A vested interest should be created in Sino-Indian stability.

CONCLUSION

The preceding two years have thrown up radical and sweeping changes in the global scenario. While on the one hand these changes have unfettered international diplomacy from the shackles of bipolarity, on the other hand they have thrown up a series of new challenges. Indian political commentators and 'think tanks' appear to be well aware of the hard nature of options ahead. As the noted commentator S Nihal Singh has written in the *Hindustan Times*... "India will have to pursue a new foreign policy because the basic assumptions of its traditional policy no longer hold good... It is time India's political leadership got away from the clichés of the past to look the present and future boldly in the face".³² The new Indian Prime Minister Shri Nar-simha Rao has announced that he, his government and his party have a "vision of the world" and that "they are working towards that vision".³³

The changed context of international relations requires an effort to rise above party dogma and internal rhetoric. More than ever before the future of India beleaguered by an economic crisis, terrorism, and low intensity conflict is at stake. In the recent past India has sent out confusing signals on issues of foreign policy due to internal rhetoric and compulsions. Indian political leadership and foreign policy mandarins are now faced by a situation which demands that they rise above internal rhetoric and face new challenges. The question is: Will they?

NOTES

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4. George J Church, 'The Course of Conscience', *Time* (US) 15 April 1991. By April 1991 US and British decision not to intervene in favour of the Kurds had

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5. Strobe Talbot, 'The Delicate Balancing Act', *Time* (US) 29 Jul 1991 p. 17, Alan Tonelson as quoted.
6. Strobe Talbot *ibid*; Joseph Nye 'Bound to Lead' as quoted.
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8. Bill Powell, 'Sayonara America, The Yen Bloc' *Newsweek* (US) 5 August 1991 pp 16-17.
9. Hoffman Stanley 'The European Community and 1992' *Foreign Affairs* (Journal; Council on Foreign Relations US) Fall 1989 pp. 27-47.
10. Hoffman *ibid* p.
11. News Item 'Learning to Speak for Asia', *Time* (US) 29 July 1991 p. 8.
12. Shrivastava BK op cit p. 6.
13. *Ibid*.
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15. Huang Zhenji, op cit p. 14.
16. Cheng Feng and Cai Mengsen Secretary General Beijing Institute of Strategic Studies 'The International Environment in the 1990s and China's Basic Policy' (Journal, BISS, Beijing) September 1990 pp 1-6.
17. Cheng Feng and Cai Mengsen *ibid*.
18. Shekhar Gupta, 'The War Within', *India Today*, New Delhi 30 June 1989 p. 29..."While New Delhi's silence was crippling, the US and UK promptly imposed symbolic sanctions against China".
19. Yang Haisheng and Chun Chun, 'The Present Situation of South Asia and Its Prospects', *BISS Journal* Beijing No. 2, 1990 (June) pp. 31-36.
20. Yang Haishen and Chun Chun *ibid* p. 36.
21. The START cuts the US strategic arsenal from 12081 warheads and bombs down to 10,395 and Soviet arsenal from 10481 to 8040. It does not stop the Strategic Defence Initiative, qualitative improvements in armaments. War heads will only be detached from their missiles and stored elsewhere..."The fact remains that the two countries can blow each other many times over - and with them the world". *Newsweek* (US) 29 July 1991 p. 10.
22. Typical of such views is that of Mizanur Rahman Khan; 'Bangladesh Perception..."My country Bangladesh and India are very much unequal nations. There cannot be any match between the two". *India's Foreign Policy in the Nineties* Ed Rasgotra, (Patriot Publishers; New Delhi) p. 258.
23. Pakistani quests for identity are confusing and reflect their inner contradictions. Shri SK Singh mentions a research paper which... "suggested that which is South Asian, and which is Islamic but which cannot be identified as Indian may be considered Pakistani". Article Profile of Pakistan - Perceptions and Relations with India; *Trishul* July 1991, p. 43.
24. Bhutto Benazir 'Daughter of the East' (London; Hamish Hamilton 1980) names a Governor of the Frontier Province as the linchpin of the drug trade; another influential person Abdullah Bhatti is stated to have been pardoned by Zia. Brig

- AR Siddiqui, Drugs and National Security 'Defence Journal 1988' laments the impact of drugs on national security. Shri SK Singh puts narcotics related earnings at US \$ 5 billion to US \$ 8 billions. *Trishul* ibid.
25. Ayub Khan, Field Marshal 'Friends Not Masters' (London Oxford University Press, 1967) pp 116, 118, 130, 169.
 26. Singh SK op cit p. 41.
 27. Sundarji K Gen, *The Hindu*.
 28. K Subrahmanyam (as quoted USI of India Seminar No 9; 'Nuclear Shadow over the Sub Continent' 09 April 1991 p. 8.
 29. Janak Kapoor, Air Commodore 'Bringing Diplomacy and Military Power Together in India', *NDC Journal 1990* (Journal National Defence College; New Delhi) p. 79.
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 31. The Indian External Affairs Ministry's Report for 1964-65 while highlighting the handicaps of lack of skilled manpower and financial resources as also the fact that these could not be overcome also states... "It has come to be recognised that these handicaps cannot be overcome without the assistance of developed countries on the one hand and a cooperative effort by the developing countries themselves on the other". Cited Dewan C Vohra 'India's Aid Diplomacy in the Third World' (New Delhi; Vikas 1980) p. 186.
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USI GOLD MEDAL ESSAY COMPETITION - 1991

On the recommendations of the Evaluation Committee, the USI Council during its meeting on 18 December, 1991, selected the following officers for the award of prizes in the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition - 1991:

Group 'A' - "FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS FOR INDIA DURING THE 1990s"

Wg Cdr SC Sharma, VrC	First Prize	Rs. 2,000/-
Major Rajiv Kumar	Second Prize	Rs. 1,000/-

Group 'B' - "MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN TODAY'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT"

Captain Akshaya Handa	First Prize	Rs. 2,000/-
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Nonproliferation of Soviet Nuclear Weapons*

M. ZUBERI

The emergence of a Commonwealth of Independent States from the ruins of the former Soviet Union has raised the troubling issue of the non-proliferation of the vast Soviet nuclear stockpile. An estimated 27,000 nuclear warheads are deployed within the republics of Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan. Thousands of tactical nuclear weapons are scattered over the various republics. The Soviet ICBMs are deployed in hardened underground silos roughly following the route of the Trans-Siberian Railway across the country. Bruce Blair, a former American Air Force missile-launch control officer and an expert on the Soviet nuclear command and control systems, says that Soviet safeguards against unauthorised use of nuclear weapons have been "more stringent than those of any other nuclear power, including the United States." Until recently there were several layers of control and the Soviet President as well as the Ministry of Defence had to provide a special code to start the launching process. Warheads were guarded separately from the missiles; the missile silos generally contained two regular servicemen and two KGB men. To arm a missile, a 12-digit number had to be punched into an electronic cypherlock; punching the wrong code could permanently disable the warhead. Moreover each code was good for only one warhead or a small group of warheads. Special electronic keys and blocking devices strengthened the security arrangements. During the abortive August coup, the commander-in-charge of mobile SS-25 ICBMS reportedly sheltered them in garrisons where they could be safely kept away from turmoil. According to all recent reports, there has been no loosening of the electronic grip and centralized control over the stockpile.

Far more complex than the custody of nuclear weapons is the question of the unity of the command, control, communications and intelligence network and the impact of the emergence of independent states on this network. Command and control is more than custody of the so-called "Nuclear Button" containing the codes for the release of nuclear weapons. The vast array of early warning systems, underground, mobile and airborne command centres, monitoring stations and command and control bunkers for the top civilian and military leaderships are components of this complex and vastly dispersed

* Paper presented at the U.N. Regional Meeting on Non-proliferation and other Disarmament Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region : Trends and Challenges, held on 27-29 January 1992 at Kathmandu (NEPAL) by the author who is a Senior Professor in the School of International Studies, J.N.U.

system. The Soviet Air Defence Forces headquarters near Moscow made the early warning and attack assessment which had to be passed on to some thirty military National Command Authority bunkers. Multiple hardened facilities and mobile command vehicles and aircraft provided support. Nine intermediate strategic force headquarters and about three hundred launch centres controlled the land-based ICBM forces. There were also a number of airborne command centres. At any time 15 to 20 Soviet ballistic missile submarines were away from their home bases. According to American sources, 12 of the 16 Soviet bases for ICBMs were in Russia as were 10 of 12 mobile ICBM bases, all six ballistic missile submarine bases and 11 of 26 strategic bomber bases. Some early warning satellites were launched from Kazakhstan and many radar systems were outside the Russian territory with some in the Ukraine and Byelorussia. The entire command, control, communication and intelligence network was linked to Moscow. Fragmentation of this network, built up over several decades at enormous cost, was a major concern of Gorbachev during the last days of his presidency of the former Soviet Union.

The deliberations at Alma Ata were inconclusive on this issue. It was agreed that Russia will have the custody of the codes for the release of nuclear weapons subject to a collective decision-making process involving the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan. This would mean that Moscow, Kiev, Minsk and Alma Ata will be linked together on the deadly issue of nuclear war. But as the *Financial Times* of London has reminded us, Alma Ata is nearer to Beijing than it is to Minsk and Minsk is half the distance from London than from Alma Ata. Air Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov is the interim head of all the armed forces. A clear delineation of nuclear responsibilities is expected to be made at the summit meeting of the republican leaders on December 30th at Minsk.

Despite these agreements, there are important nuances distinguishing the postures of the republics on the nuclear issue. Ukraine has at present such a large number of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons on its territory that it can qualify as the second most powerful nuclear weapon power in Europe, Russia being the foremost such entity. Its stockpile is larger than the combined total of the British and French holdings. During the recent elections in the Ukraine, all nationalist candidates including President Leonid Kravchuk spoke against the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia on the ground that they did not want to strengthen "Russian imperialism". There is, however, a strong anti-nuclear movement in the country and Chernobyl is a grim reminder of the nuclear danger. Ukraine would like to have the status of a nuclear weapon-free country and is willing to subscribe to the NPT and other arms control agreements. It would prefer nuclear weapons on its territory

destroyed as soon as possible and has even made a request seeking assistance from American experts for this purpose. Byelorussia would also like to get rid of nuclear weapons on its territory and join the NPT.

President Nurusultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan assured James Baker that his republic was for joint control over all Soviet nuclear weapons. This posture is coupled with his insistence that his republic will keep nuclear weapons for as long as Russia does. There is an unwillingness to allow Russia to have a monopoly of these weapons. Semipalatinsk, the Soviet nuclear test site, is located in Kazakhstan. It has been shut down as a result of a mass movement led by a famous poet.

The United States and the other western powers would like to have only Russia as a nuclear weapon power joining the NPT; Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan are expected to be non-nuclear weapon states signatories to the treaty. This can happen only if strategic and tactical nuclear weapons located in the three independent republics are either transferred to Russia or destroyed on their territories. Digging the land-based ICBMs from their silos in the republics, transporting them to Russia and building silos and other necessary structures for them is going to cost tens of billions of dollars and will take a considerable amount of time. Removal of all tactical nuclear weapons, including artillery shells, bombs and mines, is a much easier task but raises the vexed question of making sure that some of these portable weapons have not been kept in secret places.

Dismantling of the nuclear warheads would be a long-drawn process. Sergei Rogov, a Soviet arms control expert, estimates that it could take at least twenty-five to thirty years and it is difficult to predict the course of events over such a long period. Andrei Kortunov, another arms control expert, can picture a situation "in which the nuclear forces just melt-morale is down, people defect, computers malfunction, there is no checking, there are accidents, blunders and so on" and "this scenario could happen even next spring." A report prepared by experts at Harvard University has suggested that it would be faster to disable the warheads at site. Ashton Carter, one of the authors of this report, has outlined a programme of "quick and dirty" disarmament. Fissile material should be removed from warheads, then "wrap the pieces in plastic or metal wraps and squash them." This way the "geometry" of the material would be deformed thereby removing the possibilities of an explosion. Carter then suggests wrapping the fissile material in very thick plastic and putting it back into bunkers. This "quick and dirty" disarmament is not the final solution of the problem. The US Congress has sanctioned \$ 400 million for the specific purpose of storing, dismantling and destroying these weapons.

The economic and political chaos in the former Soviet Union has raised another issue related to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; this is the possibility of Soviet experts in the nuclear military field leaving the country and their services becoming available to other states. In a recent interview with a Moscow newspaper, V.N. Mikhalyov, an important member of the nuclear weapons programme, lamented the poor living conditions of nuclear scientists. Insisting that his colleagues were "patriots and none of them wants to go abroad and work on creating weapons for anyone", he asked, "how it is possible to live now on 400 roubles a month?" And he added: "What is a person to do if he only knows how to make atom bombs - and nothing more - when he feels unwanted in his own country?" Vladlen Sirotikin, a Soviet historian and political columnist, recently declared, "give me a million bucks and I'll have a nuclear-tipped missile stolen for you and delivered anywhere you want."

William C. Potter, an American expert who conducted a nuclear nonproliferation workshop in Moscow in October 1991, has mentioned a Russian organisation called the International Chetek Corporation of Moscow, founded in December 1990, which provides peaceful nuclear explosive services as a desirable means of disposing of toxic waste, decommissioned reactors and retired nuclear weapons.

Assurances regarding the safe, reliable and centralised control of the nuclear stockpile of the former Soviet Union have been given by Gorbachev, Yelstin and other responsible civilian and military leaders of the republics. Richard Cheney, however, declared on American television that central control over the former Soviet Union's 25,000 to 30,000 nuclear weapons was incomplete. According to him it was 99% successful but "you still have 250 (nuclear warheads) that they are unable to control."

The former Soviet Union's research reactors and nuclear power plants, scattered in different parts of the country, were not subjected to IAEA safeguards inspections because it was a nuclear weapon power. The IAEA's safeguards are applied generally from the beginning of a reactor's operational life; this enables the Agency to have a complete inventory from the start-up of the reactor. The long duration of research reactors' and nuclear power plants' operation in the former Soviet Union raises the issue of verification procedures in arms control. If Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon powers, the IAEA will face the unprecedented task of preparing an authentic and complete inventory of fissionable material in their nuclear installations.

Nuclear weapons appear to have become bargaining chips in the

negotiations between Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan and between these republics and potential aid donors overseas. Recognition of independent status and economic and technological assistance would depend on a satisfactory arrangement about the custody and nonproliferation of these weapons. But as Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the US Armed Services Committee, put it: "We are on the verge of either the greatest destruction of nuclear weapons in the history of the world or the greatest proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and the scientific know-how to make these weapons."

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA

The Council of the United Service Institution of India during its last meeting on 18 December 1991, keeping in view the increase in cost of paper and printing charges of the USI Journal as well as increase in cost of general provision of administrative facilities to the members, decided that w.e.f. 1 January 1992, the revised membership and subscription rates will be as follows :-

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LT GEN SC SARDESHPANDE UYSM, AVSM (RETD)

FOCUS ON THE ISSUE

A recurring theme in the evolution and practice of military ethos is: whether to stand up to the political boss or not; to take a stand on military and security matters or acquiesce. Standing up to or taking a stand against superior civil authority in a democratic system in professional or over national security matters is not disobedience, not quite as sacrilegious as that, certainly not in healthy politics and enlightened societies. When King Frederick in his notorious anger demanded the head of his devoted general, Von Seidlitz, for transgressing his battle instructions Seidlitz is said to have replied 'My Lord, my head is at your disposal, you may take it whenever you desire, but while it rests on my shoulders let me use it'. Much the same is attributed to Admiral Nelson's transgression of the sacrosanct battle tactics of his fleet in those days, whereby he is accorded the genius of "Knowing when to disobey". Von Seeckt, the Chief of the German General staff in the 1920's manipulated his government between the two World Wars through "designed militarism" to safeguard and promote the interests of the considerably circumscribed German Army and German military potential. But his successors, Ludwig Beck and Von Fritsch, were not as lucky in their opposition to their political boss, Hitler. Both were dismissed. Beck committed suicide later and Fritsch marched with his artillery regiment against Poland as a regimental officer to meet honourable death.

There is considerable debate in our own country among officers and civilians on this subject in the wake of Operations Blue Star and Pawan. For instance Brig. N.B. Grant (Retd) says that "it is the failure of the political-military equation that is causing concern--if the politicians were in such a great rush the Army brass also acquiesced to this, instead of standing up to the political leadership".¹ A. Balasubramaniam asserts that "the Army has no authority to question the wisdom of the government under any circumstances.... In case the government commits mistakes the people will bring it down through democratic process, but standing up and opposing when orders are given by competent authorities will amount to a military offence";² Maj Gen V.K. Madhok holds that "soldiers are not robots; (their) loyalty is to the nation and the constitution and not to a politician or a Minister of one of the political parties holding temporary office. When the politician is in the wrong it is the soldier -- the professional - who must put him on the right track while committing troops to battle"³.

N J Nanporia goes so far as to say that "in the Third World a neat and convenient line between (political and military situations) cannot be easily drawn; and if by any chance there is a collapse of civilian rule an Army familiar with national affairs and conditioned to cope with them would surely be preferable to one that is politically innocent", even while he accepts the argument that "so basic a rethinking on the Army's role will give the military ideas well above its proper station in the nation's life".⁴ Internally, within the organisation too there is pressure from the juniors on their seniors to take a stand on important issues. All this goes to focus on the sensitiveness of the issue of "standing up", and the increasing need for doing so, in the present turmoil which is creating unprecedented danger to the nation-state.

The one unexceptionable factor is that the soldier is not a robot; he is a living human being, breathing his people's air and aspirations. As requisites for the successful discharge of his duties he imbibes national and social virtues and values much more deeply than most other agencies, limbs and institutions of the nation-state, particularly, it may be noted, in the diverse multiplicity that the country is experimenting with, an experiment no other nation-state has undertaken democratically. Our national politics, power-sharing, political-military equations, accommodation of socio-economic aspirations within national security obligations and the military's contributory paradigm are singularly distinct and have no precedent or parallel. We have to shape them ourselves. Rigid, pre-conceived and imitative posture and wooden sentiments will not wash. The worst culprits will be those who choose to behold the military as over-eager for grabbing power through military intervention. That will be eminently unkind to one of the most dedicated and truly professional military forces in the world, as well as to one of the exceptionally plucky peoples engaged in a unique experiment of secular, liberal, economically dynamic democracy.

THE INSTITUTIONAL BASE

Samuel Huntington identified three-fold responsibilities of the military man to the State : representative, advisory and executive function⁵.

(a) *Representative Function.* To represent the claims of military security within the state machinery. Military man, he says, views national military policy in terms of the responsibility of, among others, emphasizing the magnitude and immediacy of the security threats, and opposing the state commitments and involvement of the state in war except when victory is certain; adding further that it is his function to warn the statesman when his purposes are beyond his means. "His contribution to the formulation of state policy is a cautious, conservative, restraining

voice. He has the right and duty to present his views in the public bodies, executive and legislature". (The last sentence needs to be specially noted).

(a) *Advisory Function.* To analyse and to report on the implications of alternative courses of state action from the military point of view.

(a) *Executive Function.* To implement state decisions with respect to military security even if it is a decision which runs violently counter to his military judgement.

Military forces are a non-productive, gargantuan money-guzzling agency, symbolising use of force and creating a feeling of distaste among society. Society often appears to be indifferent to and out of tune with the aims, aspirations and values of the armed forces, giving thereby a feeling to them that "their role and rationale are imperfectly understood"⁶ That generates alienation. The relationship between society's attitudes, indifference and/or antipathy towards the military, and the military's feeling of alienation from the society, the author says, produce estrangement. Ignorance, bureaucratic distancing, and "apathy of the society generated mainly by public ambivalence between the military's requirement of popular sanction of the organised application of military force on one hand and people's deep-seated reservations about the morality of such force" lead to indifference, the argument goes, exemplified by "the public expecting the government to look after the security aspect".⁶

Such social pressures work in a complex manner over the attitude and mental frame of the military hierarchy. Add to this "the levels of disillusionment and dissatisfaction within the services" obtaining in a turbulent, unstable politico-social environment, and one can have a fair idea of the seriousness and sensitiveness of the problem faced by the military.

The military represents a social segment that is well organised, well disciplined, well knit, well regulated and well controlled by an efficient, professional leadership; and is aware of its power potential. Through its self-evolved agency called military ethics it controls its military actions and destructive capacity".⁷ The function of military ethics is to identify the moral issues that arise because of the existence and use of military forces, explain the relation of those issues to one another, and attempt to come to terms with them". Military ethics is an internal, cultural control, and needs to constrain military actions and control destruction in terms of time, extent, type of weapons, types of objectives and military aims, even as it needs to be controlled, say the authors, by other agencies like civil control (organisational), political

control (directional), social control (Amnesty International) and media control.

It is thus evident from the foregoing that "the military man must have the ability to judge political consequences of military actions, and to integrate political sensitivities in directing and executing military tasks, though he may appear to overplay the role of custodian of national security in advising the government by over-emphasizing danger".⁸ He tends to direct his efforts to "penetrating and dominating civilian institutions (designed militarism) or by extending his power in an environment where civilian organisations have not had effective control over the military or where civilian leaders have not acted suitably and in time in critical situations (unanticipated militarism)".⁹

It is here that the military needs necessary and legitimate power vis-a-vis the government and its other agencies and institutions to fulfil its responsibilities to the State, to cope with social pressures, to integrate controls and to maintain its effectiveness in the nation's political-social-military relations.

Weber defines power as "the ability... to realise their own will...". Two out of the three "instruments of power" as classified by J.K. Galbraith¹⁰ are relevant to the military. These are :

- (a) Conditioned power : Winning submission by changing belief; persuasion, education or social commitment to what seems proper and right cause.
- (b) Coercive Power : Winning submission by imposing alternative to the preferences of a group, sufficiently unpleasant to force abandonment of preferences; or by threatening adverse consequences.

Also relevant are organisation and personality as sources of power "to evolve relations; to bring about physical, moral and mental force to impress, influence, persuade, compel, and create belief", while the purpose of such power is "to extend to others its social and secular values, and to win support for its perception of the public good" in national security issues.

Stephen Cohen gives a historical perspective when he says "The legacy of the British was to keep the Army politically neutral; the Indians learned, however, that it was necessary to equip the military with political understanding".¹¹ He emphasizes that "civilians must demonstrate their own effectiveness, (while) the military is taught that civilian control is the norm". Where civilian control and politician's understanding of the military in the conduct of national security affairs are uncertain, unhealthy, directionless, selfish and ignorant, the military professional starts feeling uncomfortable, overtaxed

and misused. He doubts the credibility of civil authority and the moral justification of his use in applying military force and causing death and destruction. This results in his tendency to withhold or overact.

SE Finer says that military intervention may be against the government, or it may manifest in the military's refusal to act in accordance with the government.¹² He identifies military's perception of national interest, its destiny as saviour of the nation in peril, and its interest of self-image as motives favouring its intervention, even as its professionalism, distancing from politics, acceptance of civilian supremacy and other factors discourage intervention.

It should now be reasonably clear that intervention by the military could take milder and more corrective form of clearly conveyed reluctance or thereafter, refusal to act in accordance with the government, keeping the exchanges within the government machinery. It has therefore to have a good and effective mix of conditioned and condign power endowed to it legitimately by the State, with duly recognised sources of power so as to enable the military to effectively use that power for the legitimate purpose of "winning support for its perception of the public good" in national security issues. With such power, sources, and purpose in place Finer's definition of military intervention, even in its wilder form, may not prove to be such a sacrilege in a democracy.

MILITARY MAN'S DILEMMA

In all this churn-up the military man's dilemma revolves round the following :-

- (a) Whom is the military serving the nation and society or the government in power? Is the civilian authority indeed unquestionable in the dangerously deteriorating situation and its orders justified therein? (A potent situation came up before the military in 1975 when emergency was clamped and imposition of martial law was being contemplated by the Indira Gandhi Government. Contrary to what Stephen Cohen says in his book "The Indian Army", a very large section of army officers was unhappy with the political step and disapproved of it in their conversation in the messes and informal gatherings).
- (b) What if the military splits in its opinion on the policies and actions of government, and the need to take a stand?
- (c) Are the military's perception, insight and assessment of govern-

ment's policies and actions correct, objective and truly reflective of national security interests? Are its inputs and their processing adequate, unbiased and reliable, justifying the contemplated stand?

(d) How genuinely and wholesomely democratic are the country's political system and government set-up to qualify for being accepted as unquestionably superior to the military even when the top political leader and head of the government acts more as an autocratic dictatorial boss than as a mature senior among equals in the articulate, upright, responsive, firm-willed cabinet? What is the military to do when the organisation, the system, the institutions and people abrogate their national security responsibility, and mortgage the same to one individual or his select coterie?

(e) Obedience is ingrained in the military mind. It is brought up in an ethos of accepting every task as a challenge and throwing in body-mind-and-soul in completing it, whatever the cost, without questioning. The military man knows that if he says no there will be many more in the hierarchy who will simply step in into his job. Therefore taking "no" for an answer or saying no to the given task is not in his normal equipment of military character. Hence the hesitation to say no.

MILITARY MAN'S RESPONSE

There are a few basic ingredients which need to be built up to evolve a military response in an effective, smooth and legitimate manner, obviating or minimising drastic steps such as are discussed, more in heat than in a bit of light.

First, at the apex is what Samuel Huntington calls "objective" civilian control over the military, where a legitimate civil authority must respect, heed and even encourage the differences cropping up between it and the military professionals, as against "subjective" control where the differences are blurred as civilian and professional values merge, and the latter starts being expected to be "committed" to the former.

Second, legitimate avenues must be provided for the military to articulate its military and professional advice to the highest national institutions -- the Cabinet, the Parliament and, finally, the people, in the context of the ascending degree of differences with the civil authority.

Third, the service Chief's institutional right of access to the ultimate decision-making authorities and his closer integration with the decision-making

processes relating to national security, which were denied to him consequent to the amendment of the Army (Navy and Air Force) Act(s) in 1955, as described by PR Chari¹³ must be restored.

Four, it is vitally necessary to create an effective National Security Council with necessary representation and participation of the military, and provision for articulation of its views. This would also help the government to moderate overplayed or overenthusiastic military view.

With these ingredients in place the need for the heat and hassle of "Standing upto" Putting the foot down", "Putting in papers" (i.e., quitting in protest or helplessness) etc. will be considerably reduced. If all the above mentioned provisions fail then the military chief must quit. In which eventuality the major national policy and decision making institutions, the parliament and the people would have known the military view and professional advice. In the event of such a fair arrangement, the government should have no qualms about relieving the military chief and its causing demoralisation of the soldiery. That is not quite the military chemistry. The military is an hierarchical system, where the loss of one commander is filled by another. The system is "impersonal enough to take individual loss, including the Chief's, in the stride.

The first mismatch in the civil-military understanding occurred in 1948 over the pursuance of operations in Kashmir with the government agreeing for a ceasefire prematurely, even when the Indian military had a clear advantage over Pakistan in bringing about a military situation of far-reaching political decisiveness. Neither was the government well versed in handling military force for long-term objectives, nor was the military mature, persuasive and forceful enough to convince the government of the optimisation of force application in the nation's long term security interests. The next dissonance was in 1960 with the resignation of Gen Thimayya and its immediate retraction on the advice of the political superior. This uneducated civilian predominance in military matters culminated in the thoughtless "Throw out the Chinese" order given by the Prime Minister in 1962. Jawaharlal Nehru's gigantic political stature browbeat and overawed the fledgling military to the detriment of national security.

A political pragmatist, starting as a nonentity, picking up pearls of political-military commonsense and its possibilities in the security affairs of a nation at war, devoid of the burden of aura and larger-than-life foreign policy pre-occupation was astonishingly quick in seeing through the 1965 India-Pak military considerations and agreeing to the military's choice of opening a counter-front in Punjab against Pakistan's pressure in Kashmir.

The political and the military leaders showed how quickly they could, and did, learn the civil-military game of relationship and complementarity. It was bold enough of the Army Chief to suggest the strategy of opening a front across international Indo-Pak border, and bolder on the part of the political chief to agree to it, all within three years of Chinese aggression and one year of Nehru's death.

This civil military understanding at the top reached its high point in the 1971 Indo-Pak War to liberate Bangladesh, where the Army Chief said firmly "No" to the political superior's demand of a quick retaliatory military response in April 1971. Not only was the military's "No" well taken by the political superior, but also the government went the whole hog of preparing a politically, economically, diplomatically and morally conducive and advantageous strategic environment for the military to do its job.

What role the military played in the government's contemplated attempt to impose martial law after emergency in 1975 is not adequately known. But the sands under the high castle of civil-military understanding had started running out by 1979-80 in the Punjab where mindless political skulduggery was fathering violence and terrorism. What advice, caution and warning the military gave to the government on its policies and actions in Punjab are not known, although the Corps and Army commanders then were uneasy and apprehensive, even agitated in private. The military apparently remained a silent spectator, till one fine day in June 1984 it was ordered to storm the Golden Temple at Amritsar - Operation Blue Star. For this tragedy the military must take its share of blame for not warning the government forcefully enough, well enough in advance and for not finding alternatives. So it must for what has happened in Kashmir and Assam. This aloofness, reluctance to tender military advice unless asked for and indifference to government policy-making and executive action are what Stephen Cohen calls "negative" contribution of the Indian military to its nation's development.¹⁵

Operation Pawan was a unique military advice. The military showed itself raring to go at anybody in its enthusiasm of being a major instrument of the government which was wanting to project its power in the region. Whether it was going at the Sri Lankan military or at the LTTE mattered little to it. A military advice which was wrong in its aim, methodology, timing and self-assessment as a major government instrument encouraged a presumptuous government to undertake half-baked ventures in a slipshod manner with precipitate haste. The government accepted the military's advice that suited it, through its wrong understanding of the military, the soldier and of going to war in a foreign country against virtually both its government and people.

CONCLUSION

Civil-military relations are what a polity in its intellectual, moral and organisational spheres evolves to marry political needs with military force in order to obtain delivery of advantageous results in maintaining national security in its external and internal commitments and compulsions. For harmonious and effective relations the civil authority has to be well aware of the military, its nature, character, utility and limitations, and accommodative of its professional advice, while the military must understand politics, social and economic issues, and internal and international considerations, and develop adequate intellectual and moral strength to forthrightly and honestly project its view and professional advice in keeping with the developing security situation or developing situations with security connotation. In the political, organisational and administrative evolution of the government and its institutions there is a need to provide legitimate avenues and endow adequate power to the military to articulate its view, caution, and warn (in that order) the civil authority in its ascending echelon in step with the deteriorating security situation. It should be empowered to approach the Cabinet, the Parliament and, lastly, the People themselves. That will considerably reduce the strains of forcing the military into a confrontationist stand either early in the process or too late, of "taking a stand" or "putting in papers".

Saying "No" to a task is out of the military's character and professional upbringing. In the history of civil-military relations in most democracies instances of the military leader saying no are indeed rare. It may be because of better and effective accommodation of military view, due regard shown and necessary value assigned to it by the civil authority in its government institutions like committees, ministries, parliament and public relations. In our country this kind of institutions, response and value need to be developed in view of the violence we have been having since independence and the security threat it has imposed.

NOTES

1. Indian Express, 25 Nov. 91
2. Indian Express, 15 Dec. 91
3. Indian Express, 6 Jan. 92
4. Tribune, 2 Sep 91
5. "The Soldier and the State". by Samuel Huntington.
6. "The Armed Services and Society". Edited by Wolfe and Erickson.
7. "Military Ethics : Guidelines For Peace and War", by Fotion and Elfstrom.
8. "The Soldier and The State". by Samuel Huntington.

9. "The Man on Horesback", by SE Finer (author's quote of Moris Janowitz).
10. "Anatomy of Power". by J K Galbraith.
11. "The Indian Army : Its Contribution to the Development of A Nation", b Stephen Cohen.
12. "The Man on Horseback". by S E Finer.
13. "Civilian Control Over the Military" by P R Chari, Indian Defence Review Oct. 91.
14. "Anatomy of Power", by J K Galbraith.
15. "Indian Army" by Stephen Cohen.

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Low Intensity Conflict in Indian Context

BRIG SS GREWAL, SM & COL BK KHANNA, SM

"Historians like to give names to various eras, ours can only be called the Age of Low Intensity Conflict."

-- Wall Street Journal

INTRODUCTION

World Wars have dropped out of the market. The price-tag attached to them is far too hefty. Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC) are the runaway best sellers today. They are all the rage. Cheap, accessible even to the poorest and the least powerful segments of the society and yet effective; they have the potential to produce even more dramatic results than a World War, given adequate time. The present times are as surely the age of LIC as they are the age of electronics. Since the end of the Second World War, 192 LICs have broken out all over the World, according to data compiled by the authors. The human community spawns LIC at the astonishing rate of one every two months. One does not have to be much of a crystal-ball gazer to see that as the world whizzes into the 21st century, the frequency of LIC would have increased even further. Newspaper headlines attest to this every day.

In the seventies, LIC represented 80 percent of all wars. In the eighties, this percentage shot up to 90. Given the politico-military realities, this swing from high-middle intensity conflict to LIC, is likely to continue. With the spectres of mutual assured destruction and the nuclear winter haunting the mankind nuclear conflicts or high-medium intensity conflicts which hold out the threat of exacerbating into nuclear conflicts have virtually become non-options. LIC, instead, seems to offer a more sensible and cost-effective solution to many a politico-social, territorial or ideological problems. Improved means of communication (including mass communications), availability of light weight sophisticated weapons; heightened aspiration of people the world over and a compulsive urge experienced by some ethnic and religious groups to aggressively assert their independent identity are the factors that combine to make LIC both desirable and possible; and even inevitable, given the human predilection for combat.

While, for most, the term LIC evokes the pictures of the 'killing fields' variety of swamps, jungles, paddy-fields and a semiclad, foot bare, poorly armed people taking on a mighty, well-organised military force, in reality the

term encompasses a broad spectrum of conflict from terrorist campaigns to limited wars. No country, no political system and no race is immune to this form of conflict and practically every nation in the world has had a taste - or worse - of it.

Strangely, the growth of LIC has outstripped the response of established regimes or socio-political system at whom they are aimed. Most of a modern army's capabilities are tailored and honed to meet the challenge of middle-to-high intensity conflict in which the risk is the highest, should a war start, but the possibility of it occurring is minimal. On the other hand, the possibility of an Army getting involved in a LIC is very high and yet the Army's capabilities to meet this challenge are none too impressive. Paradoxically, despite the general consensus that LIC represents the most persistent threat, there is a general reluctance to evolve appropriate strategy, doctrine and tactics to meet it. This paradox has been experienced by most nations and some have tried to break out of it in their own way. USA have raised a special force called the National Security Guard to combat internal uprisings. Israel has its special units.

In the Indian context, we have a similar problem. Though the Armed Forces are primarily structured, equipped and trained to meet foreign aggression, they have been used with greater - and ever-increasing - frequency to assist civil authorities in restoring the law of the land which is their secondary role and for which they are not adequately geared. Since Independence we have faced many LIC situations, yet policy development, strategic planning, force design, equipment acquisition, doctrine and training in the Army have tended to focus exclusively on major conventional wars. The plethora of para-military forces and the police that we have in this country, too do not have adequate capability to meet the threat posed by insurgents, secessionists and the like. So how should we get over this asymmetry? Should we, like the USA and Israel, raise a separate force to deal with Internal Security threats? Or should our Armed Forces be structured and trained to meet all kinds of threat right across the spectrum from high intensity combat to LIC? These are some of the questions which have been dogging the minds of serious military thinkers in our country for some time now. To find effective answers to them - and quickly - is imperative in the interest of our body politic. How competently we do this may well decide whether this great democracy of ours sinks or swims.

AIM

The aim of this paper is to identify shortcomings in existing set up in India to deal with LIC and suggest organisational changes keeping in mind whole spectrum of national security.

NATURE AND THEORY OF LIC

INTRODUCTION

Largest industry in the world today is arms industry doing business in billions of dollars a year. The economy of some of the developed countries depends upon it. While, a conflict of the magnitude of World War is ruled out due to nuclear deterrent and costs in terms of human lives and economic resources, the developed countries, to keep their arms industry running, create or keep the conflicts going by proxy in various parts of the world. It is said though debatable that interested developed nations spend approximately ten per cent of their earnings a year through clandestine means to sow the seeds of suspicion and mutual distrust within and between Third World countries.

GEO-POLITICAL SCENARIO

A nation can be termed a 'power' (regional or super), provided it has four main ingredients - sound economy, political stability, technical/scientific strength and military power. Due to balkanisation and impaired economy, Soviet Union has given way to its reduced entity, Russia. We have moved from symmetrical bi-polar world to a more polycentric global arrangement. USA has emerged as a military class of its own. Those concerned, that unbalanced military power is inclined by its nature to be unhealthy, will be relieved that fiscal imperatives are already bearing upon US military establishment. Japan is now judged on several criteria to be world's foremost economy. Europe too is making somewhat elephantine progress, not just economically but towards a degree of identity which would become national, subject to evolution of new German dimensions. We see that the new so called world order is fraught with uncertainty and the leit motif is going to be complexity laden with potential for disaster.

The newly independent former Soviet Republics of Central Asia and their riches are new battle grounds for dominance in the Islamic World. At stake is not only influence over 50 - 60 million Muslims, but also Tadjikistan's enriched uranium, Uzbekistan's gold and silk, Turkmenistan's natural gas, Azerbaijan's oil and Kazakhstan's oil and nuclear weapons. Several Arab countries are vying for influence in Central Asia-particularly Saudi Arabia, Syria and Libya. But the real competition is between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. Pakistan turning its back on South Asia for identification with a large vibrant bloc of Islamic countries, rich in resources and endowed with nuclear weapons could well be on the cards.

This is likely to give boost to Pakistan's nuclear programme. Already six tactical nuclear weapons are reported missing from Kazakhstan, India would have to play a far more diplomatic role in Central Asia alongwith readiness on the part of businessmen to take full advantage of markets of the republics. It is in India's interest that Central Asian republics remain active members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and do not break away to form a political or economic block with Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. Recent happenings in Afghanistan assume significance - with pro Pakistan Mujhadeen Groups calling the shots in governance of the country. India would have to do some tight rope balancing in dealing with the new rulers of Afghanistan.

MEANING OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Limited war, insurrection, subversion, terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, intervention and peace keeping operations are names given to LIC. LIC is interpreted differently by developing and developed countries. There is very subtle difference between insurgency and guerrilla warfare or revolutionary warfare on the one hand and the limited war, low cost war or LIC on the other. One merges into another. A terrorist activity in the initial stages may grow into subversion and end up as full fledged insurgency movement with popular support of the people and tacit help of a foreign power. The LIC environment present a dilemma, the threat is neither perceptible nor unambiguous.

LIC AS INTERPRETED BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

LIC is armed conflict for political purposes short of combat between regularly organised forces. LIC is also interpreted as use of force to protect national interests and support allies. They takes shape of intervention like the US involvement in Panama and Granada, and peace keeping which could be under the aegis of UN or when called upon by legitimately constituted Government.

LIC IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

LIC deals with suppressing internal subversion, insurrection, civil disturbance and disobedience, insurgency and guerrilla warfare. These internal uprisings may be with or without the overt or covert support of a foreign country. LIC would also encompass short but intense border conflicts between neighbours.

LIC - DEFINITION

It can be defined as a limited politico - military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, psychological or military objectives. It is often

protracted and fermented by diplomatic, economic and psychological pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Success in LIC depends upon subordinating military operations to political objectives. Gaining and maintaining public support is more important in LIC than tactics and terrain. Conventional military operations seldom succeed in LIC.

TERRORISM

An act or threat of an act aimed to create extreme anxiety and fear in a target group larger than immediate victim with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to political, religious or administrative demands of perpetrators.

SUBVERSION

All measures, short of use of armed forces taken by a section of people to overthrow those governing the country at the time, or to force them to do things which they otherwise would not do. Methods used are political and economic pressures, strikes, protest marches, propaganda with or without small scale violence, for purpose of coercing recalcitrant members of population into giving support.

INSURGENCY AND INTERNAL SECURITY

It is use of armed force by a section of people against the Government for the purpose mentioned above. Subversion and insurgency can take place at the same time and either or both may be supported by a foreign power providing the impetus. This should not be mixed up with Internal Security (IS) operations which are disorders not aimed to overthrow the Government or even at forcing it to do something which it does not want to do. These are activities against a particular act of the Government or non Government body. Insurgency uses force, subversion, and other forms of pressure.

GUERRILLA WARFARE

The guerrilla activity is open yet clandestine. They are for liberation of an area through conflict with the State. The size of force is initially small but develops into large units depending upon success. Their targets are mainly armed security forces. They operate both in rural and urban environment. The guerrilla respects the rules of conflict.

PEACE KEEPING

Peace keeping aims at preventing fight between two groups of people by using non warlike methods. UNO is the main authority for sanctioning peace keeping. However, forces can be sent through bilateral treaties too,

like despatch of IPKF to Sri Lanka and Maldives. UN forces have undertaken numerous peace keeping tasks eg in Congo, Cyprus, Kashmir, Vietnam, Egypt, Israel-Syria border, Namibia, Costa Rica and now in Yugoslavia and Cambodia.

LIMITED WAR

Whereas in past wars, the military commander was given an objective to achieve and told to get on with the task, in the present limited wars, the objective must be carefully evaluated by the head of the Government to prevent escalation into a general war. The political objective has to be kept so clearly in mind, that the military commander is now an executive agent, removed from the real source of decision and power. Postulates of a limited war are:-

- (a) Limited in scope, objectives and force levels. It is confined to a limited geographical area.
- (b) The aim of limited war is never 'total war' or victory'.
- (c) Operations are controlled.
- (d) National survival is not at stake.
- (e) Acceptable price in terms of operations/casualties, political effect and degree of escalation.

LOCAL WARS

Local wars have clear strategic aim. They combine political economic and diplomatic means, in consonance with which they achieve military aims with active operations. The local wars are generally fought in all dimensions eg on land, sea and in air. Local wars must bear relationship with national and military power. Local wars generally aim at delivering quick and decisive blow and then let the diplomatic/political channels handle the situation.

LIC IN INDIAN CONTEXT

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND : PRE INDEPENDENCE

Our history is replete with examples of LICs. To quote an anecdote from epic Mahabharata, King Ashwathama told his Army Chief Duripur Karve, "You can't fight them because they have a huge army - but definitely you can terrorise them by selective killings". The prophecies made by sages are now coming out to be more or less true. Girish Bihari apprises us about

the dialogue between Sukhdev and Parikshit, the son of Abhimanyu in Shrimad Bhagwad Mohapuran as, "Wicked citizens will dominate the earth and people will suffer from hunger and other miseries and worries. The poor will not get justice and rulers will become robbers. Man will live by pointless violence, deceit etc and poverty will be the sole criterion for deciding the guilty. Such social conditions will form ideal ground for guerrilla warfare".

The struggle for independence from the alien rulers - the Mughals or the Britishers - produced in the country a rich harvest of heroes who sacrificed their lives so that the country could be free and independent. Shivaji, who mastered and practised the art of guerrilla warfare is a household name in the country. Rana Pratap, Ranjit Singh and Suraj Mal adopted different techniques to throw the Mughals out of India, Rani Laxmi Bai and Tipu Sultan fought individual battles against the then mighty 'British'.

While fight against foreign rulers was on, the rajas and maharajas fought amongst themselves on various petty personal issues. The British followed policy of 'divide and rule'. The introduction of Zamindari system, issuing honorific ranks and titles like Talukdar, Subedar, Rai Bahadur etc by them created a clan which was hated by the public at large. Large scale conversions by the invading kings created problems of identity within the religion of birth. It is a fact that the converts are more fanatics. The religious fanatics, over the period have resorted to mounting religious fervors and this disease continues to plague our society even today.

POST INDEPENDENCE

With attainment of independence, it was assumed that days of violence and conflicts were over. But it remained an illusion only. Before departing, the English gave princely states option to join Union of India/Pakistan or remain independent. Some ambitious rulers opted for the latter option. It was to the credit of Iron-man Sardar Patel, who united and brought all these states under India, willingly or under coercion/threat. Insurgency started in India in the 1950s but terrorism and misguided sub nationalism has raised its ugly head on a larger scale since early eighties. To contain terrorism and insurgency conditions in certain parts of the country, the Government had to increase strength of Central Police Organisations (CPO) and Para Military Forces (PMF) which resulted in substantial increase in their budget from Rs 429 crores in 1981 to over Rs 2000 crores in 1992/93.

Single most important factor responsible for destabilisation has been the creation of States on linguistic basis for vested interests. This gave rise to regionalism and factionalism rather than nationalism. There is a need to identify the threat, marginalise it and solve it politically before it gets out of hands.

COUNTER MEASURES TO COMBAT LIC

We should see LIC in our country in the context of global phenomenon. Violence is becoming a means of airing regional aspirations. Insurgencies in our country have come to fore in a big way since the Punjab and J&K problems started. The ultras of North Eastern States, Naxalites and Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), had not concerned Delhi as much as the antinational elements (ANEs) of Punjab and the J&K. It is due to latter's geographical and strategic location with a hostile neighbour across the border. Terrorism and insurgencies are cancerous in growth and we must find measures to eradicate them.

COMBATING AT NATIONAL LEVEL

The origin of most of our problems lies at slow pace of economic development thus not being able to fulfil local aspirations of the masses. Further, ever increasing population is causing constant stress on our system which effects quality of day to day life. We need to arrive at a national consensus on how to combat effects of above factors which form root causes of terrorism and insurgency. These issues cannot be resolved by police action alone. The intelligensia should educate masses that fissiparous ideas propagated by some parties would add on to misery of common man, rather than throwing up a positive solution. The need of the hour is to identify forces of secessionism and initiate action to combat it. In a democracy the fight against anti-national activities is an issue above local or party policies. The problems of Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir and Assam are national problems which can be resolved politically, after a favourable congenial atmosphere has been created by security forces. Other peripheral issues of GNLF and Jharkhand are watching from the fence, awaiting a catalyst to develop them into full-fledged LICs.

ROLE OF MEDIA

The media represents a critical factor in LIC environment. The political nature of LIC creates an unforgiving environment. Every move of security forces is observed by a news media served by instant satellite communication. In the past, a commander might violate a law or two with impunity as long as the battle was won. Not so today, a thoughtless violation of law or policy can turn an otherwise successful operation into a disastrous news event. On the other hand, insurgency movements would have little meaning without media coverage. The ultras have a vested interest in publicity since their cause as also their deeds are given quantum jump through publicity. They magnify their exploits through massive media coverage. According to a media

expert "The media is terrorist's best friend. A terrorist act by itself is nothing, publicity is all".

In a democratic society like ours, what should be the role of media in curbing/reducing anti national activities. It is recommended that Government should not impose censorship for that would force the ultras to escalate violence in order to attract more attention. The press should report objectively and accurately. There should be no blowups and exaggerated stories. Media under the patronage of 'Press Council of India' should develop code of conduct and understand their responsibility towards society and nation.

INTELLIGENCE

Another aspect that merits consideration in combating insurgencies is improvement in obtaining intelligence about the insurgents. Sun Tzu, in his 'Art of War' about 200 BC said "know your enemy and you can win a hundred battles." Our intelligence gathering agencies have always been found wanting in their outputs. The first requirement is to centralise all intelligence agencies under one head in the area of counter insurgency and low intensity operations. The second is to equip them with a network of computers and communication. The intelligence agencies should establish a computer surveillance bank, which would enable instant information to be passed to concerned forces. Photos, fingerprints and all other details can be flashed into a local screen within seconds. This will be a little expensive experiment to begin with and may not readily get the approval due to vested interests. But this will ultimately prove to be very effective weapon to combat insurgencies in the country. Similarly, forces fighting insurgencies must be equipped with modern communication equipment to enable them to pass information quickly.

REHABILITATION

Hardcore terrorists are normally composed of unemployed or under-employed persons who build up a feeling of resentment against the system for not having given them what they think is their due. Dismissed or discharged members of armed and PMF who are trained in combat are susceptible to allurements by the anti national elements. It may, therefore, be worthwhile to examine feasibility of some kind of rehabilitation plan even for such members of our forces who are wasted out. The Government should also find measures to provide more job facilities to the youth so that they are not sucked into anti-national movements. One of the options to combat insurgency is to help insurgents opt out of the movement. An ultra may have a genuine change of heart or see the error of his philosophy but there is little

he can do to take a different path. Youthful revolutionary zeal tends to fade with marriage and middle age and evaporate with the futility of always being at odds with authorities and for ever on the run. If he leaves or attempts to leave the group, he is regarded as a traitor and his lot is certain death. The government should exploit this aspect and take appropriate steps to protect, help and rehabilitate such ultras who genuinely wish to opt out of their movements.

SECURITY FORCES (SF)

The executive instrument to fight low intensity operations is country's security and police forces and there is considerable scope for increasing efficiency in most of them. Over a period, a number of Police and PMF have mushroomed with the same or nearly similar tasks. No clear cut division of responsibility exists. The study will try to analyse each police/PMF and find out its present/envisaged role in the whole gambit of security.

Though from strict legal sense, only PMF in the Indian Union are Assam Rifles and Rashtriya Rifles, we have a number of CPOs which are called, PMF, like BSF and CRPF. The police and PMF strength of the Indian Union alongwith their roles as per *MILITARY BALANCE* 1991-92 is as follows:-

- (a) *Police*. Each State has its own police for law and order. Besides, States also have armed/auxiliary police. Home Guards and Village Volunteer Force are maintained by some frontline States. Strength of provincial armed constabulary is approximately 2,50,000.
- (b) *CPO/PMF*.
 - (i) *Special Services Group (SSG)*. It was raised to provide security to VVIPs. Its strength is approximately 800 to 1000.
 - (ii) *National Security Guard (NSG)*. It comprises of some 5,000 personnel. The force was raised in 1984. Its main task is anti terrorism and contingency deployment force. It comprises elements of Army, CRPF and SSG. It also carries out VIP security duties.
 - (iii) *Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP)*. It has a strength of approximately 14,000 personnel. It was raised to man border with Tibet. Its commandos are being employed for VIP security and special missions.
 - (iv) *Border Security Force (BSF)*. This force raised in December 1965 to guard International Border against Pakistan (both West

and East) has some 90,000 personnel in 100 battalions. Additional battalions are likely to be raised. They have small arms, light artillery and their own transport and liaison air support. The force is also being used for internal security.

(v) *Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)*. This force has a strength of 90,000 (reserve 2,50,000) in 100 battalions. Their main task is IS duties and to act as first line reserve to Army during war.

(vi) *Central Industrial Security Force (CISF)*. It is meant for protection of industrial complexes and its strength is approximately 70,000.

(vii) *Assam Rifles (AR)*. It has approximately 32 battalions with a strength of nearly 40,000.

The forces at sub-para (b) above are maintained and controlled by the Union Home Ministry. Whenever CPO/PMF are given to States, the latter bear their expenses for the duration of their stay within the State. Besides the above forces, Railways also maintain Railway Protection Force (RPF) for protection of its property. In addition, we have 2,000 strong Coast Guards. Despite corrective measures, the CPO forces have NOT been able to contain LIC along the border areas. A need was felt to raise a force to primarily look after the rear area security. Rashtriya Rifles came into being with additional tasks of counter insurgency operations, maintenance of law and order and aid to civil authorities. This was at best a half hearted effort. Taking the long term perspective into view, there is a need to amalgamate CPO and PMF and moulding them into cohesive forces.

WHAT AILS CPO

Over a period, Government has been raising/expanding CPO and PMF to meet short term goals. Police forces have been accorded 410 per cent fiscal increase in a decade is a case in point. In fact India may be the only country in the world which is economically so poor and yet is affording the luxury of having a large variety of CPO. The forces have been expanded under successive periodic crises situations, whereas reduced force levels with greater efficiency and better training could have been more cost effective. Even after funding so many forces, the Army has been repeatedly pressed into action for domestic duties that really should be the charter of duties of CPO. It could be that if the States called CPO, they have to pay for their deployment, but in the case of Army, no such payment is envisaged. Reputation of police is bad and even the CPO are being bracketed with local police. The CPO would have given a better account of themselves in case some of the units were only

equipped and trained for countering insurgents and terrorists. In a recent article in 'Hindustan Times' Mr Ved Marwah, a senior police officer admitted it in no uncertain terms. Some of the other major drawbacks in our CPO are:-

(a) *Top Heavy and Duplicate Organisations.* Proliferation of CPO forces does not always achieve the laid down aims. On the other hand, the overheads get increased with little addition in overall working hands to execute the task. Due to parochialism, myopic vision and 'one-upmanship', the equipment procured for the force is 'state of art' but does not match with existing inventory and separate training establishments lead to duplication and are not cost effective to national exchequer.

(b) *Fiscal Mismanagement.* The country is paying almost double the cost of maintaining CPO. Deployment of these forces copywise is faulty. Companies are sucked in piece-meal. Each company, being away from its Headquarters in most cases, its personnel are entitled TA/DA which is more than their basic emoluments. Hence Government is indirectly paying two times for maintaining the same force.

(c) *Training.* Though there has been some improvement, CPO forces are still not armed and trained to fight LIC. They have separate training centres thereby lacking standardisation apart from proliferation of establishments.

(d) *Poor Leadership.* Poor leadership and lack of motivation account for their dismal performance.

(e) *Corruption.* Corruption has eroded credibility of police with the masses. This serves the cause of ANEs.

(f) *Political Interference.* Interference in the functioning of police force by same politicians make the police inefficient and ineffective.

(g) *Media and Public.* The media and public is always against police force due to their tarred reputation. Seldom does media applaud police.

(h) *Local Influence.* Kith and kin of policemen and even some of their deserters are in the ranks of ultras and ANE. The fear of liquidation of their family members or their own self hang heavily on their minds.

The above weaknesses clearly bring out that the police system has loopholes and is not serving its laid down role. On the other hand, the country

is paying through its nose to maintain such a large force. There are variety of forces with the same or similar type of tasks. They can be aptly equated to the famous saying of 'too many cooks spoil the broth'. Seeing the prevailing security environment in the country, a clear cut division of responsibility and employment of all the combat power with the Indian Union is called for. Basically, security forces are required for the following contingencies :-

- (a) *Law and Order*. To solve dacoities, thefts, local law and order problems, combat unrests, local movements and internal security not along border.
- (b) *Security of International Border (IB) and Combating LIC*. Manning of IB, rear area security, internal security and LIC along the border states.
- (c) *Local Wars and External Aggression*. To combat external aggression, the whole nation has to prepare and contribute its mite.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Political nature of LIC has prevented development of an effective capability to combat LIC. However there is a capability to protect national security interests in higher intensity conventional conflicts where military objectives are paramount, but this capability cannot cope with the political warfare of LIC. Having understood the weaknesses of the present system in India as also the force levels available, an endeavour has been made to recommend a viable and clearly demarcated structure which would be able to tackle both external and internal threats.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

Strategy to deal with insurgency/anti-national activity/LIC at national level is recommended as follows :-

- (a) Closed society experiment seems to have met global rejection. People want certain degree of political determination. Any envisaged solution should take into account political aspirations of the people. Decentralisation of power and devolution of authority may be best counter to combat a secessionist movement in a democratic society.
- (b) It is ingrained human aspiration to improve ones lot. All citizens basically want peace as prosperity can come with only congenial atmosphere. Local administration can be toned up to develop economy,

enhance educational opportunities and improve living conditions. It requires honesty, sense of purpose and commitment and above all nationalistic feelings.

(c) Identify the problem in totality and find solution politically even if it requires dialogue with ANE. It is better to have a debate on such issues to take views of national political parties and public at large to win their confidence and support. Emerging problems should be foreseen and nipped in the bud. Fertile areas for insurgency should be kept under surveillance. Local problems can lead to national disaster, if not identified and checked in time.

(d) Anti social elements in the garb of insurgents take advantage of the situation. They alongwith selfish and ambitious insurgents must be eliminated.

(e) The affected population should be weaned away by countering terrorist propaganda and psychological operations. Government should not only be honest in solving the problem but execute its implementation in all seriousness.

(f) Break or reduce the physical nexus between insurgent and foreign support, if any, by intense military and para military activities on the border, ie attempt to seal the border effectively.

(g) International pressure should be brought on the errant neighbour and coercion by all means including exhibition of force or going in 'hot pursuit', or even limited war. 'Quid-pro-quo' in sectors where the errant neighbour is vulnerable to internal dissensions.

(h) Quick disposal of captured terrorists by imposing fear of deterrent punishment.

(i) Human rights have assumed added leverage world over. Economic aid is getting linked up with human rights violations. Government should not become a party to such violations and should investigate all complaints received through International Amnesty dispassinately.

(k) Self control by media by not giving undue publicity to terrorist activities. No blanket censorship should be imposed by the Government.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

National Level. There is a need for a holistic approach in today's environment as geo-strategic environment and the internal situation in a country keep changing. To take an overall view of national security in the light of external, economic, political and military situations and their linkages with the country's domestic concerns and objectives, in an integrated form with long-term perspective, a National Security Council (NSC) is recommended to be constituted. Attempts have been made in the past also to set up such an organisation, but its implementation has not seen the light of the day. As late as on 24 Aug 1990, the then PM, Mr VP Singh announced in the Lok Sabha, formation of NSC when the war clouds with Pakistan were still hovering. Whether NSC did have regular sittings thereafter or not, we are NOT aware of. There has been a prolonged debate on the relevance of NSC. We endorse its creation but would recommend following composition :-

NSC		
Chairman (Prime Minister)		
Members	Advisory Staff	Secretariat
Defence Minister	Chairman - Joint Chiefs of Staff	National Security Advisor - Member Secretary
Home Minister	Chairman - Joint intelligence Committee	
External Affairs Minister	Cabinet Secretary	
Finance Minister	Defence Secretary	
	Home Secretary	
	Foreign Secretary	
	and any other expert like Chiefs of Staff, Chairman Atomic energy Commission, etc	

SUBJECTS

The NSC to consider the following main subjects :-

- Energy. Space and high technology.*
- Counter insurgency, counter terrorism, counter intelligence and combating LIC.
- Neighbouring Countries and Nations of National Interest.* Countries which have social communal or regional dimensions.

- (d) World economy and its impact on Indian Economy.
- (e) Foreign and defence policies.
- (f) Smuggling and trafficking in arms, drugs and narcotics and their security implications.

Secretariat. The NSC should have a secretariat which should be headed by Security Advisor. It would consist of officers on deputation from the three Services, Ministries of External Affairs, Home, Defence and Finance. The National Security Advisor would be an eminent person of national status having adequate security background. All conceptual papers relating to security would be initiated by this Secretariat and considered by the Advisory staff. The secretariat could also give USI, IDSA and Jawahar Lal Nehru University specific assignments for solving various long term national security problems. The secretariat would also service Special Advisory Group relating to management during specific crises like hijacking. Special Advisory Group would be formed out of the NSC for solving particular problems.

Responsibility. The NSC would be answerable to CCPA and to Cabinet and through it to Parliament. NSC would meet every quarter to review security environment within and around the country in particular and World in general. During external and internal emergencies, they could meet everyday. However, they would not involve themselves in day to day conduct of battle or emergencies.

RE-STRUCTURING OF CPO AND PMF

LIC along International Border. It is envisaged that manning of international border, LIC along the border states and responsibility of thwarting external aggression are sensitive issues and must be under one agency for better cohesion, potency, exchange of vital information and using all available combat power for restoring normalcy. With that in view, it is recommended that a border guarding force with responsibility to undertake LIC along border states be constituted by amalgamating BSF, Rashtriya Rifles, ITBP and Assam Rifles. This force could be called Rashtriya Rifles and should be organised on regional basis. One proposed set up is given at Appendix attached. This force is recommended to be under Ministry of Defence. It should have a Rajya Raksha Mantri (B), incharge of international border and LIC along border states during peace. On mobilisation, this force would come under Army for rear area security. It should have a Secretary (LIC) as its bureaucratic head.

In order that Army has a viable second line defence as also to keep the Army young, it is recommended that 60% of the recruitment in suggested

Rashtriya Rifles force be ex Army with 40% direct recruitment. The Rashtriya Rifles battalions should be organised and equipped on the same lines as existing Rashtriya Rifles Battalions.

Law and Order. Local police (including armed police) under respective States to be responsible for law and order as hitherto-fore. For quelling internal security situation other than those in border States, Central Government to have one force, namely Central Police Force (CPF) under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). SSG, NSG, CRPF and CISF should comprise this force. For economy, better command and coordination, the organisation should be divided into force and sub force HQ and located region-wise, depending upon threat perceptions. Minimum force to be moved should be a battalion and not company. On permanent move, battalions should change affiliation to new force/sub force HQ and must not retain permanent attachments. CPF to have following tasks:-

- (a) Internal security.
- (b) Anti-hijacking and anti terrorist.
- (c) Protection of industrial complexes.
- (d) Security of VVIPs.

There should not be separate specialist organisations like SSG and NSG but specialist battalions under the CPF. This would save in monolith HQ of these organisations. Specialist battalions would carry out surgical operations and revert to affiliated force HQ.

Following advantages are likely to accrue if the proposed recommendations are accepted:-

- (a) Saving of a large number of manpower as overheads in various existing CPO and PMF would reduce considerably.
- (b) A long term strategy for combating LIC along the international border and within the country can be made, taking into account overall force level.
- (c) The proposed arrangement would be more cohesive, cogent and capable of overcoming all shades of LIC.
- (d) It would reduce frequent call on Army in aid to civil authorities.
- (e) Nation will have a more potent second line defence as considerable percentage of rank and file would be ex Army.

- (f) Overall there would be considerable savings in revenue as a result of restructuring of CPO and PMF.

ARMY'S CONTRIBUTION TO LIC

Army is likely to get involved in combating LIC sooner or later. It is recommended that rather than diluting the whole Army in fighting terrorism, a few selected divisions (suggested three) should be converted into light divisions, with provision to re-convert them into normal divisions, on mobilisation. The light divisions are recommended to be composed of three to four infantry brigades with each brigade having three battalions of six rifle companies each. The rifle company should have three platoons of four sections with 9 men in each section. Anti tank weapons need NOT be authorised abinitio but issued on conversion only. These divisions, to be converted from infantry/mountain divisions in peace stations, should be located close to/in the area/likely area of LIC. They should be trained in combating LIC operations.


CONCLUSION

Given its vast diversities of culture, language, ethnic variations and economic developments, India ever since it gained independence has been witnessing sorry spectacle of one hill tribe after another from Eastern and NE India take up arms against the democratically elected and legally constituted Governments. These insurgencies constantly sought achievement of independence by stressing the ethnic character of the tribal regions. This was followed by the Naxalite Movement and the Assam agitation. In early 1990 the Indian Union was fighting on one hand the Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents (LTTE) on foreign soil and on the other hand terrorist and secessionists of Punjab and J&K on home ground. The last two are positively aided, abetted and supported by Pakistan, who being the weaker side have chosen easier way of waging war (camouflaged war - to borrow a terminology from Liddell-Hart on India without paying a price for it, in an effort to attain something they cannot otherwise achieve through open conflict. To add to this, LIC operations against ULFA insurgents were conceived and executed. We may have another one on our hands in Tamil Nadu against LTTE and other militant groups operating in Bihar. Even though we have spent millions of rupees in combating LIC operations, we still have not been wholly able to project the image of a great country and great people that we are. Interestingly, the very diversity of the Indian society that stokes the fires of parochialism, regionalism and ethnic chauvinism can act as a serious obstacle to a unified insurgency movement. LIC is a world-wide phenomenon and not restricted to Indian sub continent only, though the concept of LIC in

developed nations vary. We have to evolve a national policy to combat LIC which has come to stay as the warfare of today and tomorrow. The study recommends restructuring of CPO and PMF forces to perform the dual role of combatting LIC in peace time and provide second line of defence during war. It is also suggested that three divisions of the Army be converted into light divisions for LIC operations. And the most important of all, the study recommends the formation of NSC to examine challenges to India's security in internal and external context and to formulate an integrated long term response in military, diplomatic economic and political fields.

Appendix

ORGANISATION OF RASHTRIYA RIFLES



Territorial Army: Time to Consider Citizen Soldier's Relevance

MAJ GEN VK MADHOK (RETD)

India's Citizen Volunteer Force will be 43 years old this year. There is a justifiable impression, that we in India have not only hesitated but have failed to exploit its optimum potential. The cardinal reason for this is lack of information and the prevalent ignorance about TA's usefulness, in political, military and civil circles. It is, therefore, time that we took a critical look at India's 'second line of defence' which was raised with much fanfare by an act of Parliament on 9 October 1949. To consider, as to whether the TA concept retains its validity and is it relevant in the present context or has it diminished or even become obsolete with the availability of a large number of para military forces which have been raised in the last 30 years-after the TA? One aspect which is certain and more than clear is that, with a strength of 16,000 infantry (nearly 25 TA battalions) and approximately 24,000 personnel from departmental units, TA cannot but only be of peripheral assistance to an army of over a million. Such a small number, in any case, can hardly be representative of India's population of over 84 crores?

In its earlier history, besides various capitals, TA Raising days at Delhi were celebrated by its citizens at an at-home at the Red Fort after a parade that day-in the presence of the Prime Minister, his cabinet colleagues, the Chief of Army Staff alongwith his Principal Staff Officers. This enthusiasm to nurture the force acted as a tonic and inspiration to those citizens who wanted to join the TA. However, last year, it is for the third year in succession that the TA did not even have a ceremonial parade at the capital on its Raising Day in the name of economy. Although the amount spent on this parade, which usually comprises of selected contingents from various states and seldom exceeds a strength of six coys and which is so essential for a force of this nature, is peanuts when compared to the amount being spent elsewhere.

Also, one needs to consider as to whether the Army itself has been prejudiced in its approach to the TA? Many drawbacks have been cited now and then such as the inordinately long time taken to mobilise TA units-followed with their move to operational areas; their inadequate functional ability, lack of support weapons and shortages in the TA officer corps. While reflecting on these issues one need not forget that the regular army not only

provides commanding officers to all TA units (except railway and medical departmental units), but also provides a hard corps of nearly 80-100 all ranks who are posted to each TA battalion or a unit for the purposes of training, administration and recruitment. The reigns of the TA are therefore entirely in the hands of the Army which includes the issue of call-up notices, embodiment and operational deployment.

Another aspect worth taking note of is, as to whether, the politicians are sufficiently well informed or have they, as little information as the public? Unless the politician is well advised by the bureaucracy and the professional, the TA will remain where it is and only evoke a mild response from the public. But before that, the TA concept.

THE CONCEPT

TA is basically designed to supplement the regular army in various ways. In our context the limited role which we have prescribed for ourselves for utilising the TA is, to relieve the regular army from static duties like convoy protection, guards, ceremonial functions and escort duties etc. So that the regular units when relieved from these commitments can concentrate on their operational assignments. Further, to make up deficiencies of regular units at the commencement of hostilities, to aid civil authority in times of calamity (floods, train disaster and famine) and for running essential services (railways, oil and gas installations). Note, that an important role, that of assisting civil authorities in maintenance of law and order has been left out for some reason or the other. This is one area, if delegated to the TA, would absolve the army to a large extent, from getting so frequently involved in internal security situations.

Further, TA which consists of non-departmental (infantry) and departmental units is a part-time concept. There are separate training schedules to suit rural and urban areas. The departmental units are entirely funded by the concerned departments, like the railways, ONGC and the Ministry of Forests and Environment for its ecological task forces. The TA regulations provide sufficient protection to the civil volunteers as regards their jobs in the civil, retention of seniority while serving and embodied for the TA, family accommodation and other administrative matters.

Today, a serious debate is going on in the erstwhile USSR by its republics whether to keep a united or a unified armed forces structure. Whichever pattern finally emerges, a federal army at the centre or one with each republic, one thing is certain that each of the republics will have its own TA defence force under the respective Presidents, very much on the lines obtaining in the US for their National Guard.

This speaks much for the concept which originated after the Second World War that is, to have a small, well equipped and highly mobile standing army supported by a large citizen's forces which trains part-time and can be mobilised at short notice. US provides a typical example of the effectiveness of this concept when its National Guard units were mobilised and took part in the Gulf War last year as they had done so successfully earlier on also, when nearly eight divisions of National Guard fought alongwith regular formations. In our case, one or two TA units took part in operations in Sri Lanka as part of the IPKF and are supposed to have done well from available reports.

It is of interest to note that although in the past, countries all over the world were laying a great deal of stress on volunteer militias, this emphasis has considerably increased and would increase further as we move towards the twenty-first century for four good reasons: First, no country can afford to maintain a large standing army, located next to its borders for a 'push button' type deployment, because of the colossal expenditure which a nation will have to incur. And with high technology induction and man-machine mix this expenditure could be exhorbitant. Second, with improved surveillance facilities including satellites, gadgets for electronic interception, aircraft reconnaissance and international pressures, the Second World War type of surprise attacks are over. As sufficient warning and notice -- say, 3-4 days atleast would be available in which the citizen's forces would be able to mobilise. Israel, surrounded with hostile neighbours provides a good example of quick mobilisation wherein its volunteer forces are ready for combat within 48-96 hours.

Third, educated youth is now decidedly reluctant to take up a full time military career. They would, however, not hesitate to take up part-time soldiering so that they can pursue or retain lien on their civil vocations. And last and perhaps the most important reason is, that this concept enables a citizen to participate and share responsibilities not only towards the defence of his country but also to restore law and order in his own district, his state and his country in internal security situations.

All these reasons are equally applicable to India. The last one in particular is of considerable relevance because of the secessionist movements which have raised their ugly head in various parts of the country. The central forces like the CRP, BSF or for that matter the army, when sent to restore law and order are looked upon as supressors. But TA will enable the citizens to put their own home in order-in the first instance.

Unlike the Army and the para military forces, TA does not provide a

full time career. When in uniform TA personnel are entitled to all those facilities which are admissible to the regular army including medals and decorations besides a secure civil job to which to return to. TA rules are most flexible and innovative and somehow ahead of their times. In spite of this, not more than three politicians and not a single bureaucrat are part of the TA. The combat units - as stated, are confined to 25 infantry battalions. It is indeed ironic that in the 1950s when the army strength did not exceed 4-5 lacs, it was contemplated to raise a TA force of approximately 6 lacs. Now when the army strength has gone over a million, the strength of combat elements of TA has gone down to approximately 16,000? Admittedly, a large number of TA units which included armour, artillery, engineers, signal and transport units were converted into regular army units immediately after the 1962 debacle, but what has prevented us from raising replacements?

It is felt that the Ministry of Defence should consider raising TA units for four distinct requirements: First, TA units for front line tasks which should be able to take part in active operations as part of regular brigades and divisions or to relieve the regular army units which are deployed in less sensitive areas. TA units for this purpose should not be confined to the infantry only but should include tank, artillery, signals, engineer and all those units which the army would require in battle. Such units would need to be equipped and organised on the same pattern as the regular army units. During peace time they must participate in routine army manoeuvres. In fact, the army may go a step further and raise TA brigades and even divisions as happens in UK, USA and Germany.

Second, TA units for a variety of tasks which fall in the rear areas and for which they are currently organised but with slight modification to improve their mobility, to include more transport, more automatics and certainly more officers. Third, specialised and dedicated units for the protection of airfields - both civil and military, industrial, nuclear, space establishments; and provision of ceremonial guards at the Rashtrapati Bhawan. Such units would need to be available in the vicinity of their assignment areas and as such, must be recruited from the region concerned. For Example, a TA unit required for the protection of Jaisalmer airfield should be recruited from amongst the locals of Jodhpur and areas around it and should not have to move from Pune or Orissa - the type of situation which is prevailing at present. It is because of this reason that the units take too long to move to their operational areas.

And last, departmental units - entirely financed by the departments or the ministries concerned as is happening now. TA Ecological Task forces have proved to be most successful. The three Task forces, that is one working

on the Indira Gandhi Canal in Rajasthan and the other two in J&K and UP respectively have done commendable job. There is no reason as to why each state should not raise atleast one such task force for environmental purposes. Besides, like the railways and ONGC, other departments like the electric and water supply, important industries, national archives and so on can consider raising such units, which need only be mobilised during strikes and natural calamities so that the citizen is not held to ransom.

The present shortcomings in the TA are of a minor nature and unnecessarily made much of. These can be completely removed by concentrating on regional recruitment and deployment in the first instance. To repeat, the two TA battalions located at Calcutta would be most happy to move to the Farraka Barrage or the Siliguri airfield, but would find it most inconvenient and take a lot of time to move to Ludhiana or Jullundur. This is an issue which the military operations directorate at Army Headquarters should have resolved long ago. Alternately, additional units could have been raised if the existing numbers were insufficient to go around.

The cost of raising a TA unit is 1/4th or even less than that of a regular unit. With no pension liability or a commitment to provide permanent accommodation, education or medical facilities except during the period when a TA unit is mobilised, the expenditure is reduced even further. If we are failing to exploit TA's potential, then we alone are to be blamed. TA concept is very much applicable to India and its relevance would increase in future because of the need for the citizen to participate in the type of situations like internal security as well as those involving external threats. TA is here to stay and it is time that we took positive steps to revive this important instrument of security instead of thinking of new ones.

The Spirit of the Cheshire Movement- "We Care, We Share"*

MAJ GENERAL VIRENDRA SINGH (RETD)

General Malhotra and Gentlemen,

It gives me great pleasure to get this opportunity to speak to you on a subject which though non-military having nothing to do with defence matters, geopolitics or international relations, I believe, should be of relevance and interest to us all, as active or retired members of the profession of Arms. You will agree with me that community/social service must have an important place in everyone's life, if our nation is to develop as a truly welfare state. The responsibility of providing solace to the under privileged in our society cannot be the concern of a single organisation or that of the Government alone. It should be the prime objective of the society as a whole to rehabilitate and to extend security to the down-trodden. The emerging concept should be the collective responsibility to involve all sections and sectors of society in this mission.

The US President, George Bush has very aptly highlighted this dire necessity, even in a country like USA where the awareness of the attention to community service is of a high order comparatively. I quote from one of his speeches :

"It takes courage to go to your organisation and ask that they place community service at the centre of their Agendas: Sometimes it may be difficult to insist the community service has a place in every person's life. And it will take tenacity to make each one believe that, from now on, any definition of successful life must include serving others. But that's exactly what we must do... Put the power of your resources behind the kind of individual who gives 200 per cent to help people in need. Channel your collective energies into community service". Unquote.

In the next 35 minutes or so, I would like to focus your attention in particular on the community concern towards disabled persons in our society. I think it is incumbent upon society to provide meaningful care

* Text of a talk given by the author to the members of the United Service Institution of India on May 28, 1991. He is the Chairman of Cheshire Homes, Eastern Regional Council.

for such groups who are permanently handicapped by illness. Chronically ill patients, whether young or elderly, must find adjustment to their disability rather difficult. Prolonged medical care, extended confinement in hospitals and special institutions, often result in cruel isolation, great loneliness, boredom, apathy, much unhappiness and frustration. Furthermore, in developing countries where broad programmes for social security do not as yet fully exist, many of these persons, because of destitute circumstances, cannot have recourse to the nursing care which they deserve.

In this context I cannot do better than starting with a mention of this great man called Group Captain Lord Cheshire, a pioneer in this field, who is a legend in his life time. He is one of the most highly decorated individuals having earned the Victoria Cross, the Distinguished Service Order with two Bars and the Distinguished Flying Cross during the second World War. But he is better known now, not as much for his heroic exploits in the war but as a man of charity, compassion, and kindness; the lone crusader who ushered in an era of hope, optimism and faith among the multitude of disabled and incurably sick. Truly, what the Cheshire Homes epitomise, is the history of one man's faith in the brotherhood of human race and his conviction that ordinary men and women have a duty to help others less fortunate than themselves. For his outstanding service to humanity, he was awarded the Order of Merit in February 1981. More recently, on 15th June 1991, he has been elevated to the peerage in the Queen's Birthday Honours List.

Lord Cheshire, I am sorry to inform you, is very sick. He was in India on a short visit and left day before yesterday. Even in this hour of great personal crisis brought upon by a sudden attack of motor neurone, he is displaying exemplary courage and deep seated concern for the disabled people. Against all medical advice and at a great risk to his health and painful discomfort, he undertook this visit confined to a wheel-chair, to put it in his words, "as a pilgrimage to beloved India where everything started internationally and to find myself once again with the residents (the disabled inmates) of Homes in Delhi and Dehra Dun" unquote. To give you a deeper insight to this amazing man of courage and compassion, I would like to mention here what he wrote in one of his letters just before reaching India. I quote -

"The fact that I now am a disabled person myself, I hope will not make any one feel a little sad or sorry. In fact it makes me closer to the disabled residents and in all honesty I can say that I feel it is both a blessing and a challenge to put it all to the best possible advantage in the task we are all jointly seeking to *fulfil*". Unquote.

Gentlemen, to my mind, the paramount aspect of the profession of Arms, is the human dimension. Be it the soldier's business of fighting for his country and making sacrifices, or his dealings within the organisation or outside, characterised by the esprit-de-corps and team spirit, he displays a conspicuous inclination towards human regard and consideration. Who could be, therefore, more suited than him as an individual and the services as an organisation, to give a lead in this field? Traditionally, our units and formations have always shown a great deal of interest in social community development programmes of the local population wherever they can in the areas of their deployment.

For decades, problems and prospects of disabled persons have not received adequate attention in the developing countries like India. The reason is not far to seek. The developing countries were the victims of turmoil and catastrophe during foreign subjugation, which resulted in the development of activities towards the welfare of people being reduced to the minimum. When most of the countries emerged politically independent, they had to grapple with many immediate crucial problems - political, defence and economic. Obviously the problems of the disabled had to per force recede into the background inspite of good intentions of people.

However, that is now the past. Although there is presently an increasing awareness of the meaningful contribution that the disabled can make to society and the role the latter should play in helping them, much remains to be done. The physically handicapped, whether disability is caused due to congenital deformity, disease or accidents, suffer and their woes go unnoticed and unattended to even today. *Article 41* of the Constitution of India provides that the State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work, education, public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement and in other cases of want. The above directive principles of State policy are expected to be translated into social action. Yet, regrettably, very little is being done in this *direction*.

Perhaps one of the more devastating effects of disablement is the loss of opportunity to attend school, to work and to be integrated in the community, brought about by the dual interaction of the impairment and/or disability, and the cultural response, which includes environmental barriers confronted by disabled *persons*.

We must, therefore, begin with a review of our attitudes towards the physically handicapped and mentally retarded. Public attitudes are generally the sum total of personal attitudes. Handicapped people perceive and attest that the present attitudes are anything but helpful to promote their

cause. They often point out with agony and anger that public attitudes become a "road block" to their participation in social and working lives - nay invariably they are treated as "human scraps". Those of you who watched the Doordarshan programme on the plight of the disabled and the avenues for their employment just the other day, on 2nd April 1992, in the evening, would bear witness to this heart-rendering drama of human tragedy and callous neglect.

Pain or infirmity cannot be bartered or transferred. Each individual is disabled individually in his own environment and predicament. A tragedy or a crisis can shatter an individual to a state of benign insanity to begin with. If this is allowed to continue, he may succumb to this state. Are we to discard him or are we to rehabilitate him?

It is also true that physically handicapped often remain in isolation, away from the main stream of society, whether they are attached to homes, schools or sheltered workshops or elsewhere, far too many remain segregated from the able majority. Afflicted by the stigma of disability, even their near and dear ones gradually disown them as "outcasts". Ridiculed and humiliated by the physically fit, psychologically too they suffer silently, develop inferiority complex, lose confidence and often fall prey to anti-social elements - (employed as beggars).

It is estimated that at least one person out of ten of the total population in any country is afflicted by some kind of disablement, severe or otherwise, due to physical impairments, chronic disease, mental retardation or sensory disabilities. World wide picture of the principal causes of disability and their numbers is horrific. I mention these to bring home the alarming picture of distress and misfortune that demands our attention :

Home Accidents - Total at least 20 million a year, with one lakh persons being left with permanent disabilities.

Road Accidents - More than 10 million are injured a year, often severely, with consequences that include amputations, brain injuries, paraplegia and quadriplegia.

Crippling diseases - Like leprosy, about twenty million people are affected.

Malnutrition-linked disabilities are extremely common in developing countries. For example, an estimated 2.5 lakhs children a year go blind because of chronic vitamin deficiencies.

Mental illness - According to the WHO, one out of ten persons suffer at some stage during a life time. Mental patients occupy one quarter of all hospital beds.

Blindness - Some 10 to 15 million people exist world-wide.

Hearing - 70 million persons have a significant hearing impairment.

Cerebral palsy - About 15 million.

Epileptics - Around 15 million.

Cardio-vascular diseases - Unestimated - particularly in the rich world.

Disabilities due to hostilities or armed conflicts - The continuing tragic toll arising from 20th century armed conflicts/wars. More about it later when I talk about the Memorial Fund for Disaster Relief.

The need to alleviate such suffering is never satiated. We must face the problem squarely with a sense of genuine concern and urgency. The five principal objectives which must be achieved are :

- (a) Helping disabled persons in their physical and psychological adjustment to society.
- (b) Promoting all national and international efforts to provide disabled persons with proper assistance, training, care and guidance, to make available opportunities for suitable work and to ensure their full integration in society.
- (c) Encouraging study and research projects designed to facilitate the practical participation of disabled persons in daily life, for example - by improving their access to public buildings and transportation systems.
- (d) Educating and informing the public of the rights of disabled persons to participate in and contribute to various aspects of economic, social and political life.
- (e) Promoting effective measures for the prevention of disability and for the rehabilitation of disabled persons.

Properly organised efforts are required to be put in, to give meaning and purpose to the life of the disabled who yearn for an identity of their own and not pity. An exemplary initiative in this direction was taken by Group Captain Lord Cheshire, who 44 years ago realised the privation

and suffering that the disabled men and women had to encounter. Leonard saw these less fortunate people as potential contributors to society and not exiles from it. He saw them as men and women whose physical disability could still render them capable of the highest mental attributes. It was this vision that shaped the Cheshire spirit which in turn crystalised into a movement of remarkable scale and magnitude that has few parallels in our modern times.

The story of Cheshire Homes with which I am personally connected right from the beginning, began with Lord Cheshire arriving in Bombay in 1954 with a Land Rover and less than 100 pounds. But all this was lost in custom duty. The Land Rover and the bus was not released till Air Marshal Mukherjee intervened. The custom officials told Air Marshal that they will let the vehicle out when they get the money. Air Marshal told them "The Air Force will pay". The custom officer asked, "will you give me that in writing", to which Air Marshal retorted "Of course". And that is how the two vehicles were released. The first Cheshire Home started in an asbestos hut constructed on a plot of land in a jungle donated by a contractor where Cheshire began the Cheshire Movement with looking after 4 very feeble old men. From that humble beginning the Cheshire Movement has today come to 270 such Homes sprung up all over the world, out of which 25 are in India.

I met Leonard Cheshire in Bombay and invited him to come to Babina where I was commanding First Armoured Brigade. He addressed all officers in the station leaving an ever lasting impact on their minds and thus started also, the beginning of my association, a life long friendship with this great man and the Cheshire Movement.

I have held the office of the Chairman, Cheshire Homes India Foundation from its inception till 1973, after which I became Chairman, Cheshire Homes Eastern Regional Council, a charge I continue to hold to render service to this noble cause of the rehabilitation and care of the disabled people. I am also a member of the International Council of Cheshire Foundation.

Cheshire Homes is an organisation which provides care and shelter for disabled people whose handicaps are such that they cannot live independent lives in the community. *The official* definition of Cheshire Home describes it as " a place of shelter, physically, and of encouragement spiritually; a place in which the residents can acquire a sense of belonging and of ownership by contributing in any way within their capabilities to its functioning and development; a place to serve with others, and from

which to help others less fortunate; a place in which to gain confidence and develop independence and interest; a place of hopeful endeavour and not of passive *disinterest*".

They are provided facilities to live in an atmosphere as close as possible to that of a family home. The environment ensured is that of a home as it is neither an institution nor a hospital. The first thought is of the handicapped person's residual powers - those faculties he still possesses - and how he can make use of them to the best advantage. Within the limits of his disability he is given the greatest possible measure of freedom to live as normal and productive a life as he can. The disabled want to be regarded as ordinary people with normal needs and normal reactions. Like every one else they yearn for affection and freedom of family life in congenial surroundings. They want neither charity nor pity. Their wish is to be as independent as their disability allows, and to feel that they can still do something with their lives. The Cheshire Homes try to give them this opportunity.

The cardinal principle on which these Homes are run is "We Care, We Share". This permeates through all actions and activities. Our late prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had very well summed up the profile of Cheshire Homes and the singular Service that Leonard Cheshire has and continues to render. He said -

"Cheshire Homes have set an example of unostentatious but affective work for the relief of suffering without much fuss, expense or advertisement. They are a remarkable example of what can be done by earnestness and enthusiasm. Most of us are apt to lose the personal touch. The big schemes may still be necessary for Govt to undertake, but the type of work that Group Captain has been doing with great success seems to be essentially of even greater importance. Of course the two do not conflict but help each other. He has shown how limited resources can be made to go a long way. Even more so, he has given an example of human approach. I would like to express my admiration for the work he is doing and more especially the spirit in which this is undertaken".

Delhi Cheshire Home is the biggest Cheshire Home in the world, having a capacity of 100 beds. The residents are either mentally retarded or physically handicapped. Therefore, in each room of two to four inmates, we have both mentally retarded and physically handicapped living together. They work on buddy system, one physically handicapped teamed with a mentally retarded inmate supporting each other, a method which has proved

very productive. In addition to providing residential care, Delhi Cheshire Home has two other programmes, Day Care and Family Support Service.

Day Care Centre of this Home runs various projects like tailoring, cane chair repairs, manufacture of surgical gauze, paper bags, making of greeting cards and candles. The orders for these are given by reputed firms like Larsen and Tubro and Luxor Pens etc. and many five star hotels. The profits from these projects are shared by the inmates and non-residents who come to work in this centre. The endeavour is to inject a sense of purpose in the life of the disabled residents and non-residents by giving them necessary training so that they can learn and earn in the Day Care Centre.

Family Support Service is provided in selected localities like Janakpuri to look after the disabled population consisting of men, women and children in situ. They are given medical cover including medicines, calipers and other such needs. To generate self employment, they are given training in trade skills and job opportunities in their respective localities. This programme has proved to be very useful, since it is not possible to accommodate so many cases, though very deserving, in the Delhi Cheshire Home due to constraints of accommodation and allied facilities.

PHYSIOTHERAPY-CUM-RECREATION CENTRE

A new project namely Physiotherapy-cum-Recreation Centre has recently been launched to provide the much needed facilities of physiotherapy treatment, gymnasium, library and recreation hall for the residents. This is again in line with the concept that the disabled and mentally retarded must be recognised as human beings with needs like normal people, for exercise, recreation, and relaxation. The building for which the ex-Lt Governor of Delhi, Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh had given Rs 10 lakhs from the Administration is now ready. Necessary equipment is being fitted and the centre should be functional by the end of June 1992.

SERVICES' SUPPORT

20 per cent residential vacancies are reserved for handicapped ex-servicemen and their dependents. Para-military personnel are also admitted on the recommendations of the Director General of CRPF, BSF, ITBP and others in uniform.

MEMORIAL FUND FOR DISASTER RELIEF

A few words now about the Memorial Fund for Disaster Relief, a

global organisation which is the latest initiative taken by Group Captain Lord Cheshire in line with his commitment to alleviating human misery. It was formally inaugurated on 13 October 1989 at Vigyan Bhawan, New Delhi by the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral JG Nadkarni, PVSM, AVSM, NM, VSM, ADC. The other two Service Chiefs were also present. Leonard Cheshire came from UK to grace the occasion. During his visit, he met the then Prime Minister, late Shri Rajiv Gandhi, who had sent a special message to be read out at the inaugural function.

A few words about the main theme of this world-wide fund. More than one hundred million people have lost their lives in wars which has quite understandably affected and saddened the hearts of billions of families and friends throughout the world. Nothing we can say, or do, can bring them back nor ease the pain and anguish that is indelibly marked in their memories. It is the aim, however, of the Memorial Fund for Disaster Relief to establish a permanent living monument, in tangible terms, to those who so bravely sacrificed their lives, soldiers, civilians, men, women and children and in their memory save lives of victims of future disasters, both natural and man-made.

The Memorial Fund will thus fulfill its dual objectives of homage and hope. It will provide a living monument to those who died in war, and a means to ensure that their memory is honoured and given purpose by the gift to future generations. It is the only Memorial Fund, in tangible terms, to honour the supreme sacrifices made. What they did for us is appropriately described in the words “FOR THEIR TOMORROW, WE GAVE OUR TODAY” ascribed at the Kohima War Cemetery. The words have an appeal of their own. Our motto is *For every life lost - a life saved.*

The cardinal objectives of the Fund are :

- (a) to provide relief in distress caused by natural and man-made disasters;
- (b) the rehabilitation of people who have suffered as a result of any such disaster;
- (c) the mitigation and as far as possible prevention of the suffering which would be caused to people by the recurrence of disaster; and
- (d) improvement in and protection of ecological environment.

It is pertinent to mention here that the Memorial Fund is not confined only to fund-raising activity. It provides disaster relief, by executing

appropriate projects, through its own task forces consisting of volunteers. In fact, the Memorial Fund for disaster Relief - India has already launched two projects.

First, 'Operation Seva' was undertaken to come to the rescue of Kashmiri refugees. After a meeting with the ex-Prime Minister, Mr Chandra Shekhar on 24 Jan 91, followed by a detailed discussion with the Lt Governor of Delhi, Shri Markanday Singh, a joint visit with the officials of the Delhi Administration to two selected refugees camps was arranged to examine on the spot their critical problems. The Memorial Fund moved in immediately to provide them winter clothing; fire fighting equipment, medicines and sanitation were attended to. Refugees who are allotted small shops 'Teh Bazar' are given interest free loans by the Memorial Fund to enable them to stand on their own feet. We continue to do our best towards their betterment with very encouraging results.

Second, a major project is presently in hand, to help in the eradication of TB, which has assumed a disastrous proportion in India. The ravages of this deadly disease are no less than those, resulting from any natural or man-made disaster. At any point of time over 13 million Indians suffer from TB of the lungs. Mortality rate is 70-80 per lakh as against less than 10 per lakh in advanced countries.

You will agree that this deserves immediate attention, otherwise the situation will get hopelessly out of control. The Memorial Fund, therefore, plans to fight TB on all fronts, i.e. prevention, eradication and education of people. Most of the TB patients are located in remote areas, villages, jhuggies and resettlement colonies. They are very poor, ignorant about hygiene and sanitation measures and suffer from mal-nutrition.

It is said that the moral test of a nation is its inclination and capability to take care of those who are in the dawn of life, that is the children and those who are in the twilight of life that is the elderly and those in the shadows of life that is the sick, the needy and the handicapped.

Gentlemen, I firmly believe that there is the human the finer side of life in all of us. It is all a question of how much opportunity we have cared to seek and exposed ourselves to situations where we genuinely live for those who need our help. I am also convinced that the maturity, balance and compassion that you develop with such astute experience of life, makes your personality more wholesome.

On a personal note, let me share with you that, after my mother died,

my wife and I had the privilege of looking after my seriously ailing father for a number of years. The devotion and tenderness with which my wife attended to him, brought a lot of cheer to our dear father's last lap of life's journey and to us an eternal satisfaction.

In fact, in all humility I would like to say that what little I have achieved, if at all I have, in the field of consideration for those in need of help and whatever enrichment I have been able to attain in former walks of life, is a direct result of the life time association which God granted me with the Cheshire Movement and the Modern Schools of which I was Managing Trustee for 25 years. The tenderness of the children and poignancy of the disabled taught me a lot. It gave me a deeper peep into life.

If you have the time and inclination, we will be very happy to receive you in the Delhi Cheshire Home to give you a first hand view of this different kind of world, a world where life hinges on the philosophy of "We Care, We Share". Gentlemen, allow me to end with a quote from Swami Vivekanand which summarises so poignantly the philosophy of life -

"This life is short and the vanities of the world are transient, but they alone live who live for others, the rest are more dead than alive."

Thank you.

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Letters to the Editor

Letters are invited on subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the services.

I

Sir,

GULF WAR - LESSONS

Maj Gen VK Madhok in his article "Gulf War and the Indian Armed Forces - Some Immediate Lessons" published in the Jan-Mar, 91 issue of the Journal, has attempted to draw some useful lessons from the Gulf War for our armed forces to ponder upon. All such lessons, however, pertain to realms of high technology, a coherent organisation and superior strategy, as being the main factors for the success achieved in the Gulf War.

It will therefore be interesting to know that, when Gen Norman Schwarzkopf was asked, as to of all the other military reasons, what in his opinion was the one signal battle winning factor that contributed to his victory in Op Desert Storm, his answer was " I would put it to the fact that, having once given me a clear line of objectives, never once, did either President George Bush, or Defence Secretary Dick Cheney, or the Chairman JCS Colin Powell, ever interfered in the way I conducted the operation".

If our politicians and our higher military command at Delhi, had learnt that signal lesson 5 years back, perhaps, Op Blue Star and OP Pawan would have taken a different turn.

Yours Sincerely

8 June, 1991
PUNE

N B Grant
Brigadier

II

Dear Sir,

I read with interest the two successive articles on the Gulf war in your Jan-Mar 92 issue, one each by Lord Bramall and Lt. Gen. Kalkat. The latter's piece was particularly well presented.

I am keen to generate some thought in the alternate vein - what should Iraq have done for ensuring a better performance? Notwithstanding the advantage of the lessons in hindsight after Desert Shield and Desert Storm, could we have a post operation war game on how Saddam Hussein could/should have played his cards both politically as well as militarily so

that he could have remained "one up" from the day he invaded kuwait? Some hypothetical Iraqi opening gambits are offered in this connexion :-

- (1) Mustering enough political support from the Islamic world - with ostensibly justifiable causes - prior to invading Kuwait, possibly using oil and religion as trump cards.
- (2) Deploying forces well inside Saudi Arabia to give adequate depth to Kuwait.
- (3) Causing maximum attrition/physical interference during building up of Desert Shield by employing the air force, the navy (particularly submarines) and long range missiles.
- (4) Once the ground battle was joined, using armour in the classic role especially for encounter battles, since the terrain offered unlimited scope for this.
- (5) Using artillery the Russian way. The Coalition Forces method seems somewhat similar, as brought out by Lord Bramall - see page 21, para 2 of his article.
- (6) Using ECCM effectively to put the Coalition Forces' EW and ECM measures into disarray. (One is reminded of what Warsaw Pact did to NATO in this context during the Czech invasion of 1968.)
- (7) Engineering all possible wiles - a la Shakuni - to draw Israel into the war by launching ground, sea and air attacks on that country and not just a few SCUDs as was done.

I am sure there would be many more. Could we have some discussion on this aprés-combat scenario please?

Yours Sincerely

May 5, 1992
CALCUTTA

Lt Col JK Dutt (Retd)

III

Dear Sir,

Apropos 'Reminiscences of An Ambassador' published in U.S.I Journal (Oct-Dec 91).

What a pity! Had Gen S K Sinha been in the UK, he would have been knighted for his contribution to diplomacy. But in India, Well.....

Yours Sincerely

February 21, 1992
12 SIKH LI
C/o 56 APO

Major Sunil S Parihar

The Falklands War : Naval Perspective*

VICE ADMIRAL MK ROY, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

War at sea leapfrogged into the micro chip league with the induction of electronic warfare, satellite communications, and missile ripostes. The sinking of the Israeli destroyer *Eilat* by a Styx missile launched by Egypt, the missile attack by Indian missile boats off Karachi in 1971, the Falkland conflict of 1982 and the Desert Storm which swept Iraq in 1991 are the steep climbs up the ladder of technological warfare.

Admiral Woodward, the Task Group Commander who recaptured the Falklands brings into realistic focus the naval perspective which together with Lawrence Freedman's 'Signals of War' and General Sir Julian Thompson's coverage of the land campaign comprises an informative triumvirate of the Falklands campaign albeit from the victor's point of view.

Sandy Woodward and Patrick Robinson who have been the author of several best sellers have put together a gripping story of war at sea which will hold the attention of both sailors and non-sailors even a decade after re-hoisting the Union Jack in Port Stanley. The tastefully got up book published by Harper Collins contains no new revelations but nonetheless spells out several pertinent lessons which are of particular interest to navies structured on the Royal Navy pattern and operating in a similar Parliamentary style of government compounded by a free and at times critical press.

To start with, the British Command structure continued to be nebulous and remained in the shadow of the Big Ben. More so with the Royal Navy which was in the throes of severe cuts including the sale of their aircraft carriers which was being pursued by the incumbent Secretary for Defence, John Nott, whom the author describes as one 'who possessed the cold heart of a career banker not offset by the cool brain of a military historian, much less any knowledge of things maritime.' In addition, the War Cabinet and the Prime Minister, with an eye on the elections, were impatient for results which in a way led to the goof ups at Goose Green and Bluff Cove.

Rear Admiral Woodward, the Task Group Commander was himself answerable to the C-in-C Fleet (Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse) and his Flag Officer Submarines (Admiral Sir Peter Herbert) who were headquartered at

* *One Hundred Days: The memoirs of the Falkland Battle Group Commander* by Admiral Sandy Woodward (London, Harper Collins 1992) p. 360, £ 18.00.

Northwood which is just outside London. The First Sea Lord (Admiral Sir Henry Leach) was the cushion between the political bosses in Westminster and the professional gladiators at sea. The Chief of Defence Staff (Admiral of the Fleet Sir Terrence Lewin) was yet another tri-service coordinator who had a pivotal position in the emerging ball game. The British who invariably preferred unwritten laws were comfortable in this amorphous command and control structure with an inbuilt flexibility which was visible since the days of Drake, Frobisher and Nelson. Above all, the entire nation rallied round the Crown and St. George to recapture the Falklands which was 8000 miles from the U.K. and 430 miles from Argentina.

The British line of battle consisted of a forward picket line of 3 guided missile destroyers (Sheffield, Coventry and Glasgow) with Sea Dart and Sea Wolf missiles in view of the absence of early warning aircraft. The next picket line were 5 frigates with Sea Slug and Seacat missiles which were regularly detached to bombard the shore defences every night. And further east were the 2 small aircraft carriers (Hermes and Invincible) with a total of 24 Sea Harriers and 2 Squadrons of Seaking helicopters for anti-submarine and commando operations (Junglies). And on the edge of the self inflicted Exclusion Zones were positioned the 3 nuclear submarines (Conqueror, Splendid and Spartan) but under direct control of the C-in-C Fleet in UK. So much so, that the pernicky journalists on board even accused the Naval Commander of cowardice and nicknamed the battle group as the 'Simonstown patrol' as being closer to South Africa than South America! But Sandy Woodward was determined not to risk his vital floating airfields particularly as he had insufficient aircover and just enough ammunition to complete the amphibious operations before the rapidly approaching wintry fogs and darkness fore closed this option. But in effect, it was Rear Admiral Woodward communicating with his C-in-C via satellite which allowed him to get-on with his job without undue interference - an Anglo Saxon characteristic in spite of Margaret Thatcher's pompous forward which albeit will boost sales.

The Argentine order of battle was more direct with General Galtieri, the head of the military junta planning and controlling operations in concert with his colleague Admiral Anaya. Rear Admiral Gualter Allara, the Fleet Commander was embarked on the aircraft carrier, Vientecincos de Mayo with her complement of Skyhawks and Super Etendards with Exocet missiles. The escorts were coincidentally 3 British built guided missile destroyers (Santisiano, Trinidad and Hercules) which clearly demonstrated the erstwhile close commercial links between Britain and Argentina especially in the defence and transportation fields. In the South West, about 200-miles apart were the light cruiser, Belgrano (former U.S. Phoenix), 2 destroyers and a tanker and 4 submarines of which 2 were deployed at sea. The Navy was strongly supported

by the Argentine Air Force with an inventory of 200 aircraft including Skyhawks, Super Etendards, Mirage, Machhi 339, Canberras, Pucara turbo prop and helicopters operating both from the mainland as also from the airstrips in the Falklands. It was this force which was mainly responsible for the heavy British losses at sea.

The arrival of the British task force in the South Atlantic was heralded by one RAF Vulcan aircraft operating from Ascension and refuelled by 10 mid air tankers bombing the Port Stanley air strip as a curtain riser to a war drama being enacted in the South Atlantic for an island which perhaps had more emotional than economic or demographic rationale. It is to the credit of the quality and maintenance of British warships that there were few major breakdowns at sea which is a constant bane of Third World navies who continue to buy and not build warships. The U.S. assistance was in the form of staging facilities at Ascension Island, supply of Sidewinder air to air missiles and the availability of satellite intelligence.

Another lesson was the quality of British sea captains whose climb up the promotion ladder was through professional strainers in the form of 'perisher' and command exams' which were not obstructed by the seniority syndrome nor by court cases or back door pressures. Further, Commanders whether they be aviators, submariners or surface specialists had equal claim to command at sea based purely on their professional merit. The result was that 11 out of 16 commanding officers who took part in the Falkland conflict were in course of time promoted to Flag Rank. Be it so, it would have been difficult to predict the result had there been sufficient wind for the Argentine carriers to launch aircraft when within striking range of the exposed British forces or if they had acquired more Exocet missiles.

The exchange ratio was indeed heavy with the R.N. losing 4 major warships, 1 large merchant ship, 1 LST and 5 Sea Harriers, 9 Seakings and an assortment of 17 helicopters and another 5 major warships heavily damaged.

The Args lost 1 cruiser, 1 submarine, 1 auxiliary vessel and 70 aircraft before their land forces surrendered. The loss of their cruiser to torpedoes fired by an atomic powered submarine on the orders of the Task Group Commander merits elucidation. Admiral Woodward closely observing the movement of enemy forces on his operational chart, rightly decided that Belgrano 'will have to go' irrespective of her position, course or a speed. Appreciating that it will have to be approved by London which will take some time and may allow the cruiser to sail out of range, he directly ordered Conqueror to sink the cruiser which required a change in the rules of engagement. This swift action tilted the balance at sea and enabled the British Task force to impose sea control around the Falklands.

The author has vividly captured the loneliness of sea command particularly when required to make instant and unpalatable decisions. His remark when his former command Sheffield was sunk by an Exocet missile - 'Do something? No leave it be' - perhaps sums up the dilemma of a sailor shepherding his ships in dangerous waters to achieve success with minimum losses. The book will be a best seller particularly in the U.K. where a sailor hero brings back memories of a Nelson, Fisher, Jellico, Cunningham and now Woodward.

But the memoirs are in a manner a lesson to some of our own historians who have unfortunately a tendency to write for each other or for their sponsors without having the privilege or experience to portray action on the high seas which enabled maritime historians such as Morrison and Roskill or novelists like Conrad and Alistair McLean and our own home grown writers - Admiral Kohli and Commodore Ranjit Rai to bring home to countless readers the trials and tribulations at sea without contravening the archaic Official Secrets Act.

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Soldier and Statesman*

BRIG RD LAW (RETD)

George Catlett Marshall Jr settled on a military career as a young boy. Due to his scholarly limitations he had to take an indirect route to West Point via the Virginia Military Institute which prepared boys for military careers. He was commissioned in the US Army on 4th January 1902 and first came to the notice of the US Army hierarchy in 1912 during the joint Army and National Guard Manoeuvre which he had the task of planning and conducting. His performance showed him up as a competent staff officer, a reputation which was to repeatedly come in the way of his getting command appointments during his service.

When the War broke out in Europe in 1914 Marshall was concerned about the unpreparedness of the US Army as he could see the inevitability of USA getting involved in it. As a junior officer there was little that he could do about it. After USA joined the Western Allies he went to France as operations officer of a division. Of his service in France two events stand out. General Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force exploded at his divisional commander, during a visit, about the state of his Division. When every one remained silent Marshall stepped forward and sought permission to say something which was grudgingly given. Marshall, flashing with anger, spoke rapidly and overwhelmed Pershing with a host of facts such as men having to go about with gunny bags tied to their feet due to non-availability of boots and other administrative problems. Pershing was taken aback, but on future visits invariably asked for the 'sharp tempered major'. Their relationship grew; Pershing had found a capable and outspoken staff officer and Marshall his mentor.

Later when the US First Army had to switch across from one sector to another sixty miles away for Foch's offensive, Marshall, then on Pershing's staff, had to plan and coordinate the operation which involved relief in the line by 200,000 French troops, pull out, move and re-deployment of 400,000 US troops which included marching columns, mechanical and animal transport, horse drawn artillery and the entire logistic train of the Army over a very limited and poor road network against a tight time schedule: a staff officers' nightmare where one error could result in an almighty snafu. The flawless completion of the switch over reconfirmed Marshall's standing as a

* *General of the Army* by Ed Cray, London. WW Norton 1990 pp 847, £ 22.00 \$ 40.00. ISBN 0-393-02775-9.

staff officer of exceptional ability. Marshall's request for assignment with troops and requests from some of the divisional commanders for Marshall's posting to their divisions as a unit commander were turned down on grounds of his indispensability on the staff.

After the war Marshall served in staff, command and instructional appointments and in 1937 was promoted Brigadier General and given command of a brigade. A year later he was in the War Department on the War Plans Staff as the war clouds were beginning to gather over Europe. Marshall believed that USA must start preparations without delay lest it once again became involved in a war unprepared. In 1938 President Roosevelt sought 500 million dollars for defence and wanted the Air Corps, then a part of the Army, to undergo major expansion, calling for production of 15,000 aircraft per year. New ground weapons were also needed and in Marshall's view Roosevelt's emphasis on the Air Corps was disproportionate and the Army needed to be a balanced force. Marshall was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff and made responsible for the Army's Budget. While the professionals were for a balanced force, others led by the Secretary of the Treasury, and including the powerful Harry Hopkins, wanted 'what the President wanted, because the President wanted it'. After Roosevelt had finished talking at a meeting on the subject he asked those present for their views. While some agreed others had little to say, but Marshall when asked if he agreed replied, "Mr President, I am sorry I don't agree with that at all". Taken aback, Roosevelt hurriedly closed the meeting. After discussion with Marshall Hopkins became a convert to the balanced force concept and later became one of Marshall's most important allies in the War Department. Hopkins urged Marshall to take the case for a balanced force directly to the President even though as Deputy Chief he lacked the authority.

For the Chief of Staff's appointment which was falling vacant in August 1939, amongst the senior officers with at least four years to serve before superannuation Brigadier General Marshall stood fifth in the order of seniority. While some of his seniors lobbied extensively, he did nothing except attending to his official duties. Perhaps this was his greatest asset which led Roosevelt to nominate him as the next Chief of Staff. When he assumed the appointment on 31st August 1939 he jumped from one to four stars.

With German forces massed on the Polish frontier and Japan already at war with China, making its expansionist aims very clear, war was indeed near. In this scenario the strength of the US Army, including the Air Corps, stood at 174,000 officers and men with most units under strength, transport short rendering it difficult to concentrate formations for training, its equipment mostly of World War I or earlier vintage and higher headquarters

existing only on paper. New weapons had yet to be produced and the industry was not geared up for defence production. When the War broke out Marshall, as the Chief of Staff, faced immense problems and set about to tackle them immediately. The problem of equipment was partially solved by the revision of the Neutrality Act permitting cash sales of military hardware to the belligerents and later further eased by Lend Lease which gave a further boost to the defence industry. Along with the expansion of the Army, organisation, doctrines and training required revision to bring them in line with new concepts of open mobile warfare. Marshall gave this task to the Command and Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. There was a good deal of dead wood in the officer corps and Marshall appointed a committee of senior retired officer headed by the former Chief of Staff to weed out the older and ineffective officers to make room for promotion of more capable younger ones. Even before the Committee got down to work Marshall offered his own resignation to the President.

The Army started to grow and its rate of expansion picked up and reached 300,000 men per month. New mobile infantry divisions and armoured divisions patterned on the German panzer divisions were formed and logistic services and systems created for the new patterned Army. Equipment started flowing in from the industry and the Army started training on the basis of updated doctrines. This alone was a gigantic task considering that a scratch force that existed in 1939 grew into a modern Army of 3.5 million in 1942 and then to 7.5 million in 1944 and finally stood at 9 million at the end of the War, and this Army never felt the lack of logistic support, which in the eyes of other armies was lavish or even luxurious. The moving force behind it was George Marshall. In addition, as Chief of Staff, he played a key role in the shaping of not only American, but even Allied strategy for the conduct of the War and attended every single Anglo-American and Allied summit conference with Roosevelt who leaned heavily upon him for support. Marshall had the global vision to strike the correct balance between demands of the European and Pacific Theatres and within Europe of clearly seeing the advantages of mounting the invasion on the Western coast as against via the Mediterranean to strike at what Churchill called 'the soft underbelly of Europe'. His military standing and diplomatic skill enabled him to get his way with strong minded Allied leaders like Churchill and Stalin.

When time came for the appointment of the Supreme Commander for the invasion of Europe, Roosevelt changed his earlier decision to appoint Marshall and nominated Eisenhower instead after telling Marshall that he felt he could not sleep at night with him out of the country. Marshall's excellence at his job had again come in the way of his getting command in the field.

When Marshall reached the age of superannuation at the end of 1944 a bill was passed exempting him from the normal retirement age. In the same month he was promoted to the five star rank of General of the Army. Eventually, in November 1945 he was permitted to retire, although as a five star general he would remain a serving officer all his life.

The Marshalls had barely reached their home in Virginia when there was a call from President Truman asking him to go to China as the US Ambassador. He was given the task of bringing about an end to the civil war going on between Mao's Communists and Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang forces. Although he earned the respect of both sides as an impartial mediator he was unable to bring about an understanding between the two. This was one mission in which he had failed.

While he was still in China Truman had decided to appoint Marshall the Secretary of State. When he was sounded for his reaction his reply was that he would take any job to get out of his present one! Being a serving officer he could not accept a political office and for this purpose he had to be placed on the inactive list before being sworn-in in January 1947. Having contributed so much to winning the War Marshall's primary concern now was to win the peace. The economy of Europe lay shattered, its industries destroyed and food production insufficient to feed the people. The worst hit was Germany. Marshall concluded that the solution lay not in keeping European countries on perpetual American aid but in helping them to recover from the ravages of the War. This would not only reduce the burden on the US Exchequer, but also, in the long term, create markets for American goods. He came up with a seventeen billion dollar programme spread over four years to assist European countries and the occupied zones of West Germany to increase production in agriculture, fuel transportation and machine tools, striving at the same time to hold down inflation. Soviet Union along with its satellite countries opted out. Initially named European Recovery Programme, it was re-christened 'Marshall Plan' by Truman to make it more readily acceptable to the American public due to the respect commanded by Marshall. He is better remembered today for the Marshall Plan than for his work as the US Army Chief of Staff during World War II and his contribution to Allied victory. As tensions between the Western Powers and the Soviet Bloc grew Marshall proposed a Western alliance for collective security which came to be known as the NATO. In January 1949 Marshall retired as the Secretary of State looking forward to enjoying his retirement.

Though quite content with his retirement the old soldier had to once again respond to the President's call after the outbreak of the Korean War to become the Secretary of Defence. This appointment did not come about

easily. The Act which created the Department stipulated that the Secretary should not have served in the Armed Forces for the preceding ten years. Marshall, besides having been the Chief of Staff till 1945, as a five star general was a serving officer. It was necessary to amend the Act which did not go through without opposition from the extreme right led by McCarthy and others who attributed the fall of Chiang Kai-shek's regime to Marshall's pro-Communist leanings. Marshall's time as Secretary of Defence was marked by the rebuilding of the US Armed Forces to face the growing Soviet and Chinese threats, reorganisation of the higher defence set up with the Chiefs of Staff Committee headed by the Chief of Defence Staff, the Korean War and the recall of MacArthur who had begun to overstep his charter. In 1951, Marshall then over seventy and very tired asked the President to relieve him and he finally retired after forty nine years and eight months of service to his country.

In 1953 Marshall was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace, a unique distinction for a soldier.

Austere and aloof of manner, Marshall maintained a dignified reserve. He was always correct and courteous and his commanding presence made others treat him in like manner. Even Roosevelt rarely addressed him as anything other than General. He was punctilious about addressing Eisenhower as Mr President after he was sworn in even though in the Army he had been one of Marshall's boys. He rarely erupted before his subordinates, but did not hesitate to stand up to his superiors if he found them to be in the wrong. Even though he had held two political offices he personally remained apolitical to the extent that he never voted. With the esteem which the American public held him in he could have easily obtained a nomination and won a presidential election, but he firmly put down all suggestions to that effect. In his heart he probably never approved of Eisenhower having done so. On his retirement as the Chief of Staff Truman described him as the greatest military man that his country had produced.

Though not the official biography, Ed Cray's General of the Army 'provides a very adequate account of the life of George C Marshall Jr, his days as a young boy, his service in the US Army, his contribution to the consolidation of peace, his work in the rebuilding of the US Armed Forces and his interaction with various people in the course of his official and private dealings. The book, above all, gives a clear understanding of his personality and character. It is easy to read and difficult to put down once started.

Gulf Security - 2000 A.D.*

BRIG SUBHASH KAPILA

The conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, put the Gulf Region - its politics and security issues on the backburner. Little did the world realise that within two years it would be in the forefront again and witness an unprecedented application of military power as witnessed during the Gulf War in 1991.

This book is a perspective study of the Gulf Region issues as reflected in the title and is a collection of papers by eminent Middle East experts presented at a conference jointly arranged by the U.S. Middle East Institute and John Hopkins University School of International Studies in April 1990. These papers cover the perspective 2000 AD and the conference at the time of its inception was intended to warn policy makers of complacency in viewing and dealing with security and energy issues of the Gulf Region. Besides the analysis of the major regional actors in the Gulf, their policies and perspectives, the book also incorporates analysis of the interest of the major external powers in the region.

The major conclusions arrived at in this 2000 AD perspective study before the Gulf War broke out, seem to have withstood the test of time and remain valid even after the war. The conclusions were that despite rivalries and military build-ups no predominant state capable of exerting its will on its neighbours in the Gulf is likely to emerge, domestic political stability of individual governments within the region would be more broadly evident, the US-Soviet global and regional confrontations would have markedly increased and finally that US presence in the Gulf region will continue to count for a good deal more politically, commercially and militarily.

Since this project was intended to focus attention of US policy planners, the policy implications for the United States were also pointed out. These were that the policy of attempting to safeguard US energy interests with an excessive preoccupation about domestic political stability of Gulf problem is not warranted, diplomatic pressures on Palestinian issue would create helpful spillover of US policy in the Gulf; US must augment its naval and air presence in the Gulf and confront regional threats and that the United States should initiate a two-track arms control policy for the region.

* *The Gulf, Energy and Global Security* - by Charles F. Doran and Stephen W. Buck (Eds) Boulder, Colorado : Lynni Rienner Publishers Inc., 1991, p. 234, \$ 35.0.

A review of current events would indicate that the United States is actually implementing what has been recommended above.

The book provides interesting reading, good background knowledge of Gulf problems and issues and a useful perspective analysis for the year 2000 AD of the Gulf. A useful book for all those interested in the study of Middle East and Gulf Region and for policy makers of any country dealing with this region.

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A Socialist in Wartime Russia*

LT GENERAL PE MENON, PVSM (RETD)

The book covers the period of Cripps' ambassadorship to Moscow and encompasses a crucial period in world history, when dramatic war time events took place : the German conquest of Europe, British struggle for survival and Russia's transformation from neutrality to active belligerence. The period also witnessed the emergence of Sir Stafford Cripps from relatively obscure but radical member of parliament to full cabinet rank the War Cabinet of 1942.

Sir Stafford Cripps is well known to us in India because of his famous, but abortive mission to India aimed to win Indian support for the war effort in exchange for an interim agreement for self rule and a promise of independence after the war.

The period 1939-41 witnessed a radical change in the balance of power. Britain had lost all her allies on the continent and had to reckon with the least welcome alternative of forging an alliance with the Soviet Union. Russia saw an erosion of the manoeuvrability gained by the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact; she was forced to contend with continuously changing circumstances such as the Winter War, annexation of the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and frequent reorientation of relations with Britain and Germany.

The British Government's slow adaptation to changing circumstances and the lack of a clear definition of war aims, led to a situation where the diplomatic service had to assume a more than usual role in policy making. After the fall of Europe, the embassies in Washington and Moscow became the most vital legations abroad. It was at this juncture that Cripps was appointed Britain's ambassador to Moscow.

The origins of Cripps' ambassadorship could be traced back to 16 Sep 39, when he had warned of an impending Russo-German understanding if British negotiations with Russia were allowed to lapse. Cripps remained a staunch supporter of Russia through the 1930s. But his socialism was based on concepts of brotherhood, love, freedom, equality and the value of the human individual. His convictions were thus based more on the Bible and

* *Stafford Cripps' Mission to Moscow - 1940-42.* — by Gabriel Gorodetsky, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 361.

assortment of other humanitarian and egalitarian considerations rather than on *Das Kapital*. In fact, his original political thinking cutting across conventional party allegiances, his social origins and standing and eccentricities provoked conflicting and confusing picture by politicians of different convictions.

Cripps held the view that Soviet Foreign policy had turned from the idea of 'International revolution' to one of 'real politic' in which the safety and peace of Russia was the over-riding factor. He even construed Russia's invasion of Finland as a defensive act and the direct result of the 'ignominious neglect and distrust' of Britain and France towards Russia, after Munich. In this, his view was diametrically opposed to those of Churchill.

The period of Cripps' ambassadorship was quite eventful. His tenure was characterised by his endeavours to bridge the gap between Britain and Russia and prevent the latter from going over to the Germans. Although, a known friend of Russia his approach was pragmatic, so much so, that he fell foul with the host country and was not even accorded the normal courtesy of a formal send-off on his recall from the assignment. His performance could be best surmised from the tribute paid by Bagally, who was left in-charge on his departure: ".....to place on record, the regret that I and others who have served under (Cripps) feel the departure of one to whom we are indebted for constant kindness and consideration, as well as the tribute to his qualities which I have received from all quarters of the diplomatic corps.....diplomatic worlds change quickly, but I think Sir Stafford Cripps' appointment will long be remembered at this post".

Cripps rose to a prominent political position after his return from Moscow. His search for a revolutionary post war reconstruction clashed with Churchill's commitment to the war effort and of defending Britain's prewar order. Though a known left winger, Cripps got support from progressive conservatives both inside and outside the Cabinet including Churchill's Cabinet colleagues, notably Eden. He could no longer be excluded from the War Cabinet.

Cripps was a brilliant lawyer. The book highlights his overwhelming confidence in his own mental superiority, his ability to digest vast amounts of material and extract the gist, and his administrative ability.

An interesting and highly readable book which should be an asset to any Library.

Maritime Laws*

REAR ADMIRAL OP SHARMA, AVSM, VSM (RETD)

The twentieth century has seen four major attempts to codify the peacetime rules of International Law of the Sea. The first was prompted by the League of Nations which appointed a Committee of Experts, in 1924 to draw up a list of subjects ripe for codification. Later, a Preparatory Commission was set up to prepare three topics viz. nationality, state responsibility and territorial waters for codification. Unfortunately, the Hague Conference convened in 1930 failed to adopt a Convention on the territorial sea. After the setting up of the United Nations in 1945, in replacement of the League of Nations, efforts at the progressive codification of international law were continued and an International Law Commission was established charged with the responsibility of surveying the whole field of maritime international law with a view to selecting topics for codification. During its early stages, the Commission embarked on preparation of draft articles on the high seas and the territorial waters which formed the basis of the work of the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea convened in 1958. Although UNCLOS I succeeded in adopting 4 Conventions, it could not resolve two of the most crucial questions submitted to it viz the breadth of the territorial sea or the extent of the exclusive fisheries zone. The Second Conference on the Law of the Sea hurriedly convened at Geneva in 1960 again failed to reach an agreement on these two issues. The emergence of newly independent States becoming members of the United Nations, revolution in exploitation technology and Dr Arvid Pardo's exhortation in the UN that oceans needed to be preserved as the common heritage of mankind, culminated first in the convening of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1973.

The period subsequent to the convening of the Third UNCLOS witnessed the production of an enormous amount of literature relating to the Law of the Sea. There was, however, no single book which gave an up-to-date introduction to the subject as a whole. The avowed purpose of this book is to fill this gap by attempting to give an introductory survey not only of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, but also of customary and conventional law which supplements it. The book fulfils this purpose admirably.

* *The Law of the Sea* -- by R R Churchill and A V Lowe, Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1988, p. 370, £ 17.95.

The authors have wisely treated the subject of 'baselines' as a separate topic in view of the increasing importance of these lines which are now used to measure not only the outer limit of the territorial sea but also the outer limits of the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and in some cases, the continental shelf. The chapters on internal waters, territorial waters, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone adequately cover the law on the subject though these are necessarily concise. The chapter on the continental shelf however, does not fully explain the precise definition of the continental shelf and how the revised definition had been arrived at in the Third UNCLOS. Similarly, chapter XVII on the 'Military Uses of the Sea' is too perfunctory to give a clear idea of the importance of this subject. Some of the other chapters are also too concise to give a fuller picture of the developments on those subjects. The authors have, however, clarified in the 'Preface' that "discussion of many topics has had to be more concise than we would ideally have wished."

On the whole the book is a very useful addition to the literature on the Law of the Sea and should be of great help to any one interested in an up-to-date discussion on the Laws of the Sea. The selected list of books and articles at the end of each chapter, to serve as a stimulus to further reading and research, adds to the utility of the book.

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Book Reviews

Space Weapons and International Security By Bhupendra Jassani. Sweden, SIPRI 1987, p. 336, £ 35.00. ISBN 019-8291027.

This is another of SIPRI's valuable contribution to military science and is of great interest to all serious students of Space Weapons, both civil and military. It also provides useful information to scholars researching the subject. The topic is of greater interest after the Gulf War, even though the Book does not deal with weapons or strategies used in that conflict. The esoteric weapon systems considered here may well acquire comparable relevance a decade or so later.

The Book is divided into five parts. Part 1 deals with Space Weapons and International Security, which is written by Bhupendra Jassani. This provides the basic background material and some useful information of space related weapon systems, exposes their infirmities and ineffectiveness and calls for UN action to restrict them.

Part 2 deals with technical aspects of Space Weapons. Papers include, technical issues for defence research, enforcing ballistic missile defence, star wars, counteracting measures and battle management of an anti-missile system. The last three articles bring out clearly why there was such genuine, widespread and comprehensive objection to the Star Wars variety of anti-missile weapons. A 'perfect' anti-ballistic missile would not cater for defence against other means of delivery, insoluble technical difficulties persist in the SDI and the USA would not be able to sustain the programme after the Reagan Administration. The last has already come about with huge cut-backs in US programme on SDI in the last two years.

Part 3 deals with 'Space Weapons and Deterrence'. Changeover from the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) to a concept of assured survival in a strategic concept has innumerable imponderables and uncertainties. Seven papers examine various dimensions of this issue. Their conclusions generally discount the practical feasibility of an assured survival, should a nuclear ballistic missile exchange were to materialise.

Part 4 considers the international dimension of space weapons. Five papers examine the implications for the NATO, major European countries, the third world and for international security. Finally, Part 5 examines the politics of space weapons and analyses the relevance and attitudes of the Soviet Union, Europe and the Third World towards the SDI.

The cataclysmic changes in the Soviet Union and the resultant revolutionary alterations in the strategic environment in the last two years have considerably undermined the basis of this study. Yet, the scholarly treatise and the excellent exposition of various facets of Space Weapons will be of great interest to the serious student of military science.

— Maj Gen D Banerjee, AVSM

Strategic Arms Reduction. By M M May and others. *Washington DC, Brookings Institute, 1988, p. 73. ISBN 0-8157-5525-2.*

The papers on 'Strategic Arms Reduction' have been published by The Brookings Institution USA, an institution for promoting research, education & publication of works in numerous fields.

The Book has been published at a time when the need of the hour desires a sincere effort towards reduction of arms which have been constantly on the increase since the inception of cold war. An attempt in this direction is being made by both the super powers for a long time, pending the assessment of levels to which these need to be reduced.

The authors have analytically examined the possible arms reductions keeping in mind the national perspectives of both the nations based on various discussions held on the subject. The authors have rich background of experience and have incorporated logical conclusions by systematic analysis of strategic weapons, capabilities & usage by both the sides.

The necessity of reduction in Strategic Arms has been well appreciated to match the requirement of minimum deterrence.

— Col A K Sethi

Anti - Submarine Warfare. By Rear Admiral J R Hill. *Maryland, Naval Institute 1989, p. 128, \$ 24.95. ISBN 0-87021-998-7.*

Rear Admiral J.R. Hill needs no introduction. He has to his credit a number of books of naval interest. Anti-submarine Warfare is yet another very educative book by him which provides professional and detailed material on anti-submarine warfare.

The book describes in depth the development of anti-submarine weapons, the means to counter the same, the platforms and weapon systems, an idea how NATO may fight the submarine battles in case of major Soviet attack and lastly what developments have taken place in the submarine warfare. In view of close society, it is very difficult for any writer to give a true account of the Soviet's anti-submarine strategy and the development of submarine arm. But Admiral Hill is to be complimented for giving indepth details of the Soviet submarines and the weapons fitted on them and an analysis of the threat their submarines pose.

This book is of much value as each chapter has been written after thorough research. It should be read by all officers inspiring to command ships. A must for all libraries ashore and afloat.

— Capt. R P Khanna, AVSM, Indian Navy (Retd)

SDI : Technology Survivability and Software, New Jersey, Princeton, Princeton University, 1988, p. 281, \$ 45.00. ISBN 0-691-07747-9.

The publication is an unclassified version of a report by the Director - Office of Technology Assessment for the Congress, on the goals, technical and cost feasibility, and the requisite software back-up for Strategic Defence Initiative - (S D I), commonly known as Star Wars, which so dominated the American mind during the last decade under Reagan's stewardship. It is a follow-up on an earlier Report of 1985 and assesses subsequent developments in technology "to present realistically the available evidence about SDI feasibility and to suggest future thrust in Ballistic Missile Defence "(BMD)", development.

Technological inputs, software and sensor network, their dependability and survivability against possible Russian response and crucial System Integration and Battle Management aspects have been dealt with comprehensively, and, the consequent analysis of the current first phase, and future Second and Third phases of BMD Programme, provide the inquisitive reader a deep insight into the concept of Star Wars. However, the dependability or the infallibility of BMD seems to be uncertain.

In the changing international political scenario, SDI may already have lost its relevance. This book nevertheless, will retain its special reference value for defence planner of the missile and computer battle-fields.

-- Maj Gen S K Talwar

Trappings of Power : Ballistic Missiles in the Third World By Janne E. Nolan, Washington DC. Brookings Institution, 1991 pp. 209 \$ 29.95. ISBN 0-8159-60965.

Ballistic Missiles are no longer the great powers' prerogatives, the so-called not-so-advanced countries too have made their mark in this field. However, the development of ballistic missiles in quite a number of third world nations is by no means a novel feature. The programmes involving acquiring, modifying and developing such missiles in these states, on a limited scale though, have been pursued before. Only now, they attract greater international attention as these missiles are being actually used in military combats and the reports of successful flight-tests of domestically produced ballistic missiles, deemed to have consequences beyond the region and thus a potential threat to world peace, are coming in from the developing countries.

Janne E Nolan, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies programme at Brookings, in her "Trappings of Power", takes up the issue and provides us with a comprehensive survey of the ballistic missiles programmes in the third world nations. In the process, Nolan seeks to assess the role of world technology market and that of technology, diffusion, examines the military significance of ballistic missiles in potential third world military conflicts, analyses the American interests and relevant policies and finally, makes suggestions regarding an effective international technology security regime, calling for institutional reforms, because to her, these missiles symbolise certain kinds of alterations in global security arrangements that the Industrial nations have to confront.

Nolan thinks that it should be given due recognition that the competing regional powers have their own particular ambitions and many of them have the capability to fulfil these ambitions with or without the sanctions of the great powers. Coercion alone is not going to desist then from following the coveted path. Missile Technology Control Regime though somewhat limited, still acts as a check on technology diffusion, but greater coordination of international arms export guidelines is necessary. Moreover, diplomatic efforts and technical controls should go hand in hand if redistribution of world military power is to be restrained.

The reader may or may not agree with all the opinions made but Nolan's book certainly appears to be a well researched one. Nolan has a lucid style of writing and the ability to make her points forcefully. It is thought provoking, informative and given the nature of such a book does a fine job within the limitations it imposes upon itself.

— Sanjay Singh
Jawaharlal Nehru University

The Eagle and the Lion : The Tragedy of American - Iranian Relations By - James A. Bill. *London, Yale University Press, 1988, p. 520, \$ 16.95. ISBN 0-300-04097-0.*

The United States stayed aloof from the Great Power rivalry over strategic Persia till 1940's, while generations of latter's leaders zig-zagged their way for almost 150 years through the political thickets inhabited by predators like Great Britain and Russia. These leaders tried to seek a third force to exercise a neutralizing influence, which role Germany and France fulfilled to some extent, till, for national and personal reasons, the Iranian leaders tried to make use of the US "as a political balance and as an economic Santa Claus". Americans performed this role quite well till the CIA engineered over-throw of Premier Mosaddiq in 1953. After that, it is a strange story of the way in which the US anchored its national interests to this small, non-Western absolute monarchy, on a scale unprecedented in American diplomatic history. The period between 1972 and 1977 saw these two disparate countries increasingly fused together, starting at the top of their power structure.

The book under review traces the history of this symbiotic and complex relationship between America and Iran, from 1940's till the bizarre Iran - Contra affair and the recently concluded Gulf War; it tells the inside story of once close friends, becoming international foes.

Prof James Bills 'opus' is a typical product of modern, high class American scholarship-painstaking, comprehensive, perceptive, impartially analytic and factual, albeit somewhat short on human interest. But then, such works are not meant for bedside reading.

— Maj Gen Rajendra Prakash, VSM (Retd)

The Warriors : United States Marines. By K.C. Lippard, *New Delhi, Lancer International, 1990, p. 239, Rs 200/-, ISBN 81-7062-1003.*

The Book presumably, a maiden venture, is based on the author's experiences in the US Marine Corps; Those span a period of four years from enlistment through the Vietnam war to his release.

The Book comprises a series of episodes concerning the author and his comrades in the Marine Corps - "A volunteer outfit made up of hardcase men who know that when combat comes, they will be the first to draw and spill blood. They will never give ground and can be expected to die with honour if the need be".

The USMC won fifty-six Congressional Medals of Honour in the Vietnam campaign, the highest award for military valour. The comparison to the Spartans and the eulogies appear apt.

— Maj Gen Nirmal Sondhi, AVSM & BAR

American - Russian Economic Relations 1770's - 1990's, A Study of Issues and Literature. By James K. Libbey, *Claremont, Regina Books, 1989, p. 202, \$ 12.95, ISBN 0-941690-35-0.*

This book by James K. Libbey (adjunct Professor at Flagler College, St. Augustine, Florida) gives the reader a chronological survey of Economic relations between America and Russia since the 18th century. In his introduction, the author traces the economic problems and prospects existing between these two countries and amazed to note that these giants trade only on minimal processed materials.

The Cold War barrier to economic relation was however tremendous. The emergence of "Marshall Plan" and the formation of COMECON and US trade controls dominated this period till the detente. The policies and attitudes of American Presidents and change in leadership in the Soviet Union and many more factors dominated the period from 1970 to 1980. However, the Reagan administration policies and the issues of 80s like the grain contradiction, technology transfer and economic diplomacy, are well understood while reading chapter VI. But the author does not give a futuristic attitude as the cold war has winded away.

The credit goes to Libbey's collection of bibliography which is a chapter in itself. This is of immense help to research scholars of various disciplines.

— Ms. G. Satyawati
Jawaharlal Nehru University

Alpha Strike Vietnam : The Navy's Air War 1964 - 1973. By Jeffery Levinson, *Novato, Presido Press, 1989, p. 312, \$ 18.95, ISBN 0-98141-338-3.*

The book is written in an easily readable simple style. Being a personal account, makes it authentic. It is well illustrated with photographs, however, there is

only one general map. Detailed maps of different battle zones would have helped to follow the air battles better.

Alfa Strike Vietnam is not a definitive history of Naval Air War in South East Asia; but it is a segment of American history, which should never be forgotten for fear that the US will make the same mistakes again.

The author gives us a very vivid account of the sub-human treatment meted out to the American POW's chained and paraded through villages, where rocks and other missiles were hurled at them and some were even beheaded. As the war progressed, from a land oriented military, North Vietnam, with the help of China and Russia could boast of having the world's strongest and most sophisticated Air Defence network, with an estimated two hundred missile sites and thirty missile battallions with their own computers and generators. A well narrated personal account and a useful study for all aviators, specially for joint Air Operations by our three services. The book will also be useful for our defence planners, bringing out an important lesson on the negative effect in the conduct and the result of a war directed from a distant command centre.

— Brig Y P Dev (Retd)

Brown Water, Black Berets : Coastal and Riverine Warfare in Vietnam By Thomas J. Culter, *Maryland, Naval Institute Press, p. 426, \$ 21.95. ISBN 0-87021-011-4.*

As General Officer Commanding, 57 Mountain Division, forming part of Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka, I faced similar problems.

Brown water, Black Berets by Thomas J Cutler has unfolded the naval part of Vietnam War in a lucid manner. In this type of war, the situation is always nebulous and intelligence scanty. Scenarios unfold themselves continuously and plans get corrected, forces regrouped, equipment refurbished, organisation redone and strategy and tactics remodelled. State of flux is continuous.

The advisory role became full fledged participation. Series of operations beginning with Operation Market Time followed by Operation Game Warden and then the Mobile Riverine Force followed by Task Force clearwater were all meaningful operations which attributed to the war efforts by the USA.

The new strategy SEALORDS is a switch from "Search and Destroy" to "bait and destroy" paid heavy dividends where the kill ratio became 1 : 60. Finally, they were back to the advisors role again.

Though such a war gives immense freedom of action to individuals but lurking unconventional dangers, cause undue frustrations. We need characters like Dale Meyerkord, Macleod, Dicky Chapelle, Godbehere, Padre Johnson, Chuck Horowitz to keep going. On the whole the exactitude with which this book has been written, it is worth reading.

— Maj General T P Singh

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, V. XXII, Southeast Asia. John P. Glennon (Ed. in Chief) *Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1989, p. 973, ISBN 044-000-02251-6.*

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, V.XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956. John P. Glennon (Ed. in Chief). United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1990. p. 1387 Price : \$51.25.

Both the volumes are parts of a series of publications on the foreign policy of the United States. These are a kind of documentary record of major foreign policy decisions of the United States, facts responsible for formulation of such decisions, the political environment as perceived by the actors involved and diplomatic manoeuvres on a particular geographical area or of a major international issue covering a specific time period. These official accounts are edited and published by the office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State to provide a comprehensive and authoritative record of the United States as an actor in the global arena.

Embassy-telegrams, despatch-messages to the Department of State and reply thereof and instructions sent to respective embassies, letters and memoranda of conversations and conferences, national intelligence estimates, staff study reports, action plans and resolutions constitute the main bulk. Out of these small pieces a complete whole gradually takes shape in reader's mind. Editorial notes fill the gaps, that the documents fail to bridge.

Vol. XXII, on Southeast Asia, concentrates on the political and economic relations of the United States during 1955-1957 with countries situated in this part of the world. Within this period certain issues - for instance, United States interest in the question of Western New Guinea in relations with Indonesia, negotiating a revised military base agreement with the Philippines, or preventing communist subversion in Singapore and Malaya - were pre-eminent among others, and have been highlighted accordingly in the book.

Vol. XVI, on the other hand, deals with a specific issue. It begins with the initial U.S. reaction to Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company and ends with the efforts to deal with the resultant situation of the Suez Crisis by the end of December 1956, and it covers the London Tripartite Conversations, Conferences on Suez, Menzies Mission, Users Association Proposal, Security Council Debate, the invasions and the cease-fire, world reactions to American diplomacy and other relevant records, which include, inter alia, references to the Government of India's views, position and role in regard to the crisis. However, on the whole, the focus is on the U.S. decision-making process in the context of crisis diplomacy supported by intelligence operations.

Both these competently organized, well- documented day-by-day (and in some cases on a minute-by-minute basis) accounts of American foreign relations are immensely helpful to any researcher interested and/or engaged in this field of study. Also, these accounts provide an insight into the decision-style and inter-personal style of the

major political actors involved, who willy-nilly moved history to a particular direction during those years.

— Anindyo J. Majumdar
Jawaharlal Nehru University

The Soviet - Union and Northern Waters. ed by Clive Archer. *London, Routledge, 1988, p. 261, \$ 36.00.*

Northern Waters are defined as the maritime areas within the latitudes of 86°N and 60°N and from longitude 90°W to 40°E. This Sector includes the islands of Arctic Canada, Greenland, Iceland, the Faroes, Shetlands, Jan Nayan and Svalbard and extends to the Kola Peninsula in the northwest of the Soviet Union. These waters, lying in the northernmost band of the Atlantic Ocean, are important because of their natural resources and vital strategic value.

This book analyses the role of the Soviet Union in Northern Waters. The responses of NATO, USA and the Nordic countries to the Soviet military presence are also examined. The book includes eleven chapters by different experts covering the legal aspects, resource questions, the strategic implications of the Soviet presence and the responses of the Western states. Soviet maritime interests in the Northern Waters are exhaustively covered.

— Major P. K. Gupta

'War in Afghanistan' by Mark Urban, *London, Macmillan, 1980, p. 244, Price £8 9.95. ISBN 0-383-43263-0.*

It would be a folly to think that, with the War in Afghanistan reaching its logical conclusion after the prolonged ding-dong battles between the protagonists, the various Mujahideen factions on one side and the Soviet Russian propped Government forces on the other; the rendering of the Former Soviet Union, non-entity even the cartographical landscape, this book has become somewhat of an anachronism. This is far from it. The writer has done so excellent a job, that, despite the vastly changed scenario, soldiers, statesmen and lastly, but not the least, the intrepid scholar will find much in it by way of techniques of conduct of successful attritive and high profile insurgency operations and their counters, so ably excuted by the Soviet forces, and later by the Afghan Government troops, till they, as predicted much earlier in most quarters, buckled under the Mujahideen onslaught leading to establishment of the Masud backed strongmen as legal heirs to the Afghan monarchists.

— Lt Col AK Sharma

Red Banner : The Soviet Military System in Peace and War. By Christopher Donnelly. *Surrey, Jane's Information Group, 1988, p. 288, £ 35.00. ISBN 07106-04882.*

The author with his wide and deep knowledge obtained through an excellently researched material from open sources, has produced an authentic book. It should immensely benefit students of military history; soldiers and civilians alike.

A note-worthy feature of the book is the manner in which Mr Donnelly has squeezed in an easily readable form, almost all the aspects of the Soviet military, which is not only integrated into every facet of the Russian Society but that it occupies a pre-eminent place in it.

The system of officer recruitment which is being increasingly drawn from the "upper layer" of society and which has more or less, become "hereditary" and the gradual but perceptible increase in the percentage of minorities in the armed forces of the Soviet military are some other fascinating features.

— Brig Rai Singh MVC AVSM (Retd)

Politics in China. From MAO to Deng. By Ian Derbyshire. *London, W & R Chambers 1987, p. 134. ISBN 0-550-20743.*

Before pro-democracy movement was crushed on 14 June 89, China has been a closed society since the communist take over in 1949 and the outside world got to know very little of what went on behind the iron curtain. This pithy volume provides a peep across the Great Wall, a ring side view of the politics in China from Mao to Deng.

Brevity is the ballmark of the little book by Ian Derbyshire. He has tried to pack maximum information in as little space as possible without leaving out on any of the essentials. The lay reader may find the text a bit heavy. For though the political drama at the very top has been effectively portrayed, the common man has been completely left out, life of an average family under the communists, their hopes and frustrations, if described, could have made the book infinitely more interesting. Perhaps that was beyond the scope of the subject.

However, the book is an excellent introduction to contemporary China. A glossary at the end explains foreign words and phrases, abbreviations and technical terms. The bibliography guides the readers to further relevant recently published work. It is ideally suited to the needs of students of politics, journalists and political commentators.

— Maj Sulakshan Mohan (Retd)

Asean and China : An Evolving Relationship Edited by Joyce K Kallgren and others. *Berkeley, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1988, p. 368, \$ 20.00. ISBN 1-55729-004-0.*

This book is a collection of eighteen research papers by twenty contributors under the aegis of the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, USA. The scholarly papers deal with China and its relations with the member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in all its connotations. The member states are, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

These dissertations cover a wide spectrum from social, economic, political military

policies, regional peculiar problems, bilateral realtions and status of ethnic Chinese outside China to Security both regional and global concerning China vis-a-vis ASEAN. The research papers carry out a historical analysis upto 1988, and in some cases forecast the likely course of events. The effect of aftermath of happening in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989 could not be included for obvious reasons.

Glasnost and Perestroika in erstwhile USSR effecting communist totalitarian States and breaking them up into a western style of democratic open society and government, could not be visualized in case of China or any other communist state. Therefore to that extent, the value of these papers is reduced only to a historical perspective and how these ASEAN member states would shape their relations with a new China sans communism (if that ever happens) is still a million dollar question. The crystal ball gazing towards this direction was not possible at the time of research of these papers.

The papers are well researched and give an insight into the functioning of socio-economic, political, and military aspects of member states of ASEAN versus China.

-- Maj Gen JN Goel (Retd)

The Japanese offensive. By Col. Prithvi Nath, *New Delhi, Sterling, 1990 p. 92, Rs. 125.00. ISBN 81-207-1234X.*

The trouble with potted military histories - this book is one of them - is that they do not tell us the full story of the military campaigns which they seek to cover. This is particularly so, as in this case, when an attempt is made to encompass the Japanese invasion of Hongkong, Malaya, Burma, Java, Sumatra, Borneo and the Phillipines in 1941-42, in a book of 85 pages. The result is a very sketchy outline of what happened during those fateful days, when British, Australian, Canadian, Dutch and American forces, defending these countries, suffered humiliating defeat at the hands of an Asian power.

The campaigns in Malaya and Burma notably the former, receive maximum coverage, in that the course of events follow a pattern of sequence. The major military actions are described in some detail; there are general comments on command failures, and deficiencies in equipment and training. There is an interesting preliminary chapter on Japanese grand strategy, and an outline of their plans for the conquest of the whole region. There is no doubt of the thoroughness of their preparations; aided, as they were by the preoccupation of the British in the war against Germany, which had first call on naval and air forces troops and equipment. It is a sobering thought that Hong Kong had for its defence from the sea, a total of two destroyers and a few motor torpedo boats, and from the air, three torpedo bombers and three amphibian aircraft. The resistance offered by the land forces, comprising British, Indian and Canadian troops, in such hopeless circumstances, is truly heroic.

For some curious reason, the campaign in the Phillipines is wholly omitted;

likewise, the inclusion of the Arakan Campaign of 1943, even though limited to a single page, appears incongruous.

The sketches used to describe various actions are so small as to require a magnifying glass for study, and the symbols used to distinguished opposing forces, difficult to follow.

The bibliography listed at the end of the book should whet the appetite of the serious student of what was, for the Allies, a campaign of unmitigated disaster.

— Lt Gen ML Thapan PVSM (Retd)

The Foundations of Japanese Power : Continuities, Changes, Challenges : By William R Nester, *London Macmillan, 1990, p. 418, £ 19.99. ISBN 0-333-49377-X.*

The International System is steadily evolving into a postmilitary one in which industrial and financial strengths will be the most crucial determinants of national security. Japan with very strong credentials of being the new technological and economic global gnan is best positioned for the twenty first century. While the recent burgeoning of literature in the US on Japan implicitly acknowledges this new reality, it also seeks to achieve a two fold purpose. Firstly, it attempts to understand the Japanese economic miracle and draw lessons from it. Secondly, it seeks to examine the future of US Japan relations. This is important because of the enormous stakes involved in this bilateral relationship which has been plagued by a series of economic frictions recently. William R. Nester's Book - 'The Foundations of Japanese Power - Continuities, Changes Challenges' reflects these concerns, written as it is with an obvious American perspective.

Nester's look as its title suggests, is a scholarly analysis of the factors responsible for Japan's Power. In an exercise in 'Hermenutics' he adopts a multifaceted approach (whereby the gives due importance to cultural, social, political and economic factors) with a historical perspective. The author very rightly points out that the Japanese economic 'miracle' is not a result of divine intervention, or its capitalist economy an eloquent example of the success of 'the invisible hand' of the market. He shows how postwar reconstruction of Japan is a result of a concerted effort by the Japanese people in various different fields. Of prime importance here is the role of the 'governing triad' of the conservative politicians, bureaucrats and corporate elite. This underlying consensus is chiefly responsible for Japanese policies being a studied response to crises.

No understanding of the Japanese power is complete without a reference to the political economic culture. Nester devotes an entire chapter on how the values of groupism, heirarchy and conformity are internalized by the Japanese people through various institutions. These values create a social ethos in favour of hard work, loyalty to the company and the need to reconcile management worker differences. This reflects a selective insularity of the Japanese culture. It is interesting to note that while Japan adopted Western economic policies and technologies, it retained, in fact,

nourished certain relevant traditional values. This explains the political malleability of the Japanese, as is evident from the enthusiastic support which both democracy and dictatorship have received at different times.

Nester views the future economic internationalization of Japan as just another form of Japanese Nationalism. However, in an attempt to end his book on an optimistic note, Nestor's prescience dwells on a tentative possibility, in which Japan may assume responsibility in tackling issues such as development, environment & aid in an increasingly interdependent world. This comprehensive piece of work is recommended for both the academic and the layman who wishes to build up on his nodding acquaintance with the enigma i.e. Japan.

— Rina Kashyap
Jawaharlal Nehru University

State in Burma. By Robert H. Tarrow, *Hawaii, Univ. Of Hawaii Press, 1987, p. 395, £ 32.00. ISBN 0-8248-1141-0.*

The principle issue of the book centres on the relationship between the State and Society within the country.

In 1948 Burma came under one legal authority except Shan State and others remained outside the Central system until 1962. The Civil war of 1948 - 1952 provided the Army with experience and shed politicized officers. These were the lessons learnt; keep party factionalism out of the Army, and maintain corporate loyalty. The inclusion of Gen Ne Win in April 1949 Cabinet and made Deputy Prime Minister, Home and Defence. As the civil war raged, Prime Minister Nu exercised no influence outside Rangoon. The enterprises run by foreigners were taken over and Defence Forces Institute set up initially to provide consumer goods and later factories were set up and became by 1958 the largest enterprise.

Ne Win's personal power comes from the office he holds and every one realises that route to power is by impressing the superman. Local agents of the party do affect day to day life and State dominates all institutions.

— Maj Gen B D Kale (Retd)

Toward A Glorious Indonesia : Reminiscences and Observations of Dr Soetomo Edited by Paul W. Van der Veur, *Ohio University Center for International Studies Center for southeast Asian Studies, 1987, p 283, \$ 13.50. ISBN 089680-142-X.*

In the history of freedom struggle of colonial countries there are key personalities who enlighten the masses and provide them with direction for achieving independence. They are dedicated intellectuals who influence the public with their thoughts and plan of action towards this end. Some eschew violence and demonstrate non violent methods like Mahatma Gandhi in India while others feel freedom ought to be won by violence since the Colonial powers pay no heed to the non violent methods. Dr Soetomo was one such Indonesian leader who was dedicated to the freedom struggle of his country but favoured proper development, education of the masses,

eradication of poverty and creation of infrastructure to sustain proper development and functioning of the Government after achieving independence.

The Book is a translated account of observations and reminiscences of Dr Soetomo. The Editor gives a detailed biography of Dr Soetomo alongwith his thoughts and ideals as an introduction to the Book. The reading of subsequent parts of the book giving reminiscences of Dr Soetomo in his "Kenang Kenangan" (reminiscences) and 'Poespita Mantja Nagara' (Impressions from Foreign lands) becomes easier to comprehend.

The contemporary freedom struggle of Colonial countries is a valuable study to understand the current postures of these countries in the light of thoughts and ideals of great leaders. The postulates of Dr Soetomo that a country should deserve freedom by proper awakening and education and creating an infrastructure maintaining independence and that colonial powers are not always against the ruled and averse to development can be tested in post independence events of the liberated countries.

— Brig Satjit Singh AVSM, VSM

Strategy and Defence : Australian Essays. Edited by Desmond Ball. *Sydney; Allen & Unwin, 1982, p. 402. ISBN 0-868613169.*

Strategy and Defence is a collection of articles written by eminent Australian writers, who are prominent in the fields of International Relations, Military Strategy and Defence Policy. These essays have been compiled and edited by DESMOND BALL, himself a renowned scholar and writer on these subjects. The book has been compiled for the benefit of Service Officers and Civilians with the subject of National Security in Australia.

The subject of Strategy and Defence is common to nations all over the world. However, the strategy to be adopted for the defence of any country will be governed by the geopolitical environment in which it is located and consequently on its National objectives and interests. Persons dealing with strategic and defence matters need to update their thinking at all times. This book and particularly so its essays on "Introduction to strategic thinking", "War in International Politics today", "Technological changes on Conventional Battlefield-", Trends and Implication", Future Trends in Conventional Warfare", and "Aspects of Revolutionary Warfare with particular reference to South East Asia" are stimulating and thought provoking as these are pertinently applicable to our environment also.

— Maj Gen BK Mehta (Retd)

Between East and West : Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-56. By Uri Bialer. *Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. p. 292, £ 32.50. ISBN 0521-362490.*

Israel has continued to occupy the centre stage in Middle East politics right from the day it was formed in 1948. Its foreign policy particularly in its formative

years along with the position taken by Arab nations as also the reactions of the two super powers constitutes a basis for an interesting study.

Uri Bialer has researched deep into the subject and has quoted extensively from Israel archives and other papers made available to him, but his conclusions can at best be termed "Plausible", as he deliberately ignores the stand taken by the Palestinians and neighbouring Arab nations. No story of Middle East can be complete without taking into cognizance, the rights and aspirations of Palestinians. After all, before 1948, they shared this land with the Jews.

Bialer seems to suggest that Israel for the first 2 to 3 years of its existence deliberately followed a policy of "Non-Alignment" or more appropriately "Non-identification" based on ideological considerations like friendship with all freedom loving states, opposition to fascism and support for all who cherish the values of freedom and liberty and it is only when its security was threatened by the pro Arab stand adopted by USSR and the Gzech-Egyptian arms transaction of 1955, that made it lean towards USA and western countries. The smoke screen of ideological considerations stands lifted by the very facts unearthed by Bialer. Israel acted as it did in pure self interest, ideology had no part to play in this. It could not have displeased USSR and East from where "Aliyah" (immigration of Jews to Israel) needed desperately for its defence, was being covertly and overtly organised. On the other hand, the Aliyah, the resettlement of Jews, the clandestine acquisition of arms, in fact the very sustenance of Israel was being financed by American Jewry and through aid by US Govt. You cannot bite the hand that feeds you. The open pro west alignment was revealed, no sooner than USSR halted Aliyah as it feared that 2.5 million Russian and Eastern bloc Jews might develop extra territorial loyalty. Besides, despite the planting of many left leaning Jews in the Aliyah the communists had failed to gain any worthwhile support in Israel.

The myth of allegiance to values of freedom and liberty stands exploded. The denial of basic human rights to Israeli Arabs is not far from a benign version of fascism.

Notwithstanding, the one sided treatment of the subject, the book has useful information.

— Air Marshal HK Oberai PVSM, AVSM, VM, (Retd)

Creating Facts : Israel, Palestinians and the West Bank. By Geoffrey Aronson. *Washington, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987, p. 334, \$ 24.95. ISBN 0-88728-160-5.*

Following her spectacular victory in 1967, Israel occupied the areas of the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the West Bank of the Jordan River. She had now to contend with the twin problems of a million Palestinians in the occupied areas and international pressure to vacate the newly acquired territory. These decades of experience had taught her that the key to national survival was the 'facts on the ground'. Diplomacy and international treaties were both a function of this paramount truth.

She, therefore, lost no time in estending her juristiction and administration into the occupied areas which, she claimed, were 'parts of the liberated land of Israel' freed from the 'foreign yoke'. Adopting Golda Meir's blunt claim that 'the frontier of Israel is where the Jews live no efforts were spared in establishing civilian and military centres in the occupied areas to form a 'Greater Israel'. The resolution of the Palestinian problem calls for some form of compromise between the Israeli stand of 'no withdrawal' and the Arab demand for the vacation of Israeli occupation and restoration of the pre 1948 borders. Sadat's 1977 initiative and the Camp David parleys of the following year had raised hopes of an amicable accord. Israel had accepted a change in the Sinai Sector and some form of 'autonomy' for the Palestinians. But these efforts failed; Jordan and the PLO refused to participate. The Palestinians viewed the Camp David accord and the offer of 'self rule' agreed upon by Carter, Sadat and Begin as nothing more than a scheme for continued occupation under a more permanent guise. The Palestinians were now ranged against three stronger powers and were consequently more exposed and vulnerable. In the meanwhile Israel continued to employ the full resources of a sovereign state to 'create facts on the ground'. The process would consolidate her new frontiers while narrowing the options available for the resolution of competing claims to occupied territory.

Aronson's *Creating facts* is a lucid exposition of the complex exchanges of claims, accusations and justifications that have characterised this conflict. It shows in perspective a century old struggle for Palestine, the Israeli occupation being but its latest chapter. The book is the result of scholarly research, marshals considerable data and presents them in a highly comprchensible and logical form. A very readable book, it is recommended for study by researchers and anlysts of international relations.

— Lt. Gen PE Menon PVSM

The Economics of Apartheid. By Stephen R Lewis Jr. *New York, Council of Foreign Relations, 1990, p. 195, \$ 17.95. ISBN 0-87609-056-0*

There are hardly any major works done on South African economy and Mr. Lewis has done a great job which has dealt with all aspects of Apartheid economy.

One wonders if the Blacks in South Africa are denied basic rights including the economic one, how is it that the South African economy is in a reatively prosperous state? One could draw comparisons with colonial India where cheap labour and plenty of raw material supplies helped the British economy.

Economic sanctions deserve a closer look, for the sanction will not be effective if the export of the South African goods cover a small percentage of total export, the bulk of that constitutes gold and diamonds. On the supply side, the economic relations with the Frontline states and setting up bogus companies in third countries has offset the sanctions. The only real harm was through the oil sanctions which prompted them to look for other renewable sources of energy.

The only chance for change therefore is through political accomodation that

should run its own course. The Western nations have too much at stake and no one should really hope for a change on their behalf.

— Shahram Sepahi
Jawaharlal Nehru University

The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring : With a New Introduction. By Kenneth Macksey. *New Delhi, Lancer, 1988, p. 319, Rs. 250.00. ISBN 81-7062-038-4.*

Field Marshal Kesselring was a remarkably versatile hero and commander thrown up by Germany in the Second World War. He was respected and feared by friend and foe alike. A soldier turned an airman who commanded airfleets and army groups with equal ease and competence.

Hitler attacked Russia in spite of their treaty of friendship because the Fuehrer thought that it was unlikely that a friendship between Russia and Germany could be lasting. On June 22, 1941 Operation Barbarossa was launched by three army groups in three directions. All the three thrusts were halted before Moscow.

Kesselring makes repeated references to the fact that the Italians from top to bottom had no heart in the war. In fact they were already holding secret parleys with the Allies to defect. The treachery of the Italians contributed to the throwing out of the Germans from North Africa.

The Italian, French and other Allied partisans caused heavy casualties to the German troops. For example, in June-August 1944, 5,000 German soldiers were killed and 25,000-30,000 wounded by the partisans.

Kesselring's conviction and death sentence for war crimes raised a serious controversy. However, his death sentence was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment. He was released in 1952 and died in 1960. In between, he wrote his Memoirs.

The poor quality of maps detracts from the value of these classic and excellent memoirs. The maps are simply unreadable.

— Brigadier Rai Singh, MVC, VSM

The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War : An Alliance Study. By Jeffrey Grey. *Manchester, Manchester University, 1988, p. 244, £12.95. ISBN 0-7190-2611-3.*

The Korean War marked an important development in Commonwealth defence cooperation. The immediate post-World War II period had accelerated the loosening of such ties, but, militarily, as this book meticulously encapsulates, the Commonwealth retained some capacity to interact effectively on the battlefield, even when the political inclination was receding. Despite common organisational principles, there were considerable problems to be overcome at all levels to ensure the smooth functioning of integrated formations, and the Commonwealth organisation in Korea and Japan was as prone to friction as the United Nations Command, of which it was a part.

India's contribution, 60th (Parachute) Field Ambulance, commanded by Lt Col AG Rangaraj AMC, is objectively covered. As the author validly records, "The Indian Field Ambulance was one of the outstanding success of the Commonwealth involvement, earning an extraordinarily high reputation among all the other Commonwealth forces. Initially, however, their arrival was viewed as something of a mixed blessing. One needs to read this insightful book to see how the mixed blessing "was easily and successfully integrated". The reasons for the fruitful appointment of Lt Col (later Maj Gen) P. CHOUDHRY, 5 GR, as Liaison officer at the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth Forces, Korea (BCFK) are in addition mentioned.

To conclude, this book is not only a masterly study of alliance relations, both between the Commonwealth forces involved, and between the Commonwealth forces and the American, but also sheds much light upon the earlier Commonwealth involvement in the occupation of Japan, which preceded the Korean War and of which BRIN DIV (12,000 troops) had been part.

— Lt Gen SL Menezes PVSM (Retd)

Silk Roads : The Asian Adventures of Clara and Andre Malraux By Axel Madsen. London, I.B. Tauris. 1990, p. 299. ISBN 1-85043-2090. ISBN 1-85043-209-0.

This story 'narrates the adventures of Andre and Clara Maulraux in Indo-China in the reckless twenties'. Andre and Clara, an extraordinary couple by any standards had strong sympathy with the people of Indo-China against colonial rulers and they were fortunate enough to have the satisfaction to see Cambodia and Vietnam defeat the will of the Western powers.

Mr Axel's narration of the events is powerful, picturesque and it creates the right atmosphere of a past, exotic era. To his credit Mr Axel Madsen not only fully projects the problems and travails of Andre and Clara but also portrays successfully the struggle of the people of Indo-China through personal lives and experience of Andre and Clara. The book does not over-emphasise French or American political or military failures but focuses on their failure to capture the hearts and minds of the people.

An extremely interesting and touching story, lucid and well written. Recommend reading as its lessons are in many way relevant to us today. A quote from the book will be of interest as it sums up the central theme. "When Charles de Gaulle and Andre sat watching the snow fall outside the former President's House at the end of their lives, De Gaulle said politicians put together territories they dont know how to hang on to; defend interest they later on betray, and that fate works in unsuspecting way".

— Maj Gen Afsir Karim AVSM (Retd)

Napolean and Hitler : A Comparative Biography. By Desmond Seward, *New York, Viking Penguin, 1988, p. 319 Price \$ 19.95. ISBN 0-670-81480-6.*

This book is a study in megalomania - of two great historical characters Napolean and Hitler. Although there is an over-a-century gap between the two, yet they have many points in common. They both had origins different from their countries they ruled. Napolean was a Corsican, but ruled France; Hitler was an Austrian, but led Germany. Both were great conquerors. Napolean humbled nearly whole of Europe; so did Hitler. By 1797, Napolean had won 18 battles including Montenotte, Dego, Millesimo, Mondovi, Lodi, Milan, Mantua. His great triumph was at Austerlitz (1805) where he with a force of 60,000, and after a march of 1500 miles, defeated an Austrian-Russian Force of 1,00,000 and killed 15,000 troops, captured 10,000 POWs, 180 guns and 40 colours. Hitler, not a field commander, subdued Poland, Belgium, Holland and France in a swift offensive. Both thus adopted the Blitz technique. Both realised that without mastery of sea, Britain could not be invaded. So they both chose Egypt to bring Britain on her knees. But British Naval might played a major role in defeating the designs of both. Hopes of French invasion of Britain vanished at Trafalgar where Nelson crippled the French Fleet.

For both, Russia provided the fatal attraction. Surprisingly both wanted to use Russia as a stepping stone for the invasion of India. Napolean discovered Rosetta Stone in Egypt to decipher the hieroglyphs and military strategists consider Napolean as Rosetta Stone of Military art of warfare.

This book provides clues to persons rising from obscurity to conquer vast areas and tyrannise humanity. To demolish such tyrants, world has to wage major wars. Napolean, Hitler era is not an end of megalomania; Saddam Hussain of Iraq brought history to full circle. Their common flaw was that they all underestimated their adversaries. Without such paranoid psychopaths, art of war may go in hybernation.

— Lt Col Daljit Singh MSc, PSc (Retd)

Victory in Bangladesh By Maj Gen Lachhman Singh Lehl, PVSM, VrC, *Dehra Dun, Natraj Publishers, 1991. pp 310 Rs. 195/- (Revised ed.)*

In the 1971 Indo-Pak War India achieved a momentous decisive victory in Bangladesh that had far reaching consequences in South Asia: In spite of this spectacular achievement, so far very few books have appeared chronicling this unique performance of the Indian Armed Forces. Apart from the initial instant quickies brought out by Gen DK Palit and DR Mankekar in 1972, Gen Lehl's book, which was first published in 1981, was amongst the first few books to cover in adequate detail the whole campaign in Bangladesh and the operations of our Forces in the different Sectors.

When we compare this work with the tome produced by Sir Winston Churchill telling 'The Story of the Malakand Field Force', which after all chronicled a colonial campaign of an infinitely smaller force operating against primitive tribesmen on our North-West Frontier, that we begin to realise how inadequate is even this coverage.

Though Gen Lehl has, in a concise and lucid form, produced an excellent account of the operations in Bangladesh, it eventually helps to highlight and emphasise the crying need for a much more detailed and a more definitive history of this brilliant campaign in order to do real justice to the important victory achieved by the Indian Armed Forces in 1971.

The present book, which is a revised edition of his earlier book, now includes a new chapter on the Pakistan Army and its ethics. This helps to give the reader a better appreciation of the Pakistani motives, actions and reactions. The author has also included much information that has since been made available to him not only by those who led our own forces but also from the "other side of the hill" from various Pakistani sources. Though Gen Lehl, as GOC 20 Infantry Division played an important part in these operations, it must be said to his credit, that his work does not suffer the weakness of any subjective assessment of the events and their results. He has throughout been objective in his narration of events and in his conclusions.

In his reflections at the end of his book, Gen Lehl makes some very pertinent points. He poses the question that having been given the tremendously weighted advantage of a decisive victory on the battlefield, did our politicians and diplomats make the best use of this advantage in their peace negotiations with Pakistan. Unfortunately for India all the gains of the battlefield appear to have been squandered away at the negotiation table, without achieving any worthwhile political aim. Mrs Gandhi's decision to detain 93,000 prisoners of War for over two years proved to be as expensive as it was counter-productive.

Another point raised by Gen Lehl questions the validity of the Army's present selection system for promotion to higher ranks. It does seem very strange that majority of those senior officers, who had proved themselves as successful commanders in war, should have been left out for further advancement. Gen Depinder Singh makes the same point in his recent book on the operations in Sri Lanka. The Army certainly does need to reconcile this odd situation.

— Maj Gen SC Sinha PVSM (Retd)

Genesis of Terrorism : An Analytical Study of Punjab Terrorism. By Satyapal Dang. *New Delhi, Patriot Publishers, 1989, p. 155 Rs. 20. ISBN 81-7050-0877.*

For some years now terrorism in Punjab has been the most burning national problem, and every morning all newspaper carry news of terrorist killings on their first page. But interestingly, there is hardly any analytical study on this vital subject. Shri Satyapal Dang, a veteran leftist leader and old freedom fighter, has done yeoman's service by publishing this book, based on his earlier press articles and newspaper reports, already published.

A study of the background of some 50 Punjab terrorists, picked at random, has revealed that the majority of them is drawn from the rich peasant or landlords and urban middle classes, and nearly one-third of them are highly educated; about 65% of them fall in the 20-30 age group; and most of them do not have any political

background. "This means that a political youth coming from the upper strata of the society provides leadership to the terrorists in Punjab." The study also suggests that while agricultural workers, by and large, are not emotionally sympathetic to the secessionist ideology, the terrorists have links with smugglers and drug-peddlers. About 72% of the terrorists have Akali background, and 25% have extremist inclination.

This analytical and interesting book should be welcomed by all who are interested to know more about the Punjab crisis.

— Dr. B.C. Chakravorty

Lawrence of Lucknow : A Story of love. By John Lawrence. Edited by Audrey Woodiwiss, Kent, Hodder & Stroughton, 1990, p. 275, £20.00. ISBN 0-340-23918-2.

Lawrence of Lucknow is a fine biography, that tells of Henry Lawrence and his remarkable Irish family and also of India, in the crucial years leading to the Mutiny of 1857.

The author is the great grandson of Henry Lawrence and is eminently suited to write the biography. He has a number of books to his credit. His primary sources are the letters and documents left behind, (India Office Library) by Henry Lawrence and his spirited wife.

The biography covers his childhood, the beginning of his army service, as a Gunner at Dum Dum in 1823, his participation in First Burmese and First Afghan Wars and his important appointments as Resident of Nepal, Punjab, Rajputana and Oudh, where he was finally killed during the Mutiny at Lucknow. The biography contains amusing anecdotes. The acquisition of KOHINOOR by Queen Victoria (pages 201-202) or the peculiar methodology adopted by Napier, while siting the cantonment at Lahore (pages 204-5), are two such examples. Henry Lawrence's great work was in Punjab. He was sympathetic to Indian customs and had enlightened views on government and justice. He was also responsible for founding excellent schools, such as Lawrence School at Sanawar and Ooty.

The Biography is well researched, written in lucid and easy style. The printing is good and there are interesting photographs. The book is immensely readable.

— Maj Gen Ram Nath, SM

Kashmir : Behind the Vale. By M.J. Akber. New Delhi, Penguin Books India, 1991, p. 232, Rs. 250.

Of the several books that have flooded the market recently on Kashmir Mr Akbar's book is altruistic with a deeper analysis. It was expected to be so.

The crux of the Kashmir problem are basically two: the plebiscite issue; and the personalities of Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah. From the word go on 25 October 1947 when Kashmir was offered to be acceded to India, Nehru harped on the PLEBIS-

CETE issue. So did Lord Mountbatten. We are now told that Sardar Patel too connived. The issue was further confounded by Indira Gandhi accepting Kashmir a so called disputed territory in 1972 when Pakistan was a dimembered nation. Kashmir is a living example of a bungled issue-par excellence!

One point that Mr Akbar forgets is necessary to be mentioned here. Our leadership in 1947 and till almost early 1949 was virtually in the British hands. Mountbatten left only in mid 1948; and the armed forces in Delhi and Karachi were under the British officers. They did what they felt was right from their points of view!

-- Brig Chandra B. Khanduri

Pilots and Rebels : The Use of Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare 1918 - 1988 by Philip Anthony Towle, *London Brassey's, 1989. ISBN 0-08-036712-7 p. 253, £ 33.00.*

Air power became a dominant force in international politics after its achievements during World War II. The Battle of Britain, the Bomber Offensive against Germany and Japan, and the Battle of Atlantic will remain prominent landmarks in the evolution and growth of air power. The recent Persian Gulf conflict totally justified the expectations of air power theorists like Douhet, Mitchell and Trenchard.

However, a role of air power, not so well-known because of its low profile, is the use of aircraft in counter-insurgency guerrilla type Operations. Philip Towle, who is a Fellow of Queens' College, Cambridge, where he teaches Modern History and International Relations, has described the employment of air power in low intensity conflicts from 'Air Control' by the Royal Air Force in the period 1918-1939, and support for liberation and resistance movements during 1945-1954, to the more recent wars in Algeria, Vietnam and Afghanistan. The author covers the subject in depth with useful details about the operations supported by maps and photographs, references and a bibliography. He feels that the use of helicopters for reconnaissance and transport has become ever more important, even in urban guerrilla wars such as Northern Ireland.

-- N B S

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

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